This study examines the revenue implications of satisfaction measures in a setting with multiple stakeholders. I obtain a proprietary database from a leading health insurance company that measures satisfaction levels of multiple stakeholders, including: (1) clients that purchase insurance plans for their employees, (2) patients who use the insurance plans, and (3) doctors who provide medical services. Using multi-stakeholder satisfaction data over a 20-quarter period, I find that satisfaction measures are multi-dimensional, and that future revenues are positively associated with certain, but not all, dimensions of client, patient, and doctor satisfaction. Drawing on stakeholder theory, I predict that the revenue implications of stakeholder satisfaction vary with the power of different stakeholder groups. Specifically, I examine the moderating effects of the percentage of voluntary patients, business unit age, and market penetration on the relation between stakeholder satisfaction and future revenues, finding evidence consistent with my prediction.

Firms are under increasing pressure to implement effective internal whistleblowing systems. While firms can provide incentives to encourage internal whistleblowing, it remains controversial how such incentives should be structured. We examine whether the effectiveness of incentives encouraging internal whistleblowing is a joint function of the framing of such incentives (reward or penalty) and the strength of descriptive norms supporting internal whistleblowing. We predict and find in a lab experiment that penalties lead to a greater increase in internal whistleblowing (compared to rewards) when descriptive norms supporting whistleblowing are stronger. Our study contributes to the previous accounting literature on dishonesty and the role of management control systems design in promoting honesty and ethical norms in organizations. We also contribute to an emerging accounting literature on the links between controls, norms, and individual behavior by distinguishing between descriptive norms and injunctive norms and by highlighting the interplay between these two types of norms. Our results have important implications for organizations considering adopting incentives to encourage internal whistleblowing.

In this study, we examine whether, for a sample of retail chains, high levels of employee compensation can deter employee theft, an increasingly common type of fraudulent behavior. Specifically, we examine the extent to which relative wages (i.e., employee wages relative to the wages paid to comparable employees in competing stores) affect employee theft as measured by inventory shrinkage and cash shortage. Using two store‐level data sets from the convenience store industry, we find that relative wages are negatively associated with employee theft after we control for each store's employee characteristics, monitoring environment, and socio‐economic environment. Moreover, we find that relatively higher wages also promote social norms such that coworkers are less (more) likely to collude to steal inventory from their company when relative wages are higher (lower). Our research contributes to an emerging literature in management control that explores the effect of efficiency wages on employee behavior and social norms.

Prior studies have documented the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs (i.e., SG&A costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls), and have explained this phenomenon primarily with economic factors. Drawing on agency theory, we argue that SG&A cost asymmetry is driven not only by economic factors but also by the agency problem which causes a shift in SG&A cost asymmetry away from its optimal level. Using data for S&P 1500 firms over the period 1996–2005, we find that the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry is positively associated with managers’ empire building incentives due to the agency problem (measured by free cash flow and CEO horizon, tenure, and compensation structure), suggesting that the agency problem provides an additional explanation for SG&A cost asymmetry. Moreover, we find that strong corporate governance mitigates the positive association between the agency problem and the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry. In additional analyses, we also find that the agency problem influences cost stickiness to a greater extent in mature firms and in firms where SG&A costs create low future value.

Many organizations whose core purpose is to advance a social mission pay employees below-market wages. We investigate two under-appreciated benefits of below-market pay in these social-mission organizations. In a series of experiments, we predict and find that, holding employees' outside opportunities constant, those attracted to social-mission organizations that pay below-market wages perform better individually and cooperate more effectively in teams than those attracted to social-mission organizations that pay higher wages. The individual performance effect arises because below-market pay facilitates the selection of value-congruent employees who are naturally inclined to work hard for the organizational mission. The team cooperation effect arises because employees expect team members who have selected a social-mission job that pays below market to be more value-congruent and, therefore, more cooperative than those who have selected a social-mission job that pays higher wages. Collectively, we demonstrate that in social-mission organizations, offering below-market pay can yield selection benefits.

In this study, we examine whether interacting hierarchical teams outperform nominal hierarchical teams in electronic brainstorming. Our hierarchical audit teams were composed of 111 managers and seniors from two Big 4 accounting firms. We compare fraud brainstorming outcomes between nominal and interacting teams for two tasks of varying complexity: a simpler task of fraud risk factor identification and a more complex task of fraud hypothesis generation. We find that nominal teams generate a significantly larger number of unique fraud risk factors and fraud hypotheses than interacting teams. Nominal teams also generate higher-quality fraud hypotheses. We provide evidence that social loafing by less experienced auditors in interacting teams drives the differences between nominal and interacting teams in the fraud hypothesis generation task. In addition, less experienced auditors have less developed mental simulations for frauds in interacting teams compared to those in nominal teams. A key contribution of our study is that it identifies the underlying mechanisms of the differential fraud brainstorming outcomes between nominal and interacting teams.