Knowledge that Transforms

Several impatient investors with private costs C i face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-C i . We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost. (JEL C73, D44, D82, G31)

Long-Run Risk (LRR) model which emphasizes the role of long-run risks, that is, low-frequency movements in consumption growth rates and volatility, in accounting for a wide-range of asset pricing puzzles. In this article we present a generalized LRR model, which allows us to study the role of cyclical fluctuations and macroeconomic-crisis on asset prices and expected returns. The Bansal and Yaron (2004) LRR model contains (i) a persistent expected consumption growth component, (ii) long-run variation in consumption volatility, and (iii) preference for early resolution of uncertainty. To evaluate the role of cyclical risks, we incorporate a cyclical component in consumption growth — this component is stationary in levels. To study financial market crisis, we also entertain jumps in consumption growth and consumptionvolatility. We find that the magnitude of risk compensation for cyclical risks in consumption critically depends on the magnitude of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES). When the IES is larger than one, cyclical risks carry a very small risk-premium and the compensation for long-run risks is large. When IES is close to zero, the risk compensation for cyclical risks is large, however, in this case the risk-free rate is implausibly high (in excess of 10 percent). Given this, it seems unlikely that the compensation for cyclical risk is of economically significant magnitude. This implication is also consistent with Robert E. Jr. Lucas (1987), who argues that economic costs of transient shocks are small and those for trend shocks are large. Moreover, Ravi Bansal, Robert F. Dittmar and Dana Kiku (2009) provide evidence from equity markets that the compensation for long-run risks is large and that for cyclical risk is quite small.

A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g. those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions.

Can marriage institutions limit marital inefficiency? We study the pervasive custom of watta satta in rural Pakistan, a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation. Watta satta can be seen as a mechanism for coordinating the actions of two sets of parents, each wishing to restrain their son-in-law. We find that marital discord, as measured by estrangement, domestic abuse, and wife's mental health, is indeed significantly lower in watta satta versus “conventional” marriage, but only after accounting for selection bias. These benefits cannot be explained by endogamy, a marriage pattern associated with watta satta. (JEL J12, J16, O15, O18, Z13)

How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and intrinsic motivation. Some societies rely more on informal enforcement and moral obligations within their constituting groups. Others rely more on formal enforcement and general moral obligations towards society at large. How do culture and institutions interact in generating different evolutionary trajectories of societal organizations? Do contemporary attitudes, institutions and behavior reflect distinct pre-modern trajectories? This paper addresses these questions by examining the bifurcation in the societal organizations of pre-modern China and Europe. It focuses on their distinct epitomizing social structures, the clan and the city, that sustain cooperation through different mixes of enforcement and intrinsic motivation. The Chinese clan is a kinship-based hierarchical organization in which strong moral ties and reputation among clan’s members are particularly important in sustaining cooperation. In Medieval Europe, by contrast, the main example of a cooperative organization is the city. Here cooperation is across kinship lines and external enforcement plays a bigger role. But morality and reputation, although weaker, also matter and extend beyond one’s kin.

Models of heterogeneous beliefs can generate rich implications for trading and asset pricing (see Suleyman Basak 2005 for a recent survey). When studying such models, aggregation often leads to difficulty in computing equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we introduce a flexible framework to model heterogeneous beliefs in the economy, which we refer to as “affine’’ disagreement about fundamentals. Affine processes (see Darrel Duffie, Jun Pan, and Kenneth Singleton 2000) are appealing as they provide a large degree of flexibility in modeling the conditional means, volatilities, and jumps for various quantities of interest while remaining analytically tractable. Our affine heterogeneous beliefs framework allows further for stochastic disagreement among agents about growth rates, volatility dynamics, as well as the likelihood of jumps and the distribution of jump sizes.

Employment at multinational enterprises (MNEs) responds to wages at the extensive margin, when an MNE enters a foreign location, and at the intensive margin, when an MNE operates existing affiliates.

This paper describes the extent of product creation and destruction in a large sector of the US economy. We find four times more entry and exit in product markets than is found in labor markets because most product turnover happens within firms. Net product creation is strongly procyclical and primarily driven by creation rather than destruction. We find that a cost-of-living index that takes product turnover into account is 0.8 percentage points per year lower than a “fixed goods” price index like the CPI. The procyclicality of the bias implies that business cycles are more volatile than indicated by official statistics. (JEL E31, E32, L11, O31)

The capital-labor substitution elasticity and technical biases in production are critical parameters. The received wisdom claims their joint identification is infeasible. We challenge that interpretation. Putting the new approach of “normalized” production functions at the heart of a Monte Carlo analysis we identify the conditions under which identification is feasible and robust. The key result is that jointly modeling the production function and first-order conditions is superior to single-equation approaches especially when merged with “normalization.” Our results will have fundamental implications for production-function estimation under non-neutral technical change, for understanding the empirical relevance of normalization and variability underlying past empirical studies. (JEL E22, O33, O41)

The success of new technologies depends on both the firms' investment and consumers' usage decisions. We study this problem in a shared ATM network. Inefficiencies may arise because banks coordinate investment, and consumers may not make proper use of the network. Based on an empirical model of ATM investment and demand, we find that banks substantially underinvested in ATMs, in contrast with earlier findings of strategic overinvestment in the United States. Furthermore, ATM usage was too low, because regulation prohibited fees for cash withdrawals. A direct promotion of investment improves welfare, but fees for branch cash withdrawals would be more effective. (JEL G21, G31, O33)