Knowledge that Transforms

Large blocks of stock play an important role in many studies of corporate governance and finance. Despite this important role, there is no standardized data set for these blocks, and the best available data source, Compact Disclosure, has many mistakes and biases. In this paper, we document these mistakes and show how to fix them. The mistakes and biases tend to increase with the level of reported blockholdings: in firms where Compact Disclosure reports that aggregate blockholdings are greater than 50%, these aggregate holdings are incorrect more than half the time and average holdings for these incorrect firms are overstated by almost 30 percentage points. For researchers using uncorrected blockholder data as a dependent variable, these errors will increase the standard error of coefficient estimates but do not appear to cause bias. However, we find that if blockholders are used as an independent variable, economically significant errors-in-variables biases can occur. We demonstrate these biases using a representative analysis of the relationship between firm value and outside blockholders. An online appendix to our paper provides a “clean” data set for our sample firms and time period. For researchers who need to work outside of this sample, we also test the efficacy of alternative (cheaper) fixes to this data problem, and find that truncating or winsorizing the sample can reduce about half of the bias in our representative application.

We report a significant positive association between the likelihood of securities fraud allegations and a measure of executive stock option incentives. This relation is robust to the inclusion of other components of the compensation structure and to other possible determinants of fraud allegations. In addition, we find that the positive relation between the likelihood of fraud allegations and option intensity is stronger in firms with higher outside blockholder and higher institutional ownership. These findings support the view that stock options increase the incentive to engage in fraudulent activity and that this incentive is exacerbated by institutional and block ownership.

Why do firms allow their executives to accept outside directorships? Are firms acting in the best interests of their shareholders by allowing them to do so? We develop a theoretical model where accepting an outside directorship alters the CEO's effect on the value of the home firm. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than is optimal for the home firm. Our theoretical model is consistent with other recent empirical finance research on the effects of external directorships.

Contracting theory predicts that greater equity-related compensation will decrease the agency problems of equity but may exacerbate the agency problems of debt. We present evidence that the agency costs of debt may have declined during the 1990s. Specifically, changes in the financial characteristics of our sample firms suggest that underinvestment, asset substitution, and financial distress became less likely. Furthermore, agency costs of equity increased during the 1990s, primarily because firms became more difficult to monitor. Together, the findings provide an explanation for why more firms used option-based compensation in the latter 1990s, and why the proportion of options in compensation structure increased throughout the decade of the 1990s.

We argue that outsiders are handicapped (chosen only if markedly better than the best insider) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) successions to strengthen the incentive that the contest to become CEO provides inside candidates. Handicapping implies are that a firm will be more likely to choose an insider to succeed to the CEO position where insiders are more comparable to each other, where outsiders are less comparable to insiders, and where there are more inside candidates. We assess these predictions using a data set containing more than 1,000 observations on CEO succession in large U.S. firms over the period 1974–1995 and a novel measure of the comparability of insiders that identifies those firms with a product or line of business organizational structure. Our evidence is consistent with each prediction. We also explore more carefully our organizational structure variable. We find that where firms switch to a product or line of business structure (making insiders more comparable) the likelihood of outsider succession falls. And we consider the possibility that managers from firms with a product or line of business structure may be more likely to be chosen CEO because their experience as divisional head better prepares them for a CEO's duties. Two tests suggest that this is not the source of our finding that these firms are more likely to promote insiders to be CEO. The first test finds that controlling for prior experience managing a business (a division or a firm) among inside candidates to be CEO, those firms organized along product lines remain more likely to promote from within. The second test finds that when outsiders are chosen CEO, these outsiders do not come disproportionately from firms with a product or line of business structure.

This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms' corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large firms (assets extgreater2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specific factors only modestly affect governance even when they are statistically significant. This suggests that many Korean firms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm-specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with “sticky governance”, in which firms alter their governance slowly in response to economic factors.

We focus on the relations among inside ownership, board composition, unaffiliated block ownership, and compensation structure for a sample of firms following their IPOs. Specifically, we follow firms for up to eleven years after their IPOs and examine the full sample and subsamples of firms that survive, are acquired, or that file for bankruptcy during the sample period. We find that as CEO ownership declines, board independence, board seats held by venture capitalists, and unaffiliated block ownership increase. Our findings suggest that as inside ownership decreases alternative governance mechanisms evolve to help mitigate the resulting increase in agency costs. Interestingly, the associations between CEO ownership, the fraction of venture capital board membership, and unaffiliated block ownership exist only for firms that survive over the eleven-year sample period.

Contrary to arguments that poison pills degrade firm performance, we find that operating performance modestly improves during the 5-year period after pill adoption. Performance improvements are present in a wide range of firms, and are independent of adoption year and whether the firm is R&D intensive. Although recent arguments suggest that the protection offered by pills is strongest when combined with a staggered board, the performance changes also are unrelated to board structure. This evidence undermines the widely held view that poison pills have systematically negative effects on firm performance.

We consider the equilibrium relationships between incentives from compensation, investment, and firm performance. In an optimal contracting model, we show that the relationship between firm performance and managerial incentives, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits of investment, as in theories of managerial entrenchment. We estimate the joint relationships between incentives and firm performance and between incentives and investment. We provide new results showing that investment is increasing in incentives. Further, in contrast to previous studies, we find that firm performance is increasing in incentives at all levels of incentives. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with theories of overinvestment based on managers having private benefits of investment. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of investment and, more generally, models of underinvestment.

We propose that a simple "dual-self" model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin’s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay, as in the O'Donoghue and Rabin models of quasi-hyperbolic utility, and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist. The base version of our model is consistent with the Gul-Pesendorfer axioms, but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive load.