This study investigates the effect of banking system reform on the investment behavior of Chinese listed firms. We find that the politically-oriented investment problem for state-controlled listed companies is mitigated by the reform due to foreign participation in the management of Chinese banks. The problem of underinvestment in non-state-controlled listed companies also appears to be alleviated due to an increase of bank loans. We include leverage in our analysis and the main findings are robust. The results provide evidence that Chinese banking system reform has increased the efficiency of resource allocation, easing investment distortions in state-controlled listed companies and reducing financial constraints in non-state-controlled listed companies.

This paper extends the macroeconomic frailty model to include sectoral frailty factors that capture default correlations among firms in a similar business. We estimate sectoral and macroeconomic frailty factors and their effects on default intensity using the data for Japanese firms from 1992 to 2010. We find strong evidence for the presence of sectoral frailty factors even after accounting for the effects of observable covariates and macroeconomic frailty on default intensity. The model with sectoral frailties performs better than that without. Results show that accounting for the sources of unobserved sectoral default risk covariations improves the accuracy of default probability estimation.

Based upon structural credit models, we investigate the changes of the effects of employee stock options (ESOs) on bond yield spreads due to the revision of SFAS No. 123R (No.123R) which requires expensing ESO amounts. Using American bond observations from year 1995 to 2007, we find that the revision decreases the information benefits of ESOs disclosure. When controlling for credit ratings and potential endogeneity problems, we also find that ESOs are significantly and positively related to bond yield spreads in post-No.123R period while have an opposite effect in pre-No.123R period. We conclude that information effect mainly drives the ESO’s effects on credit risk in both pre- and post-No.123R periods.

We investigate odd‐lot trades in equity markets. Odd lots are increasingly used in algorithmic and high‐frequency trading, but are not reported to the consolidated tape or in databases such as TAQ. In our sample, the median number of odd‐lot trades is 24% but in some stocks odd lots are 60% or more of trading. Odd‐lot trades contribute 35% of price discovery, consistent with informed traders using odd lots to avoid detection. Omitting odd‐lot trades leads to inaccuracies in order imbalance measures and makes sentiment measures unreliable. Excluding odd lots from the consolidated tape raises important regulatory issues.

This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short‐horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information revealed by price in equilibrium (i.e., price informativeness) and can lead to multiple linear equilibria. We then demonstrate that the presence of both information asymmetry and short horizons provides a channel through which public information influences price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness. We identify conditions under which public information increases or decreases price informativeness, and when multiple equilibria may arise. Our analysis shows that public information not only directly endows prices with more (public) information, it can also have an important indirect effect on the degree to which prices reveal private information.

Exceptional accuracy and speed for option pricing are available via quadrature (Andricopoulos, Widdicks, Duck, and Newton, 2003), extending into multiple dimensions with complex path-dependency and early exercise (Andricopoulos, Widdicks, Newton, and Duck, 2007). However, the exposition is incomplete, leaving many modelling processes outside the Black-Scholes-Merton framework unattainable. We show how to remove the remaining major block to universal application. Although this had appeared highly problematic, the solution turns out to be conceptually simple and implementation is straightforward (we provide code on the Journal of Financial Economics website at http://jfe.rochester.edu). Crucially, the method retains its speed and flexibility across complex combinations of option features but is now applicable across other underlying processes.

Debtholders’ demand has been widely discussed as a key determinant of conservatism but clear causal evidence is not yet established. Using a natural experiment setting, wherein a Delaware court ruled that the fiduciary duties of directors in near insolvent Delaware companies extend to creditors, we predict and find that firms subject to the ruling significantly increased their accounting conservatism. In addition, our results suggest that the increase in conservatism is more pronounced in near insolvent Delaware firms with stronger boards, confirming that the court ruling takes effect through the channel of the board of directors. Our results are robust to using alternative measures of conservatism and near insolvency status, and controlling for potential confounding factors and other stakeholders’ demand for conservatism. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence to support the causal relation between debtholders’ demand and accounting conservatism previously suggested in the literature, and offers some insights into the role of the board of directors in financial reporting.

Using block share acquisitions made by private equity (PE) funds, we examine the sources of value gains in PE minority equity investments. We find that compared with non-PE acquirers, PE acquirers are more likely to place representatives with finance experience or those with experience in the target's industry on the target's board when the need for target oversight and/or advice is higher. The targets in PE acquisitions, particularly poorly performing targets, targets with high R&D intensity, and targets with PE-appointed directors who have experience in the target's industry, realize both higher announcement returns and better post-acquisition operating performance than do targets in non-PE acquisitions. These findings suggest that the governance and operational engineering that PE acquirers apply to their targets constitutes important sources of value creation in PE minority equity investments.