Knowledge that Transforms

Economists have long concerned themselves with environmental influences, such as neighborhood, peers and family on individuals' beliefs and behaviors. However, the impact of children on parents' behavior has been little studied. Parenting daughters, psychologists have shown, increases feminist sympathies. I test the hypothesis that children, much like neighbors or peers, can influence adult behavior. I demonstrate that the propensity to vote liberally on reproductive rights is significantly increasing in a congress person's proportion of daughters. The result demonstrates not only the relevance of child to parent behavioral influence, but also the importance of personal ideology in a legislator's voting decisions as it is not explained away by voter preferences.

Building on previous work by Schelling and Crawford, we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c. Most of our results concern outcomes that survive iterated strict dominance. If commitment attempts never fail, there are three such outcomes. In two of them, all the surplus goes to one player. In the third, there is a high probability of conflict. If commitment attempts succeed with probability q < 1, the unique outcome that survives iterated strict dominance entails conflict with probability q2. When c = 0, analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance. (JEL C78, D84)

Segregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City by Erica Field, Matthew Levinson, Rohini Pande and Sujata Visaria. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 505-10 of American Economic Review, May 2008

We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to investigate how households' portfolio allocations change in response to wealth fluctuations. Persistent habits, consumption commitments, and subsistence levels can generate time-varying risk aversion with the consequence that when the level of liquid wealth changes, the proportion a household invests in risky assets should also change in the same direction. In contrast, our analysis shows that the share of liquid assets that households invest in risky assets is not affected by wealth changes. Instead, one of the major drivers of household portfolio allocation seems to be inertia: households rebalance only very slowly following inflows and outflows or capital gains and losses. (JEL D14, D31)

Why Don’t People Insure Late-Life Consumption? A Framing Explanation of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle by Jeffrey R. Brown, Jeffrey R. Kling, Sendhil Mullainathan and Marian V. Wrobel. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 304-09 of American Economic Review, May 2008

The theory of mechanism design can be thought of as the “engineering” side of economic theory. Much theoretical work, of course, focuses on existing economic institutions. The theorist wants to explain or forecast the economic or social outcomes that these institutions generate. But in mechanism design theory the direction of inquiry is reversed. We begin by identifying our desired outcome or social goal. We then ask whether or not an appropriate institution (mechanism) could be designed to attain that goal. If the answer is yes, then we want to know what form that mechanism might take. In this paper, I offer a brief introduction to the part of mechanism design called implementation theory, which, given a social goal, characterizes when we can design a mechanism whose predicted outcomes (i.e., the set of equilibrium outcomes) coincide with the desirable outcomes, according to that goal. I try to keep technicalities to a minimum, and usually confine them to footnotes.

The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has created a new economic area, larger and closer with respect to the rest of the world. Area-specifi cs hocks are thus more important in EMU than country-specific shocks used to be in the previous states, e.g. in Germany. It is thus not surprising that the models used to determine optimal monetary policy in the Euro area (for instance Smets and Wouters, 2004, ) assume that this works essentially as a closed economy, hit by domestic shocks– i.e. the same assumption made in standard models of U.S. monetary policy (see e.g. Christiano et al., 1999 ), where all shocks are domestic with the only possible exception of energy price shocks. This paper studies monetary policy in the Euro area looking at the variable most directly related to current and expected monetary policy, the yield on long term government bonds. We explore how the behaviour of European long-term rates has been affected by EMU and whether the response of long-term rates to monetary policy has got any closer to that consistent with a closed economy. We find that the level of long-term rates in Europe is almost entirely explained by U.S. shocks and by the systematic response of U.S. and European variables to these shocks. The systematic component of European monetary policy responds to U.S. variables more than it does to local variables. This was true for the Bundesbank before EMU and remains true for the ECB since the start of EMU. We also find that unpredictable fluctuations in long-term rates are driven by shocks to term premia,.not to monetary policy. This means that the ECB can affect long rates only through the systematic component of its monetary policy–which, as we have seen, mostly responds to U.S. variables. Monetary policy ”shocks” induced by the ECB have virtually no effect on long rates. Claiming that monetary policy in the Euro area can be determined as if the region were a closed economy is thus not consistent with the empirical evidence on

Does the Secondary Life Insurance Market Threaten Dynamic Insurance? by Glenn Daily, Igal Hendel and Alessandro Lizzeri. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 151-56 of American Economic Review, May 2008

The introduction of the precious metals for the purposes of money may with truth be considered as one of the most important steps towards the improvement of commerce, and the arts of civilised life; but it is no less true that, with the advancement of knowledge and science, we discover that it would be another improvement to banish them again from the employment to which, during a less enlightened period, they had been so advantageously applied. —David Ricardo (1816)