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The Valuation of American Options with Stochastic Interest Rates: A Generalization of the Geske—Johnson Technique

Journal of Finance 1997 52(2), 827-840
ABSTRACT The Geske–Johnson approach provides an efficient and intuitively appealing technique for the valuation and hedging of American‐style contingent claims. Here, we generalize their approach to a stochastic interest rate economy. The method is implemented using options exercisable on one of a finite number of dates. We illustrate how the value of an American‐style option increases with interest rate volatility. The magnitude of this effect depends on the extent to which the option is in the money, the volatilities of the underlying asset and the interest rates, as well as the correlation between them.

The Interaction Between Decision and Control Problems and the Value of Information.

The Accounting Review 1997 72(4), 561-574
Abstract This paper studies information system design in a model of double moral hazard in which there is both a decision problem and a control problem. If either problem is considered in isolation, an information system that provides more public information is preferred. However, an information system that provides less public information can, in fact, be desirable because of an interaction between the two problems. The benefit of choosing an information system that provides less information is that it serves as a substitute for commitment for the principal. The cost is that neither the principal's decision (act) nor the agent's payments can be conditioned on the information. We provide sufficient conditions under which less information and more information are each optimal.

Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales

Journal of Political Economy 1997 105(4), 657-699
Allegations of Bidder collusion at Forest Service timber sales in the Pacific Northwest were common in the 1970s. Of course, prices may be low for reasons other than collusion. We formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions. Noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold (the standard auction model) is a special case: it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion. We also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market.

The Global Financial System: A Functional Perspective.

Journal of Finance 1997 52(2), 915
Leading financial scholars present essays examining the performance of the basic financial functions underlying global financial systems: payments, lending and investing, pooling funds, allocating risk, providing information, and dealing with incentive issues - with particular emphasis on how their performance is changing and implications for the future.