How do bankers treat green firms? Using unique loan application and banker preference data from a mid-sized bank, we find that customer managers, serving as front-line bankers, give more favorable recommendations to green firms, especially when they hold green values themselves. However, a minority of environmentally skeptical loan officers, aware through internal training that customer managers generally have greener preferences, counter this by downgrading positive evaluations of green firms. Despite not knowing the customer manager’s identity, these officers use their discretion to mitigate what they perceive as green biases, demonstrating the significant moderating role of superiors within the bank’s hierarchy.

Financial services misconduct is a concern for many stakeholders and deferred variable remuneration has been proposed as an antidote. The implications for attracting/retaining productive individuals are unknown. This study investigates deferred payment mechanisms through experiments in student and professional samples, taking account of self-selection effects. We confirm that the introduction of deferrals would reduce misconduct through better monitoring. While some individuals eschew deferred payment, even in the presence of a deferral premium, productive individuals are under-represented in this group. Productive individuals are more likely to select deferred variable remuneration, so productivity outcomes are equal to or superior to alternative treatments.

We study how political corruption affects stock market participation among households in China. Our identification strategy exploits recent anticorruption campaigns that reduce households’ exposure to political corruption and within-province variation in lifetime exposure to local corruption. We find that households with higher corruption exposure participate less in the stock market at both the extensive and intensive margins. Removals of top provincial officials during the anticorruption campaign increase the probability of stock market participation by 3 percentage points and households’ net equity purchases and equity share percentage by 13.2 and 0.2 percentage points, respectively. The effect is predominantly driven by the nonpecuniary effect of corruption on households’ trust and perceptions of institutional quality rather than on households’ accumulation of wealth. Our work highlights the negative externalities of political corruption on financial markets.