We develop a theory of endogenous uncertainty in which the ability of investors to learn about firm-level fundamentals is impaired during financial crises. At the same time, higher uncertainty reinforces financial distress. Through this two-way feedback loop, a temporary financial shock can cause a persistent reduction in risky lending, output, and employment that coincides with increased uncertainty, default rates, credit spreads, and disagreement among forecasters. We embed our mechanism into standard real business cycle and New-Keynesian models and show how it generates endogenous and internally persistent processes for the efficiency and labour wedges.

According to the Chamley-Judd result, capital should not be taxed in the long run. In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not follow from the very models used to derive it. For the main model in Judd (1985), we prove that the long-run tax on capital is positive and significant, whenever the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one. For higher elasticities, the tax converges to zero but may do so at a slow rate, after centuries of high tax rates. The main model in Chamley (1986) imposes an upper bound on capital taxes. We provide conditions under which these constraints bind forever, implying positive long-run taxes. When this is not the case, the long-run tax may be zero. However, if preferences are recursive and discounting is locally nonconstant (e.g., not additively separable over time), a zero long-run capital tax limit must be accompanied by zero private wealth (zero tax base) or by zero labor taxes (first-best). Finally, we explain why the equivalence of a positive capital tax with ever-increasing consumption taxes does not provide a firm rationale against capital taxation.

We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.

We develop a system of disaggregated economic accounts. The system breaks down national accounting positions into bilateral flows between consistently defined groups of consumers (consumer cells), groups of producers (producer cells), the government, and the rest of the world. We disaggregate the full circular flow of money, including consumer spending, labor compensation, firm profits, intermediates trade, foreign trade, and government transactions, while satisfying all national accounting identities. We implement the disaggregated system for small region-by-industry cells in Denmark and present stylized facts, such as variation in domestic spending, local and urban bias in consumer spending, and a pattern of triangular flows across regions. Cell-level measures of spending intensity capture how much spending by a cell contributes to the income of cells experiencing unemployment after a shock. Using a general equilibrium model, we show that fiscal transfers raise aggregate GDP by more when they target cells with high spending intensity on unemployed cells. The disaggregated economic accounts help governments select more effective policies.