Utilizing the 2005 Lehman index rule change, we examine the role of multiple bond ratings in corporate hedging. We find an asymmetric pattern for firms near a rating downgrade and those near an upgrade. Specifically, firms near a downgrade right before the Lehman event display a strong demand for a third Fitch rating shortly after it, whereas those near an upgrade do not. More than 75% of the firms that would have been effectively downgraded ex post rightfully acquired a third Fitch rating ex ante. This decision prevents 67% of these firms from being downgraded from their original broad rating categories. Furthermore, having a third rating is attractive to investors only for bonds near a downgrade. Investors increase the holdings of these bonds and trade them more actively after the Lehman event. These results suggest that firms use multiple ratings to hedge against downgrade risk.

We examine how ETF adoption affects retail investor performance using a comprehensive panel of 524,181 Finnish investors tracked from 2007 to 2022. ETF adopters tend to be older, predominantly male, and more active, holding smaller but better-diversified portfolios. Importantly, first-time use of ETFs yields statistically significant improvements in risk-adjusted returns. ETF users also demonstrate greater portfolio resilience during financial crises. Our findings confirm that ETFs serve as effective tools for enhancing performance and managing risk for retail investors.

Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) document that decreases in analyst competition due to broker mergers encourage analysts to please managers, leading to greater consensus optimism bias. We propose three additional effects of analyst competition. The analyst effort hypothesis suggests that weaker competition reduces analysts’ incentives to collect and analyze information. The herding hypothesis argues that weaker competition reduces analysts’ career concerns, which in turn reduces herding incentives. The strategic deviation hypothesis implies that weaker competition alleviates analysts’ incentives to strategically deviate from others. We find that after broker mergers, analysts follow fewer firms and switch their coverage from firms with more to those with less R&D expenses. They weigh their private information less when it is unfavorable. At the same time, their forecasts become more dispersed. All these findings appear to be more consistent with the analyst effort hypothesis than the herding or strategic deviation hypothesis.