Knowledge that Transforms

The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates that the return on investments of foreign subsidiaries of US multinational companies over the period 1982–2006 averaged 9.4 percent annually after taxes; US subsidiaries of foreign multinationals averaged only 3.2 percent. BEA returns on foreign direct investment (FDI) are distorted because most intangible investments made by multinationals are expensed. We develop a multicountry general equilibrium model with an essential role for FDI and apply the BEA's methodology to construct economic statistics for the model economy. We estimate that mismeasurement of intangible investments accounts for over 60 percent of the difference in BEA returns.

The theory of international trade has paid scant attention to market institutions. Neither neoclassical theory nor new trade models typically specify the process by which supply and demand meet. Yet in the real world, intermediaries play a central role in materializing the gains from exchange outlined by standard trade theories. In Antr’and Costinot (2010), we have developed a stylized but explicit model of intermediation in trade. In this short paper, we present a variant of this model that illustrates the potential role of intermediaries in facilitating the realization of the gains from trade.

We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to determine the predictors of risk and time preferences. In villages with higher mean income, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Household income is correlated with patience but not with risk. We expand measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those models with prospect theory and a three-parameter hyperbolic discounting model. Comparable risk parameter estimates have been found for Chinese farmers, using our method. (C83, D12, O12, P38)

Zhao (2008) presents an interesting “all-or-nothing monitoring” result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial effort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-verifiable observation of the agent's effort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. I then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems. (D82, D86, M54)

I revisit the question of indeterminacy in US monetary policy using limited-information identification-robust methods. I find that the conclusions of Clarida, Galí, and Gernter (2000) that policy was inactive before 1979 are robust, but the evidence over the Volcker-Greenspan periods is inconclusive. I show that this is in fact consistent with policy being active over that period. Problems of identification also arise because policy reaction has been more gradual recently. At a methodological level, the paper demonstrates that identification issues should be taken seriously, and that identification-robust methods can be informative even when they produce wide confidence sets. (E31, E32, E52, E65,)

A key area of personnel economics focuses on the provision of human resource practices by firms, such as why one type of compensation is offered over another (Edward P. Lazear and Paul Oyer 2007). While this area of research includes various types of wage compensation, it also includes types of nonwage compensation, which have been shown to have sizable effects on worker behavior, such as mobility in the case of health insurance and traditional pension plans. The present analysis examines the effect of employer sponsored investment in general human capital, administered through tuition reimbursement programs, on employee turnover. Employer provided tuition reimbursement is a widespread program in which firms provide financial assistance for the direct cost of coursework taken by employees. Estimates of the percentage of firms that offer this program are as high as 85 percent (Peter Cappelli 2004). These programs support investment in an employee’s general human capital—skills that are transferable across employers—because accredited academic institutions are responsible for curriculum development, instruction, and certification and serve students employed at a wide variety of establishments. These programs represent a puzzle because firms are unlikely to make general human capital investments without some expectation of receiving an ex post return, but standard human capital theory Human Capital, Work, and outComes

The controversy over how much to charge for health products in the developing world rests, in part, on whether higher prices can increase use, either by targeting distribution to high-use households (a screening effect), or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk-cost effect. We develop a methodology for separating these two effects. We implement the methodology in a field experiment in Zambia using door-to-door marketing of a home water purification solution. We find evidence of economically important screening effects. By contrast, we find no consistent evidence of sunk-cost effects.

Using Student Performance Data to Identify Effective Classroom Practices by John H. Tyler, Eric S. Taylor, Thomas J. Kane and Amy L. Wooten. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 256-60 of American Economic Review, May 2010

I discuss the measurement of world poverty and inequality, with particular attention to the role of purchasing power parity (PPP) price indexes from the International Comparison Project. Global inequality increased with the latest revision of the ICP, and this reduced the global poverty line relative to the US dollar. The recent large increase of nearly half a billion poor people came from an inappropriate updating of the global poverty line, not from the ICP revisions. Even so, PPP comparisons between widely different countries rest on weak theoretical and empirical foundations. I argue for wider use of self-reports from international monitoring surveys, and for a global poverty line that is truly denominated in US dollars.