Christie and Schultz (1994), (Journal of Finance, 49, 1813–1840) find that market makers in many active Nasdaq stocks avoid odd-eighth quotes. This paper studies 67 (58) Nasdaq stocks whose market makers initiate (withdraw) odd-eighth quotes. These regime shifts are often completed within the span of a day, and coincide with dramatic changes in dollar, percentage and effective spreads. In most cases, we are unable to identify comparable changes in the costs of making markets. We do identify long-run changes in average prices that may provide a partial explanation. However, we also find that these patterns are not shared by stocks traded in auction markets.

I. Introduction, 131. — II. Scope of the model, 132. — III. Mathematical statement of the model, 134. — IV. Profit maximization, 140. — V. Cost-quantity silhouettes, 145.

In this paper we critically evaluate the standard-setting inferences that can be drawn from value relevance research studies that are motivated by standard setting. Our evaluation concentrates on the theories of accounting, standard setting and valuation that underlie those inferences. Unless those underlying theories are descriptive of accounting, standard setting and valuation, the value-relevance literature's reported associations between accounting numbers and common equity valuations have limited implications or inferences for standard setting; they are mere associations. We argue that the underlying theories are not descriptive and hence drawing standard-setting inferences is difficult.

This study reports a preliminary empirical investigation into the relation between the choice of investment accounting method used by colleges and universities and factors such as type of institution, endowment size and returns, and debt. Because these institutions use fund accounting, the effects of the choice of investment accounting method can reasonably be isolated from other accounting decisions. The results indicate that the selection of investment accounting method is influenced by type of institution, endowment size and returns, but not by debt covenants.

We provide a positive analysis of a firm's decision to report the operations of a financial subsidiary on a consolidated versus an unconsolidated basis. Our evidence indicates that the firm is more likely to choose consolidated reporting the greater the operating, financial, and informational interdependencies between parent and subsidiary. Moreover, our evidence offers no support for the FASB hypothesis that firms use unconsolidated financial subsidíaries to understate the fixed claims on their balance sheets.

We study risk-taking behavior in tournaments where the optimal strategy is to take no risk. By keeping the optimal strategy constant, while varying the competitiveness in the tournaments, we are able to investigate the relationship between competitiveness and excessive risk-taking. In the most competitive tournament, less than 10% of the subjects played the optimal strategy in the first rounds. The majority playing dominated strategies increased their risk-taking during game of play. When we removed feedback about winner’s decisions each round, and when we reduced the number of contestants in the tournaments, subjects significantly reduced their risk-taking.

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been proposed as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and experiments indicate that investors exhibit behavior consistent with MLA. But a caveat is that a large bulk of financial assets is managed by investment managers whose objectives may differ substantially from those of private investors. Most importantly they manage their clients' money, not their own. In this paper we test experimentally how individuals take risk with other people's (“clients”) money. We find that subjects behave consistently with MLA over their clients' money and take less risk with their clients' money than with their own.

This paper analyzes the relation between agency conflicts and risk management. In contrast to previous contributions, our analysis incorporates not only stockholder-debtholder conflicts but also manager–stockholder conflicts. We show that the costs of both underinvestment and overinvestment are essential in determining the firm's hedging policy. In particular, firms that derive more of their value from assets in place (lower market-to-book ratios), although having lower costs of underinvestment, generally display larger costs of overinvestment. Thus, they may be more likely to hedge to control these overinvestment incentives. Our analysis explains why large profitable firms with fewer growth opportunities tend to hedge more (Bartram et al., 2004). It also provides a number of new predictions relating the benefits associated with risk management to various dimensions of the firm's economic environment.