We document a smaller expansion of the negative CDS-bond basis and lower selling pressure during the Covid crisis for bonds issued by firms with high environmental and social (E&S) scores, relative to bonds from low E&S firms. This pattern is consistent with lower investor outflows from sustainability focused funds rather than fund managers discriminating among which bonds to sell. Our results suggest that the relative performance of high and low E&S bonds during a crisis is influenced not only by shifts in firm fundamentals, but also by non-fundamental factors such as investor preferences and trading behaviour.

The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has classified sustainability topics as material or not material for investors. We leverage the staggered release of the SASB classifications from 2013 to 2016 to examine whether and how they prompt changes in U.S. firms' sustainability performance. We measure sustainability performance using RepRisk scores, which reflect environmental, social, and governance (ESG) incidents. We find that RepRisk scores on sustainability topics classified as material decrease following the release of SASB classifications. Conversely, incident scores on nonmaterial sustainability topics increase. This suggests that firms improve their sustainability performance on topics the SASB deems relevant for investors while simultaneously performing worse on irrelevant topics. Firms adjust their internal sustainability policies to mirror these changes. The changes in sustainability performance occur primarily through two channels. We document that higher exposure to the classifications from shareholder pressure and sustainability-linked executive compensation prompts managers to prioritize sustainability topics classified as relevant for investors over irrelevant ones

Firms falling short of earnings expectations are more likely to cite stakeholder-focused objectives in their public communications following earnings announcements. This behavior is consistent with managers preferring to be evaluated by subjective stakeholder-based performance criteria when falling short on objective shareholder-based measures. This increased use of stakeholder language is most evident among firms narrowly missing earnings estimates and appears unrelated to a firm’s actual environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related activity. Stakeholder language appears to influence the evaluation of CEOs; turnover–performance sensitivity is lower for managers citing stakeholder value. Collectively, our findings are consistent with concerns that stakeholder objectives reduce managerial accountability for poor performance

In this address, I discuss differences across investor and manager motivations for considering sustainable finance— value versus values motivations—and how these differences contribute to misunderstandings about environmental, social, and governance investment approaches. The finance research community has the ability and responsibility to help clear up these misunderstandings through additional research, which I suggest.

We examine disasters caused by individual firms with severe environmental impacts. These disasters trigger industry-wide demand for corporate social responsibility (CSR). We analyze whether affected firms respond by adopting substantive or symbolic CSR measures. We find that firms increase overall CSR performance through improvements in diversity and human rights rather than decreasing environmental concerns. This suggests firms prioritize symbolic CSR to legitimize their operations rather than substantive measures to mitigate environmental harm. We also document diverging costs and welfare effects. On average, substantive CSR actions are costlier and cause lower margins but avoid divestments by ESG-oriented funds while improving long-term credit ratings. Some of these benefits of substantive actions also accrue through symbolic actions at a lower cost

This article provides first evidence on the capital market effects of the EU Taxonomy Regulation (TR). The TR introduced a new classification scheme to identify companies with environmentally sustainable economic activities. The results offer support for a significant estimated TR alignment premium, compatible with the interpretation that investors already apply the TR and allocate capital to TR-aligned companies. This effect strengthens with an increase in investor attention. We also find significant cross-sectional variation in abnormal stock returns surrounding the publication date of the TR conditional on the degree of estimated TR alignment. Traditional ESG ratings cannot explain the TR premium

Firms with more competitive threats from the product market are less likely to commit violations and pay lower penalties. These findings are robust to alternative measures, specifications, and subsamples, as well as different attempts that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further analyses reveal that the disciplining effect of competition is more pronounced when managers have greater incentives to shirk and when internal governance is weaker, and that violations are associated with poor product market performance only in the presence of competitive pressure. Firms under competitive pressure are more likely to adopt ESG-related incentives in executive compensation contracts and exhibit better worker safety practices. Overall, our evidence suggests that product market threats reduce managerial slack in combating misconduct by increasing the expected damage of violations

During the revelation of the Harvey Weinstein scandal and the reemergence of the #MeToo movement, firms with a nonsexist corporate culture, proxied by having women among the five highest‐paid executives, earn excess returns of 1.3% relative to firms without female top executives. These returns are driven by changes in investor preferences toward firms with a nonsexist culture. Institutional ownership increases in firms with a nonsexist culture after the Weinstein/#MeToo events, particularly for investors with larger holdings and investors with a lower ESG focus ex ante. Firms without female top executives improve gender diversity after these events, particularly in more sexist states and in industries with few women executives. Our evidence attests to the value of having a nonsexist corporate culture and indicates that changes in societal norms toward women are permeating into capital markets and corporations

This paper provides evidence that the #MeToo movement revised investors’ beliefs about the costs (benefits) of fostering an exclusive (inclusive) culture, as reflected by the absence (presence of a critical mass) of women directors in the board room. Tracking a timeline of events associated with the #MeToo movement that begin with the Harvey Weinstein exposé in October 2017 in the New York Times , we document contrasting market reactions to the movement depending on the existing culture of the firm. Firms that historically excluded women from their board experienced a negative market response as momentum for the cause increased, whereas investors responded favorably to firms that historically embraced the inclusion of women on their boards. In contrast, we do not detect differences in the market’s response to randomly generated pseudo-events during the same time frame when comparing firms with exclusive and inclusive cultures. In the context of increased regulator attention to board gender diversity, as well as the ESG activist campaigns by large institutional investors, our study documents a shift in investors’ beliefs about the risks associated with sexual misconduct and about the value of having women in the boardroom shaping the culture of the firm

This paper examines the role of the “Big Three” (i.e., BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors) on the reduction of corporate carbon emissions around the world. Using novel data on engagements of the Big Three with individual firms, we find evidence that the Big Three focus their engagement effort on large firms with high CO2 emissions in which these investors hold a significant stake. Consistent with this engagement influence being effective, we observe a strong and robust negative association between Big Three ownership and subsequent carbon emissions among MSCI index constituents, a pattern that becomes stronger in the later years of the sample period as the three institutions publicly commit to tackle Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) issues