Differences among bidder type-specific outcomes of asset sales are theoretically related to differences in bidders’ valuations and participation. The lead application to quantify these relations is takeover auctions: bidders are classified into strategic and financial, and bids are available. I structurally estimate valuations from all bids. The positive difference in premiums between strategic and financial acquirers is driven by the difference in dispersions of valuations (e.g., strategic bidders’ synergies are more dispersed) and the set of auction participants. The difference in average valuations is relatively unimportant. My approach can help explain outcomes of asset sales, even in settings with limited bidder data.

We define quality as characteristics that investors should be willing to pay a higher price for. Theoretically, we provide a tractable valuation model that shows how stock prices should increase in their quality characteristics: profitability, growth, and safety. Empirically, we find that high-quality stocks do have higher prices on average but not by a large margin. Perhaps because of this puzzlingly modest impact of quality on price, high-quality stocks have high risk-adjusted returns. Indeed, a quality-minus-junk (QMJ) factor that goes long high-quality stocks and shorts low-quality stocks earns significant risk-adjusted returns in the United States and across 24 countries. The price of quality varies over time, reaching a low during the internet bubble, and a low price of quality predicts a high future return of QMJ. Analysts’ price targets and earnings forecasts imply systematic quality-related errors in return and earnings expectations.

ABSTRACT We commemorate the 50th anniversary of Ball and Brown [1968] by chronicling its impact on capital market research in accounting. We trace the evolution of various research paths that post–Ball and Brown [1968] researchers took as they sought to build on the foundation laid by Ball and Brown [1968] to create a body of research on the usefulness, timeliness, and other properties of accounting numbers. We discuss how those paths often link back to the groundwork laid and questions originally posed in Ball and Brown [1968].

We find that forecast revisions by analysts with more favorable surnames elicit stronger market reactions. The effect is stronger among firms with lower institutional ownership and for analysts with non-American first names. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and France and Germany's opposition to the Iraq War, revisions by analysts with Middle Eastern and French or German surnames, respectively, generated weaker market reaction. Surname favorability is not associated with forecast quality, but it has complementary effects with forecast performance on analysts’ career outcomes. Surname favorability mitigates under-reaction to forecast revisions. These findings are distinct from the effects of ethnic, cultural proximity, or in-group bias.

ABSTRACT This paper explores whether affine models with volatility jumps estimated on intradaily S&P 500 futures data over 1983 to 2008 can capture major daily outliers such as the 1987 stock market crash. Intradaily jumps in futures prices are typically small; self‐exciting but short‐lived volatility spikes capture intradaily and daily returns better. Multifactor models of the evolution of diffusive variance and jump intensities improve fits substantially, including out‐of‐sample over 2009 to 2016. The models capture reasonably well the conditional distributions of daily returns and realized variance outliers, but underpredict realized variance inliers. I also examine option pricing implications.

We explore the impact of strategic behaviour of equity holders, debt holders and an opportunistic supplier of a critical input on the firm's capital structure, organisational design, and its outsourcing decision. We show that the supplier can trigger strategic bankruptcy even when the firm is solvent. Equity holders respond to this either by eliminating the supplier and producing the input in-house or by reducing their exposure to debt by using equity-financing. Both responses introduce inefficiency since input costs are higher with in-house production, and debt is cheaper than equity. We show that the equilibrium debt-equity ratio varies positively with cash-flow profitability and the marginal cost of the supplier's input, but negatively with the riskiness of the cash flow and the equity holders' in-house input production costs.

Using a novel source of quasi-experimental variation in interest rates, we develop a new approach to estimating the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS). In the U.K., the mortgage interest rate features discrete jumps—notches—at thresholds for the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. These notches generate large bunching below the critical LTV thresholds and missing mass above them. We develop a dynamic model that links these empirical moments to the underlying structural EIS. The average EIS is small, around 0.1, and quite homogeneous in the population. This finding is robust to structural assumptions and can allow for uncertainty, a wide range of risk preferences, portfolio reallocation, liquidity constraints, present bias, and optimization frictions. Our findings have implications for the numerous calibration studies that rely on larger values of the EIS.

Abstract Stock return volatility during the Great Depression has been labeled a “volatility puzzle” because the standard deviation of stock returns was 2 to 3 times higher than any other period in American history. We investigate this puzzle using a new series of building permits and leverage. Our results suggest that volatility in building permit growth and financial leverage largely explain the high level of stock volatility during the Great Depression. Markets factored in the possibility of a forthcoming economic disaster. Received September 30, 2017; editorial decision August 27, 2018 by Editor Philip E. Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online

We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which the government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions. These frictions motivate the government to manage social risk and fiscal risk. Social risk management favors programs that ameliorate market failures in bad times. Fiscal risk management makes unattractive programs involving large government outlays when other government programs also require large outlays. These two risk management motives often conflict. Using the model, we explore how the attractiveness of different financial stability programs varies with the government’s fiscal burden and characteristics of the economy. Received December 19, 2016; editorial decision June 28, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We develop an intertemporal asset pricing model where cash-flow news, discount-rate news, and their second moments are priced by the market. This model generalizes the market-return decomposition framework, showing that intertemporal considerations imply a decomposition of squared market returns (coskewness risk). Our model accounts for 68% of the return variation across portfolios sorted by size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, investment, and profitability for a modern U.S. sample period. Further, our findings highlight the importance of covariation risk, that is, the risk of simultaneous unfavorable shocks to cash flows and discount rates, in understanding equity risk premia.