Utilizing the 2005 Lehman index rule change, we examine the role of multiple bond ratings in corporate hedging. We find an asymmetric pattern for firms near a rating downgrade and those near an upgrade. Specifically, firms near a downgrade right before the Lehman event display a strong demand for a third Fitch rating shortly after it, whereas those near an upgrade do not. More than 75% of the firms that would have been effectively downgraded ex post rightfully acquired a third Fitch rating ex ante. This decision prevents 67% of these firms from being downgraded from their original broad rating categories. Furthermore, having a third rating is attractive to investors only for bonds near a downgrade. Investors increase the holdings of these bonds and trade them more actively after the Lehman event. These results suggest that firms use multiple ratings to hedge against downgrade risk.

We propose an explanation for why corporate investment used to be sensitive to cash flow and why the sensitivity declined over time. The sensitivity stems from the informational role of cash flow in inferring the productivity of tangible capital in the old economy. Over time, however, more new-economy firms enter the market. These firms have reduced tangible capital productivity and reduced cash-flow predictability, which drives the decline in the average investment–cash flow sensitivity. Theoretical and empirical analyses support this explanation.

We examine how ETF adoption affects retail investor performance using a comprehensive panel of 524,181 Finnish investors tracked from 2007 to 2022. ETF adopters tend to be older, predominantly male, and more active, holding smaller but better-diversified portfolios. Importantly, first-time use of ETFs yields statistically significant improvements in risk-adjusted returns. ETF users also demonstrate greater portfolio resilience during financial crises. Our findings confirm that ETFs serve as effective tools for enhancing performance and managing risk for retail investors.

This paper documents the short- and long-term balance sheet effect of cash flows. We show that cash savings in the short run and debt reduction in both the short and the long run account for a substantial fraction of cash flow use. Although, in the long run, investment exhibits substantial sensitivity to cash flows, investment does not absorb the entire cash flow shock. In fact, the tighter the financial constraints, the smaller the fraction of cash flow absorbed by investment and the more by leverage reduction. Firms stage their response to increases in cash flow, delaying investment while building up cash stocks and reducing leverage. These results suggest that much of the short-run economic effect of cash flow shocks to the corporate sector may be channeled into the corporate debt market rather than the capital goods market, especially when financing constraints tighten.

Using a corporate culture measure based on the textual analysis of the Q&A section of earnings conference calls, we document robust evidence that similar corporate cultural values between supply chain partners improve the financial performance of suppliers. Consistent with the view that supplier–customer cultural similarity facilitates communication, promotes altruistic attitudes, and builds trust between trading partners, we find that culturally similar suppliers experience higher cost efficiency, fewer problems with underinvestment, and better innovation performance. Our results also indicate that cultural similarity benefits customers, although to a lesser extent. Overall, our study sheds new light on how inter-firm cultural similarity influences firm performance along the supply chain.

Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) document that decreases in analyst competition due to broker mergers encourage analysts to please managers, leading to greater consensus optimism bias. We propose three additional effects of analyst competition. The analyst effort hypothesis suggests that weaker competition reduces analysts’ incentives to collect and analyze information. The herding hypothesis argues that weaker competition reduces analysts’ career concerns, which in turn reduces herding incentives. The strategic deviation hypothesis implies that weaker competition alleviates analysts’ incentives to strategically deviate from others. We find that after broker mergers, analysts follow fewer firms and switch their coverage from firms with more to those with less R&D expenses. They weigh their private information less when it is unfavorable. At the same time, their forecasts become more dispersed. All these findings appear to be more consistent with the analyst effort hypothesis than the herding or strategic deviation hypothesis.