Cet article donne des conditions suffisantes pour que la matrice Jacobienne de la demande concurrentielle agrge soit dfinie ngative.Cette proprit forte implique en particulier que l'axiome faible de la prfrence rvle est satisfait par la demande agrge, et que la demande totale pour chaque bien augmente lorsque son prix dc1'0 i t.Ces cond i tians suffisantes portent sur la distribution des prfrences et sont indpendantes de la distribution des revenus.L'approche repose sur la.notion de transformation homothtique d'une relatiof\de prfrence.On discute galement la porte pour ce type de problme de la notion de transformation affine d'une prfrence, qui introduit une structure algbrique intressante sur l'espace des prfrences.On montre galement comment le rsultat est li celui obenu par W. Hildenbrand (Econometrica (1983)) en posant des restrictions sur la distribution des revenus.
This paper studies pure exchange economies with infinite dimensional commodity spacces in the setting of Riesz dual systems. An Edgeworth equilibrium is an allocation that belongs to the core of every replication of the ec onomy. Under some mild conditions, it is shown that (1) Edgeworth equ ilibria exist, (2) an allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium if and o nly if it is an approximate quasiequilibrium, and (3) if preferences are uniformly proper, then every Edgeworth equilibrium is a quasiequi librium. The obtained results specialize to most exchange economies t hat have appeared in the literature of general equilib rium theory. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
The authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially-weighted function of accumulated past consumption. This implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption. Our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game. It is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open-loop Nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static Cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies, which are subgame perfect, approaches a price below it. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
The existence of competitive equilibrium is established for economies with a produc tion sector and an infinite dimensional space of commodities. The cru cial assumptions which are required (beyond those required in the fin ite dimensional setting) are bounds on marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
THE EFFECT OF MONETARY GROWTH on an economy's investment has long been of interest to economists, and monetary growth models provide a convenient tool for the analysis of this question. The standard optimizing growth model postulates that money is injected into the private sector through transfer payments which typically either are of lump sum form or are proportional to wealth, income, or money holdings. (See, for example, Brock (1974), Calvo (1979), Fischer (1979), and Gertler and Grinols (1982).) In these models monetary changes are tied directly to changes in subsidy or tax rates, and greater expected money growth generally either has no effect on investment or increases it through a Tobin (1965) effect. In this paper we analyze the effects that a stochastic monetary policy has on investment in an economy with individual optimization, rational expectations, and a government which makes expenditures and finances them through borrowing, money creation, and proportional income taxes. With such a formulation, money can be injected into the private sector through government purchases and open market operations as well as through transfers, and the link between money growth and subsidy or tax rates is weakened or nonexistent. We assume that the nominal income tax rates are constant over time. Given tax rates and (stochastic) government consumption, the stochastic monetary growth rule followed by the government induces a stochastic government debt policy. The effects that changes in the stochastic monetary growth rate have on investment depend on the nature of the depreciation deduction and on the relationship between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the tax rate on production income. When depreciation deductions are based on historical costs, an equilibrium is unique so long as the coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than the tax rate applicable to production income. In this case an increase in the mean rate of money growth decreases equilibrium investment while a mean preserving spread in the money growth rate increases investment. Given Friend and Blume's (1975) finding that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is substantially greater than one, this seems to be the empirically relevant case. If the coefficient of relative risk aversion is less than the tax rate on production income, multiple equilibria are possible, and the effects on investment of changes in the stochastic money growth rate are generally indeterminate. When depreciation deductions are based on replacement costs, investment is independent of the stochastic money growth rate. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the optimization problem of the representative individual when depreciation deductions are based on historical costs. Section 3 describes the behavior of the government and develops the rational expectations equilibrium for this economy. Section 4 examines the effects on investment of changes in the stochastic money growth rate. Section 5 briefly reconsiders the model when depreciation deductions are based on replacement costs.
This paper shows that: (1) the "preference reversal" phenomenon can be consistent with transitive preferences if these preferences violate the independence axiom of expected utility theory and (2) for the class of experiments that were used to produce the evidence concerning "preference reversal, " the elicitation of certainty equivalents is possible if, and only if, the respondent's preferences can be represented by functionals that are linear in the probabilities. Furthermore, a more general class of experiments is not immune to "preference reversal" if nonexpected utility preferences are admitted. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
Comparative static properties of optimal nonlinear income taxes are obtained for a finite population version o f the Mirrlees income-tax model with a weighted utilitarian social we lfare function and quasilinear preferences. The parameters which are varied are the weights in the welfare function, the slope of the prod uction constraint, and a parameter in the utility function. The endog enous variables are the consumers' consumption levels, pretax incomes (labor supplies in efficiency units), utility levels, and marginal t ax rates. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
This paper presents a finite-horizon search model that is econometrically implemented using all of the restrictions impli ed by the theory. Following a sample of male high school graduates fr om the youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys from graduat ion to employment, search parameters are estimated. Reservation wages and offer probabilities are estimated to be quite low. Simulations a re performed of the impact of changing the parameters on the expected duration of unemployment. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.