The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. This paper explores that assumption by analyzing three game-theoretic models of debt renegotiations. In two of the models, both of which are built on the traditional one-sector growth model, all the subgame-perfect equilibria have an extreme form in which the game's surplus is captured by the creditor. The third game has many subgame-perfect equilibria that do not have this feature, however. The roles of various assumptions in all three games are examined.

Using data from the 1976 and 1978 National Longitudinal. Surveys of young men and young women, this study examines racial differences in the magnitude and composition of wealth and the reasons for them. On average, young black families hold 18 percent of the wealth of young white families, and hold their wealth in proportionately different forms. Even after controlling for racial differences in income and other demographic factors, as much as three-quarters of the wealth gap remains unexplained. We speculate on the causes for this, concluding that racial differences in intergenerational transfers most likely play an important role.

This paper documents for a sample of 327 US acquisitions between 1975 and 1987 three forces that systematically reduce the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a rapidly growing target , and when the performance of its managers has been poor before the acquisition. These results are consistent with the proposition that managerial rather than shareholders' objectives drive bad acquisitions.