Knowledge that Transforms

Banking crises are frequent events. Gerard Caprio and Daniela Klingebiel (1997) catalog over 80 banking crises during the last 25 years. Interestingly, some banking crises are associated with no output losses whatsoever, while others involve massive recessions. Finally, it is known that the probability of a banking crisis rises as the rate of inflation rises (see Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache, 1997; John Boyd et al., 2001a, b). While received wisdom exists about the conduct of monetary policy while a crisis is underway, there is no formal treatment of how the conduct of monetary policy during “normal times” affects the potential for banking crises to occur. To fill that gap, I consider economies where spatial separation and limited communication create a transactions role for money, and random shocks to agents’ liquidity preferences create a role for banks. In addition, banks confront randomness in withdrawal demand. When withdrawal demand is sufficiently high, banks exhaust their cash reserves. There are good reasons to associate this with a banking panic. The output lost during a banking panic depends on how great withdrawal demand is. Some banking crises generate no output losses, while others generate large reductions in resource availability. In addition, the conduct of monetary policy during “normal times” affects the probability of a banking crisis. The higher the nominal interest rate (the inflation rate), the higher is the probability of a panic. Driving the nominal interest rate to zero (following the Friedman rule) eliminates bank panics. This constitutes a new rationale for the Friedman rule. Nonetheless, conventional methods of implementing the Friedman rule never produce an optimal resource allocation. In particular, low nominal interest rates induce banks to hold large cash reserves, thereby forgoing socially more productive investments. In effect, the Friedman rule induces banks to become narrow banks voluntarily. The banking system is very safe, but it undertakes a suboptimal level of investment. Less conventional methods for implementing the Friedman rule, such as allowing unrestricted access to the discount window at a zero nominal interest rate, lead either to the nonexistence of equilibrium, or to massive indeterminacies. None of the equilibria will be consistent with full optimality.

We document the return to investing in U.S. nonpublicly traded equity. Entrepreneurial investment is extremely concentrated, yet despite its poor diversification, we find that the returns to private equity are no higher than the returns to public equity. Given the large public equity premium, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a seemingly far worse risk-return trade-off. We briefly discuss how large nonpecuniary benefits, a preference for skewness, or overestimates of the probability of survival could potentially explain investment in private equity despite these findings.

This paper suggests that skill accumulation through past work experience, or “learning-by-doing” (LBD), can provide an important propagation mechanism in a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model, as the current labor supply affects future productivity. Our econometric analysis uses a Bayesian approach to combine micro-level panel data with aggregate time series. Formal model evaluation shows that the introduction of the LBD mechanism improves the model's ability to fit the dynamics of aggregate output and hours.

As policy makers have sought to reduce the welfare rolls by increasing labor supply among single mothers, much attention has been given to the possible role of expanded child care subsidies, including direct provision of public preschool. At the same time, public interest in child care subsidies for two-parent households is high; for example, former Vice President Gore not long ago proposed to make high-quality pre-school fully available to every family, for every child, in every community in America (Albert Gore, 1999). In this paper, I use 1980 Census data to estimate the effect of public school enrollment for a woman's five-year-old on measures of labor supply and public assistance receipt. This approach has two advantages. First, I am able to estimate the effect of a large implicit child care subsidy.1 Second, because public kindergarten is universally available to all age-eligible children where it is provided, selection problems related to means-testing do not arise. A difficulty with public school enrollment arises because parents may choose to hold their children back a year or enroll them in private school. I deal with this issue by using five-yearold's quarter of birth (QOB) variables as instruments for public school enrollment status. This strategy works because parents' ability to enroll a child in public kindergarten in the academic year when the child turns five typically depends on the calendar date of the child's birth.2 In most states, children born in the second quarter (April 1-June 30) of 1974 will have been eligible to start kindergarten in the fall of 1979, while children born in the first quarter (January 1March 31) of 1975 generally will not. Eligibility for children born between July 1 and December 31, 1974 depends on the rules where they live.3

We discuss two-class voting procedures where voters are divided into classes and a separate majority is required in each class. Examples include Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and some political mechanisms. We investigate how voting mechanisms aggregate information dispersed among voters when voters have conflicts of interests as well as different information regarding a proposal. We find that two-class voting provides a significant improvement over one-class voting in all situations where voters have significant conflicts of interests, and where the voters are relatively evenly divided between interest groups. However, two-class voting is inefficient absent conflicts of interests.

The Economics of Copyright "Fair Use" in a Networked World by Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner and Kevin M. Murphy. Published in volume 92, issue 2, pages 205-208 of American Economic Review, May 2002

Do contributions levels matter endogenous protection or is the existence of a lobby sufficient? Are lobbies’ net benefits from protection identical to their contribution levels, or does the level of protection simply reflect contribution levels of supporters and opponents? We estimate the Influence Driven (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) models within a unified theoretical framework to examine the contrasting implications derived from these two prominent tariff formation models. We find strong evidence that protection is indeed for sale. The important new result is, however, that not only the existence of lobbies matters, but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions. Using J tests to compare the power of the models directly, we cannot reject the null of correct specification of the Influence Driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the Tariff Function model.

Do scale economies help to explain international trade flows? Using a large database on output, trade flows, and factor endowments, we find that allowing for the presence of increasing returns to scale in production significantly increases our ability to predict international trade flows. In particular, using trade data, we find that a third of all goods-producing industries are characterized by increasing returns to scale. Thus, scale economies are a quantifiable and important source of comparative advantage.

We use household data from northeast China to examine the link between investment and land tenure insecurity induced by China's system of village-level land reallocation. We quantify expropriation risk using a hazard analysis of individual plot tenures and incorporate the predicted “hazards of expropriation” into an empirical analysis of plot-level investment. Our focus is on organic fertilizer use, which has long-lasting benefits for soil quality. Although we find that higher expropriation risk significantly reduces application of organic fertilizer, a welfare analysis shows that guaranteeing land tenure in this part of China would yield only minimal efficiency gains.

Robert E. Lucas, Jr.:' January 2002 issue of the Atlantic contains an article by Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne called A New Grand Strategy. article deplores the role of the United States in the Middle East, which the authors interpret as derived from a perceived need to ensure the availability of from that region. As the authors observe, America derives most of its from Alaska, Canada, the continental United States, Mexico, and Venezuela. About 25 percent of U.S. petroleum imports come from the Persian Gulf. If the United States adopted a national energy strategy it could free itself from dependence on Persian Gulf oil (p. 37). They go on to advocate doing this, and leaving Middle East politics to other, still dependent powers. They explain: The role the United States has assigned itself in the Persian Gulf has made it-not Japan, not the states of Western Europe, not China-vulnerable to a backlash (p. 38). Schwarz and Layne article is a good example of what W. Lee Hansen et al. (2002 [preceding paper, this issue]) call illiteracy. Its entire argument is based on the market for oil, but the authors do not have even an Economics 101 understanding of what a market is. They construct a vision of a new U.S. foreign policy based on a wholly arbitrary matching up of particular buyers of a homogeneous good with particular sellers of the good. We will exercise hegemony in Mexico and Venezuela, they say, and let the Japanese take care of the Middle East. example illustrates three points emphasized in Use or Lose It: Teaching Literacy in the Economics Principles Course (this issue, preceding paper). First, economic illiteracy often is an affliction of the well-educated: Schwarz and Layne are articulate experts in foreign affairs. Second, economic illiteracy can be dangerous: there is more at stake than bad answers to our exam questions. Third, the ignorance involved is not ignorance of the research tools of technical economics. should not be necessary to be handy with fixed-point theorems in order to avoid mistakes like the one Schwarz and Layne make. Use or Lose It has two main theses. first is that we can and should promote economic literacy by redesigning the first collegelevel economics course (one semester) to teach principles, not methods. second is that we can use a list of 20 Content Standards provided by the National Council on Economic Education to define what it means to teach principles. I have misgivings about both these theses, to which I turn in a moment. I must say at the outset, though, that my criticism will be almost entirely nonconstructive: I agree that introductory economics needs to be reinvented, but I do not claim to know how to do it. In criticizing introductory economics courses and textbooks, the authors lament the increasingly technical nature of the course and cite others who share this view. Nostalgia is expressed (in a quote from McConnell, not a direct statement by these authors) for a 1946 text of Frank Taussig's that predates even my ancient training by 15 years! would be hard to think of a surer way to discourage the most able students from pursuing a career in economics than to offer them a 50-year-old textbook on the grounds that P. J. O'Rourke did not like graphs. Imagine proposing such a thing to an association of physicists or chemists or, for that matter, musicologists! Knowledge is cumulative-a fact that should make us happy, not sad. One of our jobs as teachers is to help our most eager and creative students get to the knowledge frontier as fast as they want to go. In the natural sciences and the arts, introductory courses are professionally oriented basic-training courses on which one can build a creative career. Economics students deserve as much. problem with leaving the matter at this is that introductory science courses tend to be useless for nonmajors. Indeed, levels of physics literacy, chemistry literacy, and musical literacy among well-educated people are in no better shape than economics literacy. This is the classic case against letting each student design his 'Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th St., Chicago, IL 60637.