Knowledge that Transforms

To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
1778 results ✕ Clear filters

Life Expectancy and Old Age Savings

American Economic Review 2009 99(2), 110-115
Rich people, women, and healthy people live much longer than their poor, male, and sick counterparts. Two extremes, taken from our analysis of single people in the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset, illustrate this point: an unhealthy 70-year-old male at the twentieth percentile of the permanent income distribution expects to live only 6 more years, that is, to age 76. In contrast, a healthy 70-year-old woman at the eightieth percentile of the permanent income distribution expects to live 16 more years, thus making it to age 86.] Such significant differences in life expectancy could, all else equal, lead to significant differ ences in saving behavior. A related observation is that people with high permanent incomes keep large amounts of assets until very late in life. Table 1, also based on the

Anchoring Effects: Evidence from Art Auctions

American Economic Review 2009 99(3), 1027-1039
This paper shows that the price of a painting sold at an art auction and the experts' pre-sale valuations are anchored on the price at which the painting previously sold at auction. We are able to separate anchoring from rational learning by using the identifying strategy that the unobservable component of quality for a particular painting remains constant between the last auction sale and the current auction sale. We interpret these results as anchoring on the part of the buyers, with the sellers and auctioneers either anticipating anchoring on the part of the buyers or exhibiting anchoring effects themselves. (JEL D44, Z11)

Offshoring and Volatility: Evidence from Mexico's Maquiladora Industry

American Economic Review 2009 99(4), 1664-1671
This paper studies the second-moment properties of offshoring, the arrangement whereby firms carry out particular stages of production abroad. It documents a new empirical regularity: maquiladora industries in Mexico that are associated with US offshoring experience fluctuations in employment that are twice as volatile as the corresponding industries in the United States. This finding is not attributable simply to higher volatility in the overall Mexican economy, nor to the smaller size of Mexico's industries compared to US counterparts. (JEL F14, F23, L24, L25, L60, O14)

Disability Screening and Labor Supply: Evidence from South Africa

American Economic Review 2009 99(2), 512-516
Yet research that examines the poverty reduction and labor supply effects of disability programs has taken place exclu-sively in developed countries with relatively low unemployment and high labor force participa-tion rates. In developing countries with high unemployment rates, the disincentive effect of cash transfers on labor supply has often been assumed to be economically insignificant (Anne Case and Angus Deaton 1998). In this paper, I provide initial evidence on, and draw attention to, the effect of the South Africa Disability Grant (DG) program on labor supply, in the context of a policy change in disability screening. I use a difference-in-differences estimator to assess the effect of a change toward a less intensive dis-ability screening on labor force nonparticipation for older individuals.If screening for disability benefit programs were perfect, the supply of disability benefits would be independent of labor supply decisions, and only those unable to work due to health con-ditions would receive benefits. However, the dis-ability screening process is imperfect because it is, in practice, difficult to determine whether a person is able to work, which is the typical test of eligibility for disability benefit programs. Recent evidence suggests that the work disincen -tive effects of disability benefits are expected to

Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation

American Economic Review 2009 99(4), 1178-1205
We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning that provides sharp predictions as to how learning members of an organization might cope with the simultaneous learning of others as a function of fundamental variables, e.g., firm size and the discount factor. While the problem of learning while others are learning is quite difficult, we find support for the comparative static predictions of the model's unique symmetric equilibrium. (JEL C72, D23, D83)

Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending

American Economic Review 2009 99(1), 49-84
We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might give rise to them. We analyze unique data from a large auto sales company serving the subprime market. Short-term liquidity appears to be a key driver of consumer behavior. Demand increases sharply during tax rebate season and purchases are highly sensitive to down-payment requirements. Lenders also face substantial informational problems. Default rates rise significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for loan caps, and higher-risk borrowers demand larger loans. This adverse selection is mitigated, however, by risk-based pricing. (JEL D14, D82, D83, G21)

Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets

American Economic Review 2009 99(3), 608-627 open access
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets. (JEL C78)

Child Benefits, Maternal Employment, and Children's Health: Evidence from Canadian Child Benefit Expansions

American Economic Review 2009 99(2), 128-132
Industrial countries typically provide income transfers to families with young children. Traditionally, these family benefit programs were motivated by distributional concerns--families with children faced higher expenditure needs than other families, and a concern for horizontal equity led to transfers. Throughout the 1990s, however, many countries introduced benefits aimed at improving labor market incentives for mothers with young children. In the United States, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has played this role, but similar programs exist in Europe, Canada, and elsewhere. Much effort has been expended on evaluating the labor market impact of child benefits. However, less work has examined the impact of these programs on broader outcomes such as the mental and physical health of both the children and the parents, outcomes that follow from the traditional equity motivation for child benefits. In this paper, we review and extend some recent results studying the expansion of family benefits in Canada. In particular, we exploit a change that occurred in the province of Manitoba to highlight the effects of child benefits on both labor supply and family outcomes.

Defensive Weapons and Defensive Alliances

American Economic Review 2009 99(2), 282-286
In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush initiated the deployment of a new ballistic missile defense system. 1 The move triggered vociferous international concerns, including a recent statement of Russia and China condemning U.S. plans as a destabilizing move. 2 Indeed, the move amounts to a withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. The U.S. position is that such missile defense systems only reduce the damage caused by an incoming strike, and therefore do not threaten international stability. This paper provides a careful formal analysis of how the unilateral acquisition of defensive weapons may affect the sustainability of peace. We consider a dynamic game in which two symmetric countries repeatedly decide to be peaceful or to attack. Peace is sustained in equilibrium by trigger strategies in which attacks are followed by permanent conflict. Under complete information, peace is sustainable if and only if the value of continued peace is greater than the temptation of launching a surprise attack. Because defensive weapons limit the possibility of retaliation, the unilateral acquisi-