We develop a model in which a monopolist uses differences across consumers in their valuation of time to imperfectly price discriminate. Though it is customary to analyse price discrimination problems by the calculus of variations after postulating a continuum of types, we assume a finite number of types and exploit the geometry and duality of the contract set and the structure of the programming specification. We analyse in detail the qualitative properties of the model's solution and show by construction that our results exhaust the implications of the model for equilibrium contract pairs. We show that imperfect discrimination is not bounded in welfare terms between perfect discrimination and single-price monopoly and that the deadweight loss, consumer surplus and output comparisons between single-price monopoly and imperfect discrimination are ambiguous.

Abstract Financial regulators considering the desirability of a new rule or regulation sometimes use pilot studies for evidence-based decision making. Although pilot studies can generate new knowledge, they also can be expensive and subject to serious selection biases, spillover problems, and the infeasibility of a blind design. Alternatively, regulators can often evaluate a proposed regulation’s impact by analyzing archival data or applying theory based on well-accepted economic principles. We discuss why pilot studies can be useful, but also why regulators and industry participants sometimes favor pilot studies with little scientific value. We illustrate these issues by discussing various SEC pilot studies. (JEL G18, G28, G38, K22, L51)

Unlike most securities, the pricing of sinking fund bonds is influenced by the distribution of ownership, which summarizes the extent to which the market is cornered. The effect of the distribution of ownership on the pricing of sinking fund bonds is examined by an explicit game in which the price obtained for bonds sold can depend upon the size of the investor's position. This framework is used to contrast the valuation of sinking fund bonds with the valuation of amortizing bonds and straight debt. We show that it is generally incorrect to view sinking fund bonds as being equivalent to serial bonds.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority began collecting transaction data from brokerdealers in 2011 as a step toward enhancing its understanding of securitization markets. We use transaction data to document the importance of the interdealer network structure to market quality. Some dealers are relatively central in the network and trade with many dealers, while others are peripheral. Core dealers receive relatively lower and less dispersed spreads than peripheral dealers. We develop a model in which core and peripheral dealers trade with different customer clienteles and argue that the presence of relatively sophisticated customers in securitization markets explains these facts.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority began collecting transaction data from broker-dealers in 2011 as a step toward enhancing its understanding of securitization markets. We use transaction data to document the importance of the interdealer network structure to market quality. Some dealers are relatively central in the network and trade with many dealers, while others are peripheral. Core dealers receive relatively lower and less dispersed spreads than peripheral dealers. We develop a model in which core and peripheral dealers trade with different customer clienteles and argue that the presence of relatively sophisticated customers in securitization markets explains these facts. Received June 23, 2015; editorial decision December 20, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

[We analyze theoretically and empirically the implications of information asymmetry for equilibrium asset pricing and portfolio choice. In our partially revealing dynamic rational expectations equilibrium, portfolio separation fails, and indexing is not optimal. We show how uninformed investors should structure their portfolios, using the information contained in prices to cope with winner's curse problems. We implement empirically this pricecontingent portfolio strategy. Consistent with our theory, the strategy outperforms economically and statistically the index. While momentum can arise in the model, in the data, the momentum strategy does not outperform the price-contingent strategy, as predicted by the theory.]

This article explores the optimal trading and pricing of taxable securities with asymmetric capital gains taxes and transaction costs. In the long-term region, investors realize all gains below some critical cutoff level, which we derive analytically. In the short-term region, investors defer all gains and, depending upon the time remaining in the short-term region, may also defer small losses. Contrary to common intuition, deferral of short-term losses can be optimal even without transaction costs. The value of tax timing is considerably higher under the optimal trading strategy than under alternative strategies previously analyzed. The impact of offset rules is also explored.

[This article explores the optimal trading and pricing of taxable securities with asymmetric capital gains taxes and transaction costs. In the long-term region, investors realize all gains below some critical cutoff level, which we derive analytically. In the short-term region, investors defer all gains and, depending upon the time remaining in the short-term region, may also defer small losses. Contrary to common intuition, deferral of short-term losses can be optimal even without transaction costs. The value of tax timing is considerably higher under the optimal trading strategy than under alternative strategies previously analyzed. The impact of offset rules is also explored.]

It is commonly believed that deposit rates are determined primarily by supply: Depositors require higher deposit rates from risky banks, thereby creating market discipline. An alternative perspective is that market discipline is limited (e.g., due to deposit insurance and/or enhanced capital regulation) and that internal demand for funding by banks determines rates. Using branch-level deposit rate data, we find little evidence for market discipline as rates are similar across bank capitalization levels. In contrast, banks’ loan growth has a causal effect on deposit rates; for example, branches’ deposit rates are correlated with loan growth in other states in which their bank has some presence, suggesting internal capital markets help reallocate the bank’s funding.

ABSTRACT We analyze how a profit‐maximizing proxy advisor designs vote recommendations and research reports. The advisor benefits from producing informative, unbiased reports, but only partially informative recommendations, biased against the a priori likely alternative. Such recommendations induce close votes, increasing controversy and thereby the relevance and value of proxy advice. Our results suggest shifting from an exclusive emphasis on recommendations, highlighting the importance of both reports and recommendations in proxy advisors' information provision. They rationalize the one‐size‐fits‐all approach and help reinterpret empirical patterns of voting behavior, suggesting that proxy advisors' recommendations may not be a suitable benchmark for evaluating shareholders' votes.