Very few business topics attract as much public attention as the paychecks of top executive officers in the largest U.S. companies. Undoubtedly, part of this interest has been fueled by the large and continuous increases in chief executive officers ’ (CEOs) compensation over the past three decades. Even ignoring the more recent escalation in the use of executive stock options (Brian Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, 2000, 2003), the base salaries and bonuses of Forbes 800 CEOs increased from an average of $700,000 in 1970 (in 2002-constant dollars) to over $2.2 million in 2000. 1 During the same period, the ratio of CEO cash compensation to average pay for production workers increased from about 25 in 1970 to nearly 90 in 2000. 2 The most prevalent explanation in popular press for this trend is the “fat cat ” theory, a variant of which has been espoused among academics by Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and

Prevalent thinking about liquidity traps suggests that the perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short-term nominal interest rate renders open-market operations ineffective for achieving macroeconomic stabilization goals. In an earlier paper, we showed that this reasoning does not hold, that open-market operations can provide substantial macroeconomic benefits and facilitate the use of powerful fiscal policy tools even in a liquidity trap. In this paper, we consider an alternative approach that has been suggested for use in a liquidity trap, a scheduled increase in consumption tax rates. We find that such a policy could, indeed, increase short-run consumption, but would be less effective at increasing welfare or accelerating a country's exit from a liquidity trap. Though a variant of this tax policy might induce exit from a liquidity trap, the impact of welfare is negative in this case as well. We also argue that this alternative tax-rate-based approach is subject to more severe credibility problems than the monetary policy approach explored in our original paper.

Are deflation and depression empirically linked? No, concludes a broad historical study of inflation and real output growth rates. Deflation and depression do seem to have been linked during the 1930s. But in the rest of the data for 17 countries and more than 100 years, there is virtually no evidence of such a link.

There are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation. In one view, voters can affect candidates' policy choices: competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center. In this view, elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise. In the alternative view, voters merely elect policies: politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies, and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented. We assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the U. S. House. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of a “randomized” change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives' roll-call voting records. We find that voters merely elect policies: the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator's voting behavior. For example, a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the Democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties' nominees to the left. Politicians' inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition-induced convergence in policy.

We compare forecasts of the realized volatility of the pound, mark and yen exchange rates against the dollar, calculated from intraday rates, over horizons ranging from one day to three months. Our forecasts are obtained from a short memory ARMA model, a long memory ARFIMA model, a GARCH model and option implied volatilities. We find intraday rates provide the most accurate forecasts for the one-day and one-week forecast horizons while implied volatilities are at least as accurate as the historical forecasts for the one-month and three-month horizons. The superior accuracy of the historical forecasts, relative to implied volatilities, comes from the use of high frequency returns, and not from a long memory specification. We find significant incremental information in historical forecasts, beyond the implied volatility information, for forecast horizons up to one week.

Players in a game are “in equilibrium” if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is “cognitive hierarchy” (CH) theory, where each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k - 1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5 steps fits data from many games.

A period of malaise in the mid-1990s led to a contraction in enrollment at many economics Ph.D. programs. The resulting reduction in the supply of new Ph.D. economists, combined with a smaller contraction in demand for new Ph.D. economists, generated, as the Wall Street Journal reported, a "hot pursuit " for some economics Ph.D.s, with "even low-level candidates [being] treated like big shots " (Jon E. Hilsenrath, 2001, p. B1). As might be expected, the scarcity of new economics Ph.D.s that materialized at the end of the decade appears to have induced more enrollments in economics Ph.D. programs, with annual matriculations rising by about 25 percent between Fall 1998 and Fall 2002 (Charles E. Scott and John J. Siegfried, 1999-2003). Predictions for the current job market are mixed. On the one hand, demand may expand as some academic departments whose hiring had been constrained by financial exigency return to active recruiting (Jennifer Jacobson, 2003). On the other hand, the aftermath of the recession continues to limit some public university budgets at the same time that the supply of new economics Ph.D.s may start to expand, resulting in a job market for American Ph.D.s that The Economist describes as “bleak ” (“Unemployment Forecast, ” 2003, p. 60). Five years ago we reported the results of a comprehensive survey of the labor market for economics Ph.D.s graduating in 1996-97 (Siegfried and Wendy A. Stock, 1999). In contrast to other social science and science disciplines, most economists who graduated with a doctorate in 1996-97 found full-time career-tracking jobs that paid well (those in permanent full-time jobs in the U.S. earned an average starting salary of $61,000). Many of those employed in business and industry, however, were not satisfied with their jobs despite receiving a significant salary premium relative to academics. 1 Here we report results from a new survey of the class of economics Ph.D.s graduating in 2001-02. This information should be of interest to current and prospective Ph.D. students, of use to advisors of undergraduates considering graduate study in economics, and of assistance to faculty concerned with the employment prospects of applicants they admit to their doctoral programs. For methodological details consult our earlier report (Siegfried and Stock, 1999).

In human capital intensive industries where it is difficult to contract upon the training effort of skilled agents a socially suboptimal level of training may occur. We show how partnership organisations can overcome this problem by tying human and financial capital. Partnerships are opaque so that the willingness of clients to pay depends upon reputation. Partnerships are illiquid and partners must stay with the firm until clients discover their type and update the firm's reputation. This renders unskilled agents, who will aversely affect reputation, unwilling to accept partnerships. Skilled agents therefore train the next generation so as to ensure that there is an adequate market for their own shares. We comment upon the salient differences between partnerships and joint stock firms.