Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) established that economic institutions today are correlated with expected mortality of European colonialists. David Albouy argues this relationship is not robust. He drops all data from Latin America and much of the data from Africa, making up almost 60 percent of our sample, despite much information on the mortality of Europeans in those places during the colonial period. He also includes a “campaign” dummy that is coded inconsistently; even modest corrections undermine his claims. We also show that limiting the effect of outliers strengthens our results, making them robust to even extreme versions of Albouy's critiques.

This paper employs data from the 1998 and 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances to analyze whether, after controlling for observable factors that influence loan decisions, there is a significant difference in the loan approval rate and the interest rate charged on approved loans for businesses owned by minority or white females and firms owned by white males.

Over the past half-century there have been over three hundred instances of nation building initiatives, episodes where countries jointly give military and economic aid to a country embroiled in conflict. Despite the prevalence and expense of this foreign policy, little research has explored the potential growth effects from these operations. This project uses a standard growth regression framework to quantify the effects of nation building on GDP per capita growth of the recipient nation. The research considers how the characteristics of conflict zones and the interaction of diverse types of both military and economic aid impact the development process.

We extend research on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance to include the role of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring. Our evidence from large samples implies that U.S. public firms undertake less aggressive tax positions when tax enforcement is stricter. Reflecting its first-order economic impact on firms, our coefficient estimates imply that raising the probability of an IRS audit from 19 percent (the 25th percentile in our data) to 37 percent (the 75th percentile) increases their cash effective tax rates, on average, by nearly two percentage points, which amounts to a 7 percent increase in cash effective tax rates. These results are robust to controlling for firm size and time, which determine our primary proxy for IRS enforcement, in different ways; specifying several alternative dependent and test variables; and confronting potential endogeneity with instrumental variables and panel data estimations, among other techniques.

Critics argue that fair value provisions in U.S. accounting rules exacerbated the recent financial crisis by depleting banks' regulatory capital, which curtailed lending and triggered asset sales, leading to further economic turmoil. Defenders counter-argue that the fair value provisions were insufficient to lead to the pro-cyclical effects alleged by the critics. Our evidence indicates that these provisions did not affect the commercial banking industry in the ways commonly alleged by critics. First, we show that fair value accounting losses had minimal effect on regulatory capital. Then, we examine sales of securities during the crisis, finding mixed evidence that banks sold securities in response to capital-depleting charges. However, the sales that potentially resulted from the charges appear to be economically insignificant, as there was no industry- or firm-level increase in sales of securities during the crisis. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M44. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the article.

We examine the effects of city-level auditor industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing in the United States. Using a sample of Big N clients for the 2000–2007 period, and a scale measure based on percentile rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level, we document significant specialization premiums and scale discounts in both the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) periods. However, the effects of industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing are highly interactive. The negative effect of city-industry scale on audit fees obtains only for clients of specialist auditors. By contrast, clients of non-specialist auditors obtain scale discounts only when they enjoy strong bargaining power, suggesting that auditors are “forced” to pass on scale economies to clients with greater bargaining power. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the article.

This study finds evidence that public-company reporting by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) creates disincentives to repatriate foreign earnings to the U.S. and contributes to the accumulation of cash abroad. MNCs operate under U.S. international tax laws and financial reporting rules and face two potential consequences when they repatriate foreign earnings: a cash payment for repatriation taxes and a reduction in reported accounting earnings. Using a confidential dataset of financial and operating characteristics of foreign affiliates of MNCs combined with public-company data, we examine how repatriation amounts vary across firms that face relatively strong reporting incentives to defer an accounting expense. Our results suggest that reporting incentives reduce repatriations by about 17 to 21 percent annually. Data Availability: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data were made available to the authors under a legal confidentiality arrangement; all non-BEA data are available from public sources.

We investigate the effect of climate change on population growth in 18th and 19th century Iceland. We find that annual temperature changes help determine the population growth rate in pre-industrial Iceland: a year 1 degree Celsius cooler than average drives down population growth rates by 1.14%. We also find that 18th and 19th century Icelanders adapt to prolonged changes in climate after 20 years. These adaptations reduce the short run effect of annual change in temperature by about 60%. Finally, a 1 degree Celsius sustained decrease in temperature decreases the steady state population by 10% to 26%.

This paper reports an experiment in 640 Indonesian villages on three approaches to target the poor: proxy-means tests (PMT), where assets are used to predict consumption; community targeting, where villagers rank everyone from richest to poorest; and a hybrid. Defining poverty based on PPP$2 per-capita consumption, community targeting and the hybrid perform somewhat worse in identifying the poor than PMT, though not by enough to significantly affect poverty outcomes for a typical program. Elite capture does not explain these results. Instead, communities appear to apply a different concept of poverty. Consistent with this finding, community targeting results in higher satisfaction.

Compensation committees face special difficulties when setting pay in the last years of a CEO's tenure. For example, incentives to manipulate earnings for the purpose of enhancing earnings-based compensation are greater in CEOs' terminal years. We predict that compensation committees are aware of these incentives and adjust the relative weights placed on earnings components in the cash compensation function to mitigate the problem. Consistent with our prediction, we find that in CEOs' terminal years, positive changes in discretionary accruals receive significantly less weight than other income components in determining cash compensation. This provides new evidence that not all gains flow through to compensation. We also find that in non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of selling, general, and administrative expenditures (SG&A), but this effect reverses in the terminal period, consistent with the compensation committee discouraging investment in legacy assets by outgoing CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that compensation committees treat components of earnings differently when setting pay in the terminal period.