Knowledge that Transforms

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Intertemporal Consumption and Credit Constraints: Does Total Expenditure Respond to an Exogenous Shock to Credit?

American Economic Review 2010 100(3), 1080-1103
There is continuing controversy over the importance of credit constraints. This paper investigates whether total household expenditure and debt is affected by an exogenous increase in access to credit provided by a credit market reform that enabled Danish house owners to use housing equity as collateral for consumption loans. We find that the magnitude of the response is correlated with the amount of equity released by the reform and that the effect is strongest for younger households. Even for this group, the response was moderate. The aggregate effect of the reform was significant but small. (JEL D14, D91, E21)

Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship

American Economic Review 2010 100(4), 1826-1846 open access
Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents. (JEL D82)

Does Product Market Competition Lead Firms to Decentralize?

American Economic Review 2010 100(2), 434-438 open access
There is a widespread sense that over the last two decades firms have been decentralizing decisions to employees further down the managerial hierarchy. Economists have developed a range of theories to account for delegation, but there is less empirical evidence, especially across countries. This has limited the ability to understand the phenomenon of decentralization. To address the empirical lacuna we have developed a research program to measure the internal organization of firms - including their decentralization decisions - across a large range of industries and countries. In this paper we investigate whether greater product market competition increases decentralization. For example, tougher competition may make local manager's information more valuable, as delays to decisions become more costly. Since globalization and liberalization have increased the competitiveness of product markets, one explanation for the trend towards decentralization could be increased competition. Of course there are a range of other factors that may also be at play, including human capital, information and communication technology, culture and industrial composition. To tackle these issues we collected detailed information on the internal organization of firms across nations. The few datasets that exist are either from a single industry or (at best) across many firms in a single country. We analyze data on almost 4,000 firms across twelve countries in Europe, North America and Asia. We find that competition does indeed seem to foster greater decentralization.

The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk of Entrepreneurship

American Economic Review 2010 100(3), 1163-1194
Entrepreneurship is risky. We study the risk facing a well-documented and important class of entrepreneurs, those backed by venture capital. Using a dynamic program, we calculate the certainty-equivalent of the difference between the cash rewards that entrepreneurs actually received over the past 20 years and the cash that entrepreneurs would have received from a risk-free salaried job. The payoff to a venture-backed entrepreneur comprises a below-market salary and a share of the equity value of the company when it goes public or is acquired. We find that the typical venture-backed entrepreneur received an average of $5.8 million in exit cash. Almost three-quarters of entrepreneurs receive nothing at exit and a few receive over a billion dollars. Because of the extreme dispersion of payoffs, an entrepreneur with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of two places a certainty equivalent value only slightly greater than zero on the distribution of outcomes she faces at the time of her company's launch. (JEL G24, G32, L26, M13)

Using Performance on the Job to Inform Teacher Tenure Decisions

American Economic Review 2010 100(2), 250-255
The notion that some high stakes need to be attached to direct measures of teachers’ class-room performance as a control for quality in the work force is an idea gaining traction in public education. One such proposal prescribes low-ering the barriers to entry into teaching while simultaneously being more selective about which teachers are retained when they become eligible for tenure (Robert Gordon, Thomas J. Kane, and Douglas O. Staiger 2006; Eric A. Hanushek 2009).

The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks

American Economic Review 2010 100(3), 763-801
This paper investigates the impact of tax changes on economic activity. We use the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and Congressional reports, to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar tax policy actions. This analysis allows us to separate legislated changes into those taken for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and those taken for more exogenous reasons. The behavior of output following these more exogenous changes indicates that tax increases are highly contractionary. The effects are strongly significant, highly robust, and much larger than those obtained using broader measures of tax changes. (JEL E32, E62, H20, N12)

The Education-Health Gradient

American Economic Review 2010 100(2), 234-238
In this paper, we determine the role played by early cognitive, noncognitive, and health endowments. We identify the causal effect of education on health and health-related behaviors. We develop an empirical model of schooling choice and post-schooling outcomes, where both schooling and the outcomes determined in part by schooling are influenced by measured early family environments and latent capabilities (cognitive, noncognitive and health). We show that family background characteristics, and cognitive, noncognitive, and health endowments developed by age 10, are important determinants of labor market and health disparities at age 30. Not properly accounting for personality traits overestimates the importance of cognitive ability in determining adult health. Selection on factors determined early in life explains more than half of the observed difference by education in poor health, depression, and obesity. Education has an important causal effect in explaining differences in many adult outcomes and healthy behaviors. We uncover significant gender differences. We go beyond the current literature which typically estimates mean effects to compute distributions of treatment effects. We show how the health returns to education can vary among individuals who are similar with respect to their observed characteristics, and how a mean effect can hide gains and losses for different individuals. Our research highlights the important role played by the early years in producing health.

Inherited Trust and Growth

American Economic Review 2010 100(5), 2060-2092 open access
This paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation. We show that inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants is significantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears. We thus use the inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants as a time-varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin. This strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects. (JEL N11, N12, N31, N32, O47, Z13)