Journal Article Note on Uncertainty and Planning Get access T. W. Hutchison T. W. Hutchison Bonn. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 5, Issue 1, October 1937, Pages 72–74, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967582 Published: 01 October 1937

Journal Article A Note on Tautologies and the Nature of Economic Theory Get access T. W. Hutchison T. W. Hutchison Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 2, Issue 2, February 1935, Pages 159–161, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967564 Published: 01 February 1935

This paper investigates the internal managerial control mechanisms at the disposal of a corporation's compensation-setting board or committee. The hypotheses tested are that both compensation changes and management changes are methods used to control top management, and that the use of these control methods is motivated by changes in the firm's stock price performance. Public data from the period 1977–1980 support our hypotheses. We conclude that the firm's board creates managerial incentives consistent with those of the firm's owners, both by setting compensation and following management change policies which benefit shareholders.

This study, based on Holland's theory, examines the relationship between accountants' personality types and their commitment to work in various occupational settings and organizational levels. Empirical evidence on this subject may have useful implications for personnel selection and job design in public accounting firms as well as in industry. The results show that conventional and enterprising types were the most frequent among the 1206 Canadian CAs and 810 California CPAs who participated in the study. In addition, a larger proportion of sole practitioners and partners in small firms tend to be of the conventional type, whereas the enterprising type comprises the largest proportion of partners in large firms. Canonical correlations indicate that accountants' commitment to both profession and organization is essentially related to their scores as conventional and enterprising types. Résumé. Fondée sur la théorie de Holland, cette étude porte sur les relations entre les types de personnalités de comptables et leur dévouement au travail, à l'intérieur de milieux de travail et de niveaux organisationnels divers. Les informations de nature empirique issues de cette question peuvent possiblement influencer les activités de sélection de personnel et de conception de tâches au sein des cabinets d'experts‐comptables et de l'industrie. Les résultats indiquent une fréquence élevée des types de personnalité conformiste et entreprenant parmi les 1206 c.a. canadiens et les 810 c.p.a. de Californie ayant pris part à l'étude. De plus, une forte proportion de practiciens autonomes et d'associés de petits cabinets se trouve dans le type de personnalité conformiste, tandis que le type entreprenant est composé surtout d'associés de grands cabinets. Des corrélations canoniques montrent que le dévouement des comptables à l'organisation et à la profession est surtout relié à leurs scores de types conformiste et entreprenant.

A large literature attempts to explain compensation and personnel policies in large organizations. Three features of the U.S. military system—flat rank spreads in pay, a relatively generous pension, and heavy reliance on up‐or‐out promotions—are at variance with common practices in large civilian organizations. This article develops a model of individual decision making in a large, hierarchical organization and uses the model to explain these apparent puzzles. The lack of lateral entry and heterogeneity in entrants’ abilities and preferences for military service play key roles in the observed policies.

Firms often view job applicant referrals from current employees as more informative than direct applications or referrals through formal labor market intermediaries such as placement firms. The authors argue that old boy networks reduce employers' uncertainty about worker productivity. Using Jovanovic's job matching model, they show that workers hired through the old boy network should (1) earn higher initial salaries, (2) experience lower subsequent wage growth on the job, and (3) stay on the job longer than otherwise comparable workers hired from outside the network. They find considerable support for this theory using data from the 1972 Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers.

The 1970 and 1979 Current Population Surveys are used to compute the personal distribution of income. The major innovation in this paper is that all individuals in the household are not treated identically. In particular, children receive a different proportion of income than do adults. That proportion is estimated. Its variations with respect to household characteristics are discussed, and a final distribution of personal income is computed. That distribution has considerably fatter tails than does the one normally used.

Theoretical economic models, official labor force statistics, and most empirical studies of young workers disregard employment experience of students under age 16. Evidence from several sources, however, suggests that students ages 14 and 15 acquire substantial employment experience. Moreover, that experience is vastly different for black and white youths. Several policy-related issues, including causes of black-white differences in adult earnings, may deserve to be interpreted differently in the light of differentials in early employment experience. This employment experience of 14- and 15-year-olds in general and its racial pattern in particular should not continue to be ignored.

This paper tests a necessary condition for the neutrality of money in a framework that imposes only weak restrictions on the money supply process. It extends Bernanke's [1986] work by weakening the set of just-identifying restrictions and by providing a statistical test of the overidentifying restrictions. Instead of specifying a structural model to identify primitive shocks, I deduce the impact effects of structural money shocks under the neutrality hypothesis and then test whether the system maintains neutrality as it propagates these impact effects. The tests reject neutrality for both the M1 and the monetary base.