Knowledge that Transforms

The authors derive low frequency, say weekly, models implied by high frequency, say daily, ARMA models with symmetric GARCH errors. They show that low frequency models exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity of the GARCH form as well. The parameters in the conditional variance equation of the low frequency model depend upon mean, variance, and kurtosis parameters of the corresponding high frequency model. Moreover, strongly consistent estimators of the parameters in the high frequency model can be derived from low frequency data. The common assumption in applications that rescaled innovations are independent is disputable, since it depends upon the available data frequency. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

This lecture surveys recent models of growth and trade in search of descriptions of technologies that are consistent with episodes of very rapid income growth. Emphasis is placed on the on-the-job accumulation of human capital: learning by doing. Possib le connections between learning rates and international trade are discussed Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

Han’s maximum rank correlation (MRC) estimator is shown to be√ n-consistent and asymptotically normal. The proof rests on a general method for determining the asymptotic distribution of a maximization estimator, a simple U-statistic decomposition, and a uniform bound for degenerate U-processes. A consistent estimator of the asymptotic covari-ance matrix is provided, along with a result giving the explicit form of this matrix for any model within the scope of the MRC estimator. The latter result is applied to the binary choice model, and it is found that the MRC estimator does not achieve the semiparametric efficiency bound.

Accessible sur JSTOR : http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951649

REMEDIES FOR THE ERRORS-IN-VARIABLES problem often take the form of consistently estimable bounds on a parameter, the advantage of such remedies being that they require weaker assumptions than those needed for consistent estimation of the parameter itself. The seminal result is the "errors-in-variables bound " of Gini (1921), which

A social welfare function f is Arrowian if it has transitive values and satisfies Arrow's independence axiom. For any fraction t and any Arrowian f, either there will be some individual who dictates on a subset containing at least the fraction t of outcomes, or at least the fraction 1 minus t of the pairs of outcomes have their social ranking fixed independently of individual preference. And for any Arrowian f, there is a set containing a large fraction of the citizens whose preferences are never consulted in determining the social ranking of a large fraction of the pairs of alternatives. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

The debate between the North and the South about the enforcement of intellectual property rights is examined within a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North invents new products and the South imitates them. A welfare evaluation of a policy of tighter intellectual property rights is provided by decomposing its response into four items: (1) terms of trade; (2) production composition; (3) available products; and (4) intertemporal allocation of consumption The paper proceeds in stages. It begins with an exogenous rate of innovation in order to focus on the first two elements. The following two components are added by endogenizing the rate of innovation. Finally, foreign direct investment is added to the model. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

Anecdotal and experimental evidence suggests that bargaining sessions subject to deadlines often begin with cheap talk and rejected proposals. Agreements, if they are reached at all, tend to be concluded near the deadline. We attempt to capture and explain these phenomena in a strategic bargaining model that incorporates a bargaining deadline, the possibility of strategic delay, and a lack of perfect player control over the timing of offers. Imperfect player control is generated by an exogenous uniformly-distributed random delay in offer transmission. Our model has a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, unique at almost all nodes, in which players adopt strategic delay early in the game, make and reject offers later on, and reach agreements late in the game if at all. In equilibrium players miss the deadline with positive probability. The expected division of the surplus is unique and close to an even split.