Knowledge that Transforms

We use data from the Current Population Survey collected both before and after Hurricane Katrina to estimate the impact of Katrina on the labor market outcomes of evacuees. Our estimates are based on a difference-in-differences strategy that compares evacuees to all residents of Katrina-affected areas prior to Katrina, with a control group consisting of individuals who originally resided outside the areas affected by the storm. We estimate that Katrina had substantial effects on the labor market outcomes of evacuees over the 13-month period immediately following Katrina. However, our estimates suggest that the effects of Katrina diminished substantially over time as evacuees recovered from the hurricane and adjusted to new economic and social conditions. Evacuees who did not return to their pre-Katrina areas have fared much worse in the labor market than have those who returned. Differences in individual and family characteristics account for some of the differences in outcomes between returnees and non-returnees. We present evidence that non-returnees have fared much worse in the labor market primarily because they came from areas that experienced greater housing damage due to the storm and thus were more likely to have had their lives severely disrupted.

We study the impact of financial constraints on firm size distribution (FSD). We find that financially constrained firms, identified using various proxies, are smaller than the others (their FSD is more skewed to the right). Among OECD countries, however, the FSD of nonconstrained firms virtually overlaps that of the entire sample, suggesting that the overall impact of financial constraints on the FSD is modest. The difference is more pronounced in our sample of firms from non-OECD countries. We conclude that financial constraints cannot be considered the main determinant of the FSD evolution in developed economies.

Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing: Deductions for Property Taxes and Mortgage Interest and the Exclusion of Imputed Rental Income by James Poterba and Todd Sinai. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 84-89 of American Economic Review, May 2008

This paper presents new stylized facts on the distribution of the home bias at the fund level. We find (i) a large heterogeneity in the degree of home bias across mutual funds; (ii) a positive correlation between the size of funds and home bias; and (iii) a positive correlation between the size of funds, the number of foreign countries and the number of sectors in which they invest. These facts constitute a challenge for existing theories.

This paper suggests that the US recovery from the Great Depression was driven by a shift in expectations. This shift was caused by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's policy actions. On the monetary policy side, Roosevelt abolished the gold standard and—even more importantly—announced the explicit objective of inflating the price level to pre-Depression levels. On the fiscal policy side, Roosevelt expanded real and deficit spending, which made his policy objective credible. These actions violated prevailing policy dogmas and initiated a policy regime change as in Sargent (1983) and Temin and Wigmore (1990). The economic consequences of Roosevelt are evaluated in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal frictions.

For two decades, the consensus explanation of the British Industrial Revolution has placed technological change and the supply side at center stage, affording little or no role for demand or overseas trade. Recently, alternative explanations have placed an emphasis on the importance of trade with New World colonies, and the expanded supply of raw cotton it provided. We test both hypotheses using calibrated general equilibrium models of the British economy and the rest of the world for 1760 and 1850. Neither claim is supported. Trade was vital for the progress of the industrial revolution; but it was trade with the rest of the world, not the American colonies, that allowed Britain to export its rapidly expanding textile output and achieve growth through extreme specialization in response to shifting comparative advantage.

We reexamine Alan R. Rogers' (1994) analysis of the biological basis of the rate of time preference. Although his basic insight concerning the derivation of the utility function holds up, the functional form he uses does not generate equilibrium evolutionary behavior. Moreover, Rogers relies upon an interior solution for a particular kind of intergenerational transfer. We show such interior solutions need not generally arise. Hence Rogers most striking prediction, namely that the real interest rate should be about 2 percent per annum, does not follow.

Recently, a number of authors have argued that the standard search model cannot generate the observed business-cycle-frequency fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies, given shocks of a plausible magnitude. We propose a new calibration strategy of the standard model that uses data on the cost of vacancy creation and cyclicality of wages to identify the two key parameters –- the value of nonmarket activity and the bargaining weights. Our calibration implies that the model is consistent with the data.

We test whether good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected in a large panel of democracies. We find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries independent of income level, level of democracy, or government or electoral system. In developed countries and old democracies, deficits in election years or over the term of office reduce reelection probabilities. Higher growth rates over the term raise reelection probabilities only in developing countries and new democracies. Low inflation is rewarded by voters only in developed countries. These effects are both statistically significant and quite substantial quantitatively.

We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. We show (a) a first-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium; and (b) with resale, the expected revenue from a first-price auction exceeds that from a second-price auction. The inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a general revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded.