This article studies the optimal design of bank capital regulations when capital markets are subject to adverse selection. I show how the implementation of capital requirements can eliminate the information frictions that make raising capital costly by screening banks to reveal their private information to the market. The optimal regulations induce information revelation via recapitalization programs when the banking sector is weak and pool the banks’ private information via uniform capital requirements otherwise. Optimal capital requirements are linked to the securities issued to meet them, demonstrating potential welfare gains from incorporating more and less informationally sensitive securities into the design of capital regulations. Finally, the analysis generates insights into the joint design of equity capital requirements and additional tier 1 capital securities

We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks’ incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency problem. In a model with non-maturing deposits where optimal withdrawals make deposits endogenously long-term, we find commitment to have important effects on the optimal level and cyclicality of capital adequacy. Our results call for a systematic framework that limits capital regulators’ discretion

This paper argues that bonus caps can be welfare improving in banking labour markets with high mobility. On the labour market, the largest banks hire the most talented traders, but they need to do so with contracts with high bonuses in order to both screen talent and to prevent poaching by smaller banks. This can lead to excessive risk taking. In some cases, it is socially optimal to prevent screening, leading to a less efficient matching of talent to banks, but also to less risk taking. Bonus caps can achieve this in a way that is both more effective and less costly than setting tighter capital constraints

In a theoretical context where innovators borrow loans or settle for state-owned enterprise (SOE) sponsorship for their projects, we examine the effects of banking prudential regulations and their interaction with corporate leverage on the patenting partnership choice in China using a unique matched patent-firm-bank loan dataset for 15,623 observations in the 2013–17 period. We use a unique instrumental variable (IV) strategy to identify idiosyncratic bank prudential reform shocks associated with the post-2012 Basel III regulation and find prudential metrics (corporate leverage) of the financiers (firms) to positively (negatively) influence SOE patenting partnership choice, though prudential regulation mitigates the latter. Prudential reforms therefore come at a cost of further SOE dominance. However, conditional on an innovation project being SOE sponsored, we find positive spillover effect from the SOE’s employment mandate to loan productivity. Our results are robust across different IV strategies, alternative measures, sub-sample and mechanism analyses

Bank board directors are highly independent but possess limited prior banking experience. Using a sample of banks from 90 countries between 2000 and 2020, we find that country-specific characteristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence. In contrast, country characteristics have little explanatory power for boards’ banking experience. While we document evidence of international convergence in bank board independence, U.S. banks lag behind their global counterparts in director banking experience. The data suggest that country-specific laws and regulations primarily shape bank board composition through requirements for director independence

This paper analyzes financial contagion in a banking system where banks are linked to each other by interbank claims and common assets. We find that asset commonality makes banking systems more vulnerable to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and helps to determine which interbank network structures are resistant to contagion. When the degree of commonality is homogeneous across banks, the complete interbank network, in which each bank borrows evenly from all the others, displays the usual robust-yet-fragile property. However, in the more general case of heterogeneous common asset holdings the complete interbank network is less resilient than other incomplete networks but not necessarily the most fragile. We also show that the degree and variability of asset commonality between banks and the way this intertwines with the cross-holdings of interbank deposits have important implications for macroprudential regulation

Nonbank lenders have been playing an increasing role in supplying debt, especially after the Great Recession. How important are the distortions in the greater regulation of banks that differentially limit risk-taking across alternative providers of credit? How might the growing role of nonbanks in credit markets affect financial stability? This selective review addresses these questions and discusses how banks and nonbanks helped provide liquidity to the nonfinancial sector during the COVID-19 pandemic shock. We argue that tighter bank regulation has created incentives for nonbanks to increase their participation in credit markets, a trend that creates concerns about financial stability

Bank adoption of external application programming interfaces (APIs) enables bank customers to share their data more efficiently and securely with other third-party financial institutions and FinTechs, thus enabling open banking and bank data portability. Analyzing determinants of API adoption by U.S. banks from 2007 to 2022, we show that banks that adopt APIs tend to be larger and face lower competitive pressures. The announcement of President Biden’s executive order in July 2021 encouraged increased bank data portability and led to an acceleration in bank API adoption. Banks that adopt APIs experience an increase in Return on Assets ( ROA ) and Tobin’s Q and a decrease in loan loss provisions, particularly after President Biden’s executive order. We find that APIs’ ability to facilitate data access and sharing improves bank information flows and supports banks’ loan and deposit services which form the foundation of notable improvements in bank performance. Overall, our results on the determinants and implications of API adoption have important policy implications for the discussion on open banking regulation and bank data portability

We study how regulation shapes the interaction between financial fragility and bank liquidity management, and propose a rationale for the complementarity between bank recovery and resolution planning. To this end, we analyze an economy in which a resolution authority arranges a bank resolution plan to suspend deposit withdrawals and create a “good bank” at a cost in the event of a depositors’ run. In such a framework, banks find it optimal to establish recovery plans in advance, specifying how to manage liquidity during runs. However, such plans are time inconsistent, and resolution authorities need powers to force their implementation at times of financial fragility

We construct a novel panel of insider ownership for roughly 600 U.S. bank holding companies from 2003 to 2014 to test whether ownership structure shaped recapitalizations around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Insider ownership shows no discrete shift around the GFC. Using a difference-in-differences design with BHC and time fixed effects, we find that, after Q3 2008, banks with higher pre-crisis insider stakes issued significantly less common equity than otherwise similar peers. This effect is more pronounced where insiders enjoy greater private benefits of control, as proxied by insider lending and earnings opacity—consistent with dilution reluctance as the mechanism. The findings hold in propensity score matched regressions and when employing instrumental variables for insider ownership. These results reveal that ownership structure affects banks’ equity issuances in crises, underscoring the importance of accounting for ownership structure in bank stress tests and capital-regulation frameworks