Knowledge that Transforms

We estimate uncertainty measures for point forecasts obtained from survey data, pooling information embedded in observed forecast errors for different forecast horizons. To track time-varying uncertainty in the associated forecast errors, we derive a multiple-horizon specification of stochastic volatility. We apply our method to forecasts for various macroeconomic variables from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Compared to simple variance approaches, our stochastic volatility model improves the accuracy of uncertainty measures for survey forecasts.

This study investigates the impacts of exporting on working conditions in Myanmar by drawing on a new firm survey. For the identification, I use the rapid opening of Myanmar to trade alongside the firm's proximity to airports and products that have generated variations in access to foreign markets. The results show that exporting has significant positive impacts on working conditions regarding fire safety, health management, and freedom of negotiation; positive insignificant effects on wages; and negative insignificant effects on working hours. I also find that exporting positively affects firm size, management practices, and the likelihood of receiving a labor audit.

We evaluate the temporal stability of risk preferences using a remarkable data set that combines sociodemographic information from the Danish Civil Registry with information on risk attitudes from a longitudinal field experiment. Our econometric model accounts for endogenous sample selection and attrition processes that may confound inferences about temporal stability. Our experimental design builds in randomization on the incentives for participation that facilitates empirical identification of the model. In general, we find evidence consistent with temporal stability after correcting for the effects of selection and attrition. When neglected, these effects change our inferences in an economically and statistically significant manner.

Affirmative action raises the likelihood of getting into college or obtaining a government job for minority social groups in India. I find that minority group students are incentivized to stay in school longer in response to changes in future prospects. To identify causal relationships, I leverage variation in group eligibility, school age cohorts, and state-level intensity of implementation in difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity designs. These estimators consistently show that affirmative action incentivizes about 0.8 additional years of education for the average minority group student and 1.2 more years of education for a student from a marginal minority subgroup.

We estimate the impact of youth minimum wages on youth employment by exploiting a large discontinuity in Danish minimum wage rules at age 18, using monthly payroll records for the Danish population. The hourly wage jumps by 40% at the discontinuity. Employment falls by 33%, and total input of hours decreases by 45%, leaving the aggregate wage payment almost unchanged. We show theoretically how the discontinuity may be exploited to evaluate policy changes. The relevant elasticity for evaluating the effect on youth employment of changes in their minimum wage is in the range 0.6 to 1.1.

By matching a large database of individual macroforecaster data with the universe of sizable natural disasters across 54 countries, we identify a set of new stylized facts: forecasters are persistently heterogeneous in how often they issue or revise a forecast; information rigidity declines significantly following large, unexpected natural disaster shocks; and disagreement decreases among inattentive agents while it might increase for attentive ones. We develop a learning model that captures the two channels through which natural disaster shocks affect expectation formation: attention effect—the visibly large shocks induce immediate and synchronized updating of information for inattentive agents—and uncertainty effect—attentive agents might increase their acquisition of private information to compensate for the higher uncertainty after shocks.

In this paper, we estimate the costs associated with an important suite of labor regulations in India by taking advantage of the fact that these regulations apply only to firms above a size threshold. Using distortions in the firm size distribution together with a structural model of firm size choice, we estimate that the regulations increase firms' unit labor costs by 35%. This estimate is robust to potential misreporting on the part of firms and enumerators. We also document a robust positive association between regulatory costs and exposure to corruption, which may explain why regulations appear to be so costly in developing countries.

While the unemployment insurance (UI) program is one of the largest safety net programs in the United States, research on its benefits is limited. This paper exploits plausibly exogenous changes in state UI laws to empirically estimate whether UI generosity mitigates any of the previously documented negative health effects of job loss. The results show that higher UI generosity increases health insurance coverage and utilization, with stronger effects during periods of high unemployment rates. During such periods, higher UI generosity also leads to improved self-reported health. Finally, I find no effects on risky behaviors or health conditions.

We develop a method to use the one-time cross-sectional impact of a cleanly identified shock to identify its aggregate impact through the use of a factor model. We apply this methodology to evaluate the importance of fluctuations to the commitment to a currency peg for macroeconomic outcomes during the gold standard period in the United States. The presidential election in 1896 provides a cleanly identified positive shock to commitment to the gold standard. After the election, bank leverage increased substantially, particularly in states where gold was in greater use. Using the latent factor identified by the election, we find that full commitment to gold had the potential to reduce the volatility of real activity overall by a significant amount in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, as well as substantially mitigate the economic depression starting in 1893.

A one-third quota rule for women in local political leadership seats in India increases the number of female candidates who later contest seats in state and national legislatures. This arises from the candidacy of beneficiaries who gained political experience due to the quotas and career politicians who continue contesting in longer-exposed areas. The policy accounts for a substantial portion of the increase in female candidates for high office since the mid-1990s. Women have a higher probability of a top finish when running on major party tickets or contesting in areas that overlap with their local constituency.