Knowledge that Transforms

Predictions of the noisy rational expectations equilibrium (REE) model are found to be relatively accurate for both asset and information markets in the laboratory. When information about an asset's uncertain dividend is sold to a fixed number of highest bidders, prices, allocations, efficiency, and distribution of profit predictions of the full revelation REE model in the asset market dominate the predictions of the Walrasian model; demand for information shifts to the left and its price declines close to zero. When the price of information is fixed at a relatively high level, the number of informed agents and the informativeness of the asset market tends to adjust to permit the informed agents to recover their investment in information.

, Pierre-Yves Geoffard, Roger Guesnerie, Sunspot Fluctuations Around a Steady State: The Case of Multidimensional One-Step Forward Looking Economic Models, Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 5 (Sep., 1992), pp. 1097-1126

A weakening of D. Kreps and R. Wilson's (1982) notion of sequential rationality is presented. The motivation stems from the difficulty in justifying sequentially rational behavior in subgames reachable only through a violation of sequential rationality. Although the present notion of weak sequential rationality is based upon extensive form considerations, it bears a close relation to R. Selten's (1975) normal form perfect equilibria. Backward induction outcomes can be achieved in generic games of perfect information with additional restrictions on beliefs. An example with imperfect information shows that sequential rationality is not the consequence of equilibrium play and the absence of incredible threats. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

The authors analyze the evolution of duopolists' prices and market shares in an infinite-period market with consumer switching costs in which in every period new consumers arrive and a fraction of old consumers leaves. They show prices (and profits) are higher than without switching costs and that this result does not depend importantly on their specific assumptions. The authors show switching costs make the market more attractive to a new entrant, even though an entrant must overcome the disadvantage that a large fraction of the market is already committed to the incumbent's product. They also examine the effects of market growth. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

A dynamic stochastic model for a competitive industry is developed in which entry, exit, and the growth of firms' output and employment is determined. The paper extends long-run industry equilibrium theory to account for entry, exit, and heterogeneity in the size and growth rate of firms. Conditions under which there is entry and exit in the long run are developed. Cross sectional implications and distributions of profits and value of firms are derived. Comparative statics on the equilibrium size distribution and turnover rates are analyzed. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

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Quotas are the predominant means of protection in developed countries, with quota rents commonly shared between exporter and importer. This paper derives shadow prices appropriate to evaluating trade reform under these circumstances and provides a number of useful sufficient conditions for welfare-improving "piecemeal" reform. In doing so, the authors apply the distorted (quantity-constrained) expenditure function and use implicit separability to derive more powerful results than have previously been available.

This paper proposes a new test statistic to deter the presence of heteroskedasticity. The proposed test does not require a parametric specification of the mean regression function in the first stage regression. The regression function is estimated nonparametrically by the kernel estimation method. The nonparametric residual is estimated and used as a proxy for the random disturbance term. This nonparametric residual is robust to regression function misspecification. Asymptotic normality is established using extensions of classical U-statistic theorems. The test statistic is computed using the nonparametric quantities, but the resulting inference has a standard chi-square distribution. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

Although their goal is to separate a decision maker's underlying beliefs (their subjective probabilities of events) from their preferences (their attitudes toward risk), classic choice-theoretic derivations of subjective probability all rely upon some form of the Marschak-Samuelson "Independence Axiom" or the Savage "Sure-Thing Principle, " which is equivalent to requiring that the decision maker's preferences over lotteries conform to the expected utility hypothesis. This paper presents a choice-theoretic derivation of subjective probability which satisfies the axioms of classical probability theory, but which neither assumes nor implies that the decision maker's preferences over lotteries necessarily conform to the expected utility hypothesis.

Robert E. Cumby, John Huizinga, Testing the Autocorrelation Structure of Disturbances in Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Regressions, Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 185-195