This paper proposes a new test for simultaneous intraday jumps (cojumps) in a panel of high frequency financial data. We utilize intraday first-high-low-last values of asset prices to construct estimates for the cross-variation of returns in a large panel of high frequency financial data, which we then use to form a test statistic that can detect cojumps. Simulations show that a bias corrected version of the test performs well when microstructure noise is present. Applied to a panel of high frequency Chinese equity data, our test identifies cojumps that coincide with announcements relating to monetary policy and stock market regulations.

This study investigates how the political connections of government bank CEOs affected their banks’ performance during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Examination of global data shows that government banks with politically connected CEOs experienced significantly higher loan default rates and worse operating performance during the crisis than those without politically connected CEOs. However, these politically connected CEOs were less likely than others to be penalized for the poor performance of their banks. Our evidence suggests that politically connected CEOs of government banks can influence a bank’s lending decisions by using their political power and influence to relax lending standards and to reap private benefits that thus raise their banks’ sensitivity to a crisis.

How do bankers treat green firms? Using unique loan application and banker preference data from a mid-sized bank, we find that customer managers, serving as front-line bankers, give more favorable recommendations to green firms, especially when they hold green values themselves. However, a minority of environmentally skeptical loan officers, aware through internal training that customer managers generally have greener preferences, counter this by downgrading positive evaluations of green firms. Despite not knowing the customer manager’s identity, these officers use their discretion to mitigate what they perceive as green biases, demonstrating the significant moderating role of superiors within the bank’s hierarchy.

Financial services misconduct is a concern for many stakeholders and deferred variable remuneration has been proposed as an antidote. The implications for attracting/retaining productive individuals are unknown. This study investigates deferred payment mechanisms through experiments in student and professional samples, taking account of self-selection effects. We confirm that the introduction of deferrals would reduce misconduct through better monitoring. While some individuals eschew deferred payment, even in the presence of a deferral premium, productive individuals are under-represented in this group. Productive individuals are more likely to select deferred variable remuneration, so productivity outcomes are equal to or superior to alternative treatments.

We study how political corruption affects stock market participation among households in China. Our identification strategy exploits recent anticorruption campaigns that reduce households’ exposure to political corruption and within-province variation in lifetime exposure to local corruption. We find that households with higher corruption exposure participate less in the stock market at both the extensive and intensive margins. Removals of top provincial officials during the anticorruption campaign increase the probability of stock market participation by 3 percentage points and households’ net equity purchases and equity share percentage by 13.2 and 0.2 percentage points, respectively. The effect is predominantly driven by the nonpecuniary effect of corruption on households’ trust and perceptions of institutional quality rather than on households’ accumulation of wealth. Our work highlights the negative externalities of political corruption on financial markets.

We report the results of a longitudinal intervention with students across 5 universities in China designed to reduce online consumer debt. We allocate participants to either a financial literacy treatment group, a self-control treatment group, or a zero-touch control group. Our self-control training intervention features detailed tracking of spending and borrowing, budgeting, and introspection about consumption choices. This intervention reduces online borrowing and delinquency charges, mainly driven by a reduction in entertainment-related spending and borrowing. In contrast, financial literacy interventions improve test scores but only marginally affect borrowing. Our results suggest that cultivating self-regulation and budgeting skills can improve borrowing behavior on e-commerce platforms.