Differences in culture, proxied by differences in religion and language, cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection differs across countries. We show that a country's principal religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country's natural openness to international trade, its language, its income per capita, or the origin of its legal system. Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than Protestant countries. A country's natural openness to international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights. Culture proxies are also helpful in understanding how investor rights are enforced across countries.

We examine whether knowledge sharing can enhance the efficacy of implicit, trust-based incentives. Using a stark laboratory experiment, we find support for theory suggesting that individuals believe that their knowledge is an important part of their identity, making it costly to share, but facilitating greater trust that recipients of this knowledge will reciprocate with future rewards. Utilizing participants with substantial work experience, results from additional scenario-based experiments demonstrate practical implications of this theory. Collectively, the results from our experiments show that individuals help others less when the help conveys personal knowledge relative to when it does not absent the prospect of rewards, but more when they can expect future rewards (i.e., with implicit incentives). Importantly, knowledge sharing increases the efficacy of implicit incentives more when they are determined by the help recipient relative to someone else (e.g., a supervisor). Collectively, we contribute to a better understanding of incentive systems designed to promote knowledge sharing in practice.

We find that individualistic countries regulate insider trading activities more intensely. The result is robust to controlling for alternative culture variables, additional controls, and instrumental variable analysis. We also document that individualism's effect is magnified in democratic countries. In addition, we study the economic and financial consequences of individualism, insider trading regulation, and its enforcement. The analysis suggests that individualism and the enforcement of insider trading regulation promote financial development. Interaction effects reveal that individualism and insider trading regulation serve as complements to promote financial development. These findings contribute to the insider trading debate since regulation alone may not be the primary determinant of market efficiency. Combined, our results challenge prior works concluding that individualism is anti-regulation.

In this paper we develop and estimate a model to explain variations in immigration to the United States by source country since the early 1970s. The explanatory variables include ratios to the United States of source country income and education as well as relative inequality. In addition, we incorporate the stock of previous immigrants and a variety of variables representing different dimensions of the immigration quotas set by policy. We use the results to shed light on the impact of policy by simulating the effects of the key changes in immigration policy since the late 1970s. We also examine the factors that influenced the composition of U.S. immigration by source region over the entire period.

A SUMMARY IS PRESENTED OF THEORETICAL ANALYSIS DEVELOPED TO EXAMINE THE STRUCTURE OF FACTOR PRICES AND COSTS WITHIN A CORE-DOMINATED CITY. THIS ANALYSIS HIGHLIGHTS THE EFFECTS OF CERTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL LAGS AND TRANSPORT COST RELATIONSHIPS. THE DECENTRALIZATION OR SUBURBANIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS IS A FAMILIAR PHENOMENON. A MODEL DESCRIBING THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITHIN THESE METROPOLITAN AREAS, ASSIGNS TO THE AUTOMOBILE A MORE MODEST ROLE IN THE SUBURBANIZATION OF METROPOLITAN ACTIVITY THAN IS FOUND IN MOST STUDIES. RESULTS ARE PRESENTED OF TWO EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN THE PARTICULAR CORE-DOMINATED CITY OF CHICAGO. THE ANALYSIS OF LOCATION IS MADE FOR THIS SECTOR SINCE MANUFACTURING IS THE LARGEST EMPLOYER IN MANY OF THESE METROPOLITAN AREAS AND HAS HAD THE LARGEST CENTRAL CITY DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT.

U.S. firms currently hold a $2trillion cash stockpile. We examine if cash stockpiles fuel cash acquisitions by studying the method of payment decision for cash-rich firms. Surprisingly, cash-rich firms are 23% less likely to make cash bids than stock bids, relative to firms that are not cash rich. We examine several potential explanations related to omitted variable bias and endogeneity and the result remains. More specifically, the results are robust to explanations related to agency, financial constraints, tax-related explanations, equity overvaluation, and capital structure. Our evidence implies that the link between cash stockpiles and cash acquisitions is not obvious.

This paper reports the results of multiple studies that together provide converging evidence in support of the theory that gender stereotypes bias employee selection during group recruiting events. Specifically, we predict and find that female (male) job candidates who exhibit stereotypically male behaviors receive lower (higher) evaluations during group recruiting events, particularly among male recruiters. Prior research suggests gender stereotypes do not bias employee selection during one‐on‐one interviews. However, our results suggest that evaluating job candidates in the more social context of group events can have important unintended consequences on employee selection, a key component of the accounting control environment. Given the importance of group recruiting events to inform hiring decisions across organizations such as investment banks and public accounting firms, our results contribute to a better understanding of survey and field evidence suggesting that entry‐level male and female employees have different personalities at these organizations, which appear to influence their career trajectories.