ABSTRACT Poor financial health of intermediaries coincides with low asset prices and high risk premiums. Is this because intermediaries matter for asset prices, or because their health correlates with economy‐wide risk aversion? In the first case, return predictability should be more pronounced for asset classes in which households are less active. We provide evidence supporting this prediction, suggesting that a quantitatively sizable fraction of risk premium variation in several large asset classes such as credit or mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) is due to intermediaries. Movements in economy‐wide risk aversion create the opposite pattern, and we find this channel also matters.

ABSTRACT Managed portfolios that take less risk when volatility is high produce large alphas, increase Sharpe ratios, and produce large utility gains for mean‐variance investors. We document this for the market, value, momentum, profitability, return on equity, investment, and betting‐against‐beta factors, as well as the currency carry trade. Volatility timing increases Sharpe ratios because changes in volatility are not offset by proportional changes in expected returns. Our strategy is contrary to conventional wisdom because it takes relatively less risk in recessions. This rules out typical risk‐based explanations and is a challenge to structural models of time‐varying expected returns.

Abstract We document extreme disruption in debt markets during the COVID-19 crisis: a severe price crash accompanied by significant dislocations at the safer end of the credit spectrum. Investment-grade corporate bonds traded at a discount to credit default swaps; exchange-traded funds traded at a discount to net asset value, more so for safer bonds. The Federal Reserve’s announcement of corporate bond purchases caused these dislocations to disappear and prices to recover. These facts inform potential theories of the disruption. The best explanation is an acute liquidity need for specific bond investors, such as mutual funds, leading them to liquidate large positions.

ABSTRACT We analyze the behavior of credit and output in financial crises using data on credit spreads and credit growth. Crises are marked by a sharp rise in credit spreads, signaling sudden shifts in expectations. The severity of a crisis can be predicted by the extent of credit losses (spread increases) and financial sector fragility (precrisis credit growth). This interaction is a key feature of crises. Postcrisis recessions are typically severe and prolonged. Notably, precrisis spreads tend to drop to low levels while credit growth accelerates, indicating that credit supply expansions often precede crises. The 2008 crisis aligns with these patterns.