Concerns about excessive mobile phone use among youth are mounting. We present estimates of behavioral and contextual peer effects, along with comprehensive evidence on how students’ own and their peers’ app usage affect academic performance, physical health, and labor market outcomes. Our analysis draws on administrative data from a Chinese university covering three student cohorts over four years. We exploit random roommate assignments, differential exposure to a policy shock (gaming restrictions for minors), and differential exposure to a discrete event (the introduction of a blockbuster video game) for identification. App usage is contagious: a one s.d. increase in roommates’ in-college app usage raises own usage by 5.8%. High app usage is harmful across all measured outcomes. A one s.d. increase in app usage reduces GPAs by 36.2% of a within-cohort-major s.d. and lowers wages by 2.3%. Roommates’ app usage reduces a student’s GPA and wages through both disruptions and behavioral spillovers, generating a total negative effect that exceeds half the magnitude of the impact from the student’s own app usage. Extending China’s three-hour-per-week gaming restriction for minors to college students would boost their initial wages by 0.9%. High-frequency GPS and app usage data show that heavy app users spend less time in study halls, are more frequently late or absent from class, and get less sleep.

In the presence of litigation-facing suppliers, the supply chain relationship is at risk. Suppliers with principal customers (dependent suppliers) have a higher concentration of sales to customers, and they are more at risk relative to suppliers without principal customers (non-dependent suppliers). As a result, we predict and find that litigation disclosure patterns differ for the two supplier types: dependent suppliers are more likely to delay bad news and accelerate good news related to litigation outcomes, compared to non-dependent suppliers. Such strategic disclosure patterns in our end-game setting are opposite to those documented in the existing supply chain literature for the repeated-game setting (for example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012).

Auditors are charged with the responsibility of evaluating internal control systems. Recent advances in decision support systems indicate that the speed, accuracy, and memory capacity of computers may be used to aid auditors in this task. To test this proposition, a computer-assisted method of designing, analyzing, and evaluating internal control systems, called The Internal Control Model or TICOM, was designed and implemented. The technical manual and the TICOM software are available from the authors. This paper presents the results and conclusions of that project. TICOM is a computer-based analytic tool that aids the auditor first to model the internal control system and then to query the model in order to aid the auditor in evaluating the internal control system. TICOM is based on concepts in artificial intelligence such as knowledge representation and graph simplification. It serves (1) to describe office information systems while emphasizing internal accounting controls and (2) as an aid in control evaluation. It was found that the advantages of TICOM over traditional evaluation methods are that (1) the evaluation can be more rigorous and exhaustive, (2) the documentation of the system can be more thorough because of automated completeness and consistency tests, and (3) the modeler may probe and test controls by using the query-processing portion of TICOM.

Analyzing a sample of Chinese firms, we find that when companies receive more coverage from FinTech advisory firms, their stock prices move less in tandem with the overall market. This suggests that FinTech coverage improves how accurately stock prices reflect firm-specific information. Our results hold true across multiple testing methods and alternative ways of measuring stock price synchronicity. Further analysis shows that FinTech coverage reduces stock price synchronicity primarily by addressing information gaps between companies and investors. Additionally, greater FinTech coverage improves stock liquidity and lowers the costs of raising debt or equity financing. When examining the topics covered by FinTech firms, we find that diverse coverage topics are linked to lower stock price synchronicity, with discussions on finance, corporate governance, and negative sentiment playing a particularly effective role. Finally, a textual analysis reveals that FinTech coverage includes significantly more firm-specific information than traditional analyst reports.

We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation packages once their firms are referenced by credit default swap (CDS) trading, particularly when institutional ownership is high and when firms are in financial distress. These findings provide suggestive evidence that boards offer pay packages that encourage greater risk taking to take advantage of the reduced creditor monitoring after CDS introduction. Further, we show that the onset of CDS trading attenuates the effect of vega on leverage, consistent with the threat of exacting creditors restraining managerial risk appetite.

Corporations often use affiliated firms as guarantors when issuing guaranteed bonds, thus combining external financing with internal credit enhancements. In this study, we empirically examine the potential determinants of corporate guaranteed debt issuance. We find evidence that issuers with fewer tangible assets, lower credit ratings, more pronounced debt overhang and/or greater managerial agency problems are more likely to issue guaranteed bonds. Moreover, we find that while firms generally issue guaranteed bonds with different motives, alternative incentives for guaranteed bond uses are largely captured by bond prices at issuance.

We explore the impact of capital adequacy requirements on financial institutions’ risk-taking behavior from a novel perspective. Specifically, we show that an important feature of the risk-based capital (RBC) system—a built-in diversification benefit in aggregating risk categories—induces moral hazard. We find that insurers that face lower marginal RBC costs of fixed-income (FI) investment tend to purchase riskier FI securities. This relationship holds even when lower marginal RBC costs result from increased risk in other risk categories, which is an unintended consequence of the RBC's square root rule. Using Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy as exogenous shocks to the RBC cost, we find that insurers that suffered more in the two disasters undertook more risk in their FI investments and witnessed an increase in their overall risk. We further show that insurers with a high RBC cost sell similar risky bonds during the financial crisis, presenting a source of systemic risk. These results provide an important regulatory implication for minimum capital calculation in capital regulation regimes.

This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.

We construct a unique political connection index to capture variations in the strength of firm political relations in China. The index incorporates various channels through which a firm's executives, chairperson, directors, and other senior officers are politically connected with government officials and bureaucrats. Overall, there is a negative relation between our index and firm value for the full sample, but such negative relation mainly exists for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and it becomes positive for non-SOEs. Furthermore, close examination shows an inverted U-shaped relation between political connections and firm value for the full sample in general and for non-SOEs in particular: Firm value increases initially at a lower level of connections and then begins to decrease at a higher level. The findings are consistent with the different business objectives and motivations of SOEs and non-SOEs in seeking political connections. Finally, our findings are robust after controlling for potential endogeneity and using an alternative headcount index construction method.

This paper addresses the impact of foreign ownership on the risk-taking behavior of banks. Using bank-level panel data of more than 1300 commercial banks in 32 emerging economies during 2000–2013, we find that foreign owned banks take on more risk than their domestic counterparts. We further examine several factors that may potentially contribute to foreign banks’ differentiated riskiness from four perspectives, namely, foreign banks’ informational disadvantages, agency problems, the contagious effect of parent banks’ financial conditions and the disparity between home and host markets. We find supportive evidence that these factors play a significant role in affecting foreign banks’ risk-taking.