Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 X 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.

We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to determine the predictors of risk and time preferences. In villages with higher mean income, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Household income is correlated with patience but not with risk. We expand measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those models with prospect theory and a three-parameter hyperbolic discounting model. Comparable risk parameter estimates have been found for Chinese farmers, using our method. (C83, D12, O12, P38)

We test for consumption smoothing using bankruptcy data on players in the National Football League (NFL), who typically earn several million dollars during an income spike that lasts a few years. The life-cycle hypothesis predicts that players should save substantially while playing and then have little risk of bankruptcy post-NFL. However, players in our sample begin to file for bankruptcy soon after they stop playing and continue filing at a high rate through at least the first 12 years of retirement. Players' total earnings and career lengths have surprisingly little effect on the risk of bankruptcy.

We report experiments on sender-receiver games with an incentive for senders to exaggerate. Subjects “overcommunicate”—messages are more informative of the true state than they should be, in equilibrium. Eyetracking shows that senders look at payoffs in a way that is consistent with a level-k model. A combination of sender messages and lookup patterns predicts the true state about twice as often as predicted by equilibrium. Using these measures to infer the state would enable receiver subjects to hypothetically earn 16–21 percent more than they actually do, an economic value of 60 percent of the maximum increment. (JEL C72, C91, D82, Z13)

We examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game show where contestants bargain over a large money amount that is split into three unequal shares. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and take home larger amounts. Contestants who announce that they will not back down do well relative to others, but they do not secure larger absolute amounts and they harm others. There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence that demographic characteristics matter.

We study decisions that involve choosing between different numbers of options under time pressure using eye-tracking to monitor the search process of the subjects. We find that subjects are quite adept at optimizing within the set of items that they see, that the initial search process is random in value, that subjects use a stopping rule to terminate the search process that combines features of optimal search and satisficing, and that subjects search more often in certain focal regions of the display, which leads to choice biases. (JEL C91, D12, M31)

This paper describes a series of laboratory experiments studying whether the form in which items are displayed at the time of decision affects the dollar value that subjects place on them. Using a Becker-DeGroot auction under three different conditions—(i) text displays, (ii) image displays, and (iii) displays of the actual items—we find that subjects' willingness-to-pay is 40–61 percent larger in the real than in the image and text displays. Furthermore, follow-up experiments suggest the presence of the real item triggers preprogrammed consummatory Pavlovian processes that promote behaviors that lead to contact with appetitive items whenever they are available. (JEL C91, D03, D12, D87)