This paper examines how technology transfer within U. S. multinational firms changes in response to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by sixteen countries over the 1982–1999 period. Analysis of detailed firm-level data reveals that royalty payments for technology transferred to affiliates increase at the time of reforms, as do affiliate R&D expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications. Increases in royalty payments and R&D expenditures are concentrated among affiliates of parent companies that use U. S. patents extensively prior to reform and are therefore expected to value IPR reform most. For this set of affiliates, increases in royalty payments exceed 30 percent.

One of the alleged benefits of the recent global movement to strengthen intellectual property rights (IPRs) is that such reforms accelerate transfers of technology between countries. The paper examines how technology transfer among U.S. multinational firms changes in response to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 12 countries over the 1982-99 period. The analysis of detailed firm-level data reveal that royalty payments for intangibles transferred to affiliates increase at the time of reforms, as do affiliate research and development (R&D) expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications. Increases in royalty payments and R&D expenditures are more than 20 percent larger among affiliates of parent companies that use U.S. patents more extensively prior to reform and therefore are expected to value IPR reform most.

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.

This paper analyzes the determinants of partial ownership of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms and, in particular, the marked decline in the use of joint ventures over the last 20 years. The evidence indicates that whole ownership is most common when firms coordinate integrated production activities across different locations, transfer technology, and benefit from worldwide tax planning. Because operations and ownership levels are jointly determined, it is helpful to use the liberalization of ownership restrictions by host countries and the imposition of joint venture tax penalties in the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 as instruments for ownership levels to identify these effects. Firms responded to these regulatory and tax changes by using wholly owned affiliates instead of joint ventures and expanding intrafirm trade and technology transfer. The implied complementarity of whole ownership and intrafirm trade suggests that the reduced costs of engaging in integrated global operations contributed substantially to the sharply declining propensity of American firms to organize their foreign operations as joint ventures over the last two decades. Estimates imply that as much as one-fifth to three-fifths of the decline in the use of joint ventures by multinational firms is attributable to the increased importance of intrafirm transactions. The forces of globalization appear to have diminished, rather than accelerated, the use of shared ownership.

This article evaluates the impact of capital controls and their liberalization on the activities of US multinational firms. These firms attempt to circumvent capital controls by reducing reported local profitability and increasing the frequency of dividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is comparable with the effect of 27% higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countries imposing capital controls are 9.8% more likely than other affiliates to remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls face 5.25% higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. Capital control liberalizations are associated with significant increases in multinational activity—property, plant, and equipment grow at 6.9% faster annual rates following liberalizations. The combination of the costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates discourages investment in countries with capital controls, and this effect is reversed upon liberalization of controls. (JEL F21, F23, F36, F42, G15, G32, G34)

This paper analyzes the extent to which tax differences affect the use of trade credit. U.S.-owned affiliates in low-tax countries use trade credit to lend, whereas those in high-tax countries use trade credit to borrow: 10% lower local tax rates are associated with net trade credit positions that are 1.4% higher as a fraction of sales. The use of trade credit to get capital out of low-tax, low-return environments is also illustrated by the temporary repatriation tax holiday in 2005, which was used most intensively by affiliates with positive net trade credit positions.

ABSTRACT The Homeland Investment Act provided a tax holiday for the repatriation of foreign earnings. Advocates argued the Act would alleviate financial constraints by reducing the cost to U.S. multinationals of accessing internal capital. This paper shows that repatriations did not increase domestic investment, employment, or R&D—even for firms that appeared to be financially constrained or lobbied for the holiday. Instead, a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with a $0.60 to $0.92 increase in shareholder payouts. Regulations intended to restrict such payouts were undermined by the fungibility of money. Results indicate that U.S. multinationals were not financially constrained and were well‐governed.

Rising levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) concern growing numbers of policymakers and members of the American public. These concerns stem from the perception that foreign activities of American multinational corporations reduce employment and other economic activities within the United States. While investment flows within the United States go largely unnoticed, in an international setting the lexicon of “winners” and “losers” can be inescapable. Curiously, both capital-exporting countries and capital-importing countries have at times expressed concern over the consequences of international capital flows. Capital-exporting countries worry that too much of their capital goes abroad, while capital-importing countries fear foreign control of domestic assets and the possible macroeconomic instability associated with rapid changes in foreign investment levels. The concerns of capital-exporting countries, while diffuse, often are based on conceptions of outbound FDI as diverting economic activity. Unsurprisingly, growing overseas activities of multinational firms have become a source of economic insecurity for workers, managers, and tax collectors (see e.g., Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, 2001).

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the capital structures of foreign affiliates and internal capital markets of multinational corporations. Ten percent higher local tax rates are associated with 2.8% higher debt/asset ratios, with internal borrowing being particularly sensitive to taxes. Multinational affiliates are financed with less external debt in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or weak creditor rights, reflecting significantly higher local borrowing costs. Instrumental variable analysis indicates that greater borrowing from parent companies substitutes for three‐quarters of reduced external borrowing induced by capital market conditions. Multinational firms appear to employ internal capital markets opportunistically to overcome imperfections in external capital markets.