The manufacturing sectors of developing countries have traditionally been relatively protected. They have also been subject to heavy regulation, much of which has favored large firms. Accordingly, it is often argued that in these countries: (1) markets tolerate inefficient firms, so cross-firm productivity dispersion is high; (2) small groups of entrenched oligopolists exploit monopoly power in product markets; and (3) many small firms are unable or unwilling to grow, so important scale economies go unexploited. Drawing on plant and firm level studies, I assess each of these conjectures and find none to be systematically supported. However, many open issues remain.

In the U.S., as in most countries with well-developed securities markets, derivative securities enjoy special protections under insolvency resolution laws. Most creditors are “stayed” from enforcing their rights while a firm is in bankruptcy. However, many derivatives contracts are exempt from these stays. Furthermore, derivatives enjoy netting and closeout, or termination, privileges which are not always available to most other creditors. The primary argument used to motivate passage of legislation granting these extraordinary protections is that derivatives markets are a major source of systemic risk in financial markets and that netting and closeout reduce this risk. To date, these assertions have not been subjected to rigorous economic scrutiny. This paper critically re-examines this hypothesis. These relationships are more complex than often perceived. We conclude that it is not clear whether netting, collateral, and/or closeout lead to reduced systemic risk, once the impact of these protections on the size and structure of the derivatives market has been taken into account.

This study examines the Morningstar rating system as a predictor of mutual fund performance for U.S. domestic equit funds. We also compare the predictive abilities of the Morningstar rating system with those of alternative predictors. The results indicate findings that are robust across different samples, ages and styles of funds, and performance measures. First, low ratings from Morningstar generally indicate relatively poor future performance. Second, there is little statistical evidence that Morningstar's highest-rated funds outperform the next-to-highest and median-rated funds. Third, Morningstar ratings, at best, do only slightly better than the alternative predictors in forecasting future fund performance.

The weighted average cost of capital (Ko) is presented in virtually all textbooks in financial management and capital budgeting as a practical concept fundamental to the actual selection of optimal financial and investment alternatives. As often employed Ko can be defined aswhereKo = the weighted average cost of capital, Ks = the cost of equity capital, Kb = the cost of debt capital, S = the market value of the firm's equity, B = the market value of the firm's debt, andV = S + B, the total market value of the firm.

The trading of security options is one of the fastest growing and most dynamic areas of investment concern. When the Chicago Board of Trade's proposal to develop an exchange for trading option contracts is implemented, security option trading will become an even more important aspect of the investment world.

Recent studies suggest the apparent delay in the stock‐price response to earnings announcements (i.e., post‐earnings announcement drift) is caused by investors who underestimate the autocorrelation of seasonally‐differenced earnings (persistence). I present results that suggest: (1) a firm’s future persistence is predictable on the basis of its past persistence; (2) the immediate stock‐price response to earnings is positively related to historical persistence; (3) post‐earnings‐announcement drift is independent of historical persistence; and (4) consistent with (2) and (3), the difference between a firm’s current observed persistence and that implied in stock prices is independent of its historical persistence. These results extend prior research by demonstrating that investors are aware not only that seasonally‐differenced earnings are autocorrelated, but that investors recognize firm‐specific differences in the magnitude of the autocorrelation.

Analyst forecasts, Earnings forecast error persistence, Analyst forecast revisions

Internal control system, Decision making, Parallel-processing control decisions