We examine over 7400 analyst recommendations made in the year after going public for IPOs from 1999 to 2000. Initiations of coverage at the end of the quiet period come almost exclusively from affiliated analysts, whereas initiations afterward are predominantly from unaffiliated analysts. Contrary to previous findings, we find no evidence that the market discounts recommendations from affiliated analysts once we control for recommendation characteristics and timing. Moreover, analyst coverage in the first year is not affected by underpricing, and after the flurry of initiations at the end of the quiet period, the number of analysts covering a firm during the following 11 months is unrelated to the number of managing underwriters.

Research departments are managed by directors of research (DORs). Subordinate analysts working for higher-quality DORs provide superior earnings forecasts that elicit stronger market reactions, provide better investment recommendations, and have better career outcomes. For the broker, higher-quality DORs drive more trading commissions. Economically, analysts benefit the most from DOR–analyst industry alignment resulting from DORs’ former analyst experience. We provide several tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns and explore various mechanisms to explain these results. Overall, our article identifies a unique channel whereby the industry-specific and general human capital of top management filters through to individual subordinates and consequently improves organizational performance.

IPO stock prices increased approximately 2.3% on the first day of secondary market trading over the period 1993 through 2003. While these aftermarket returns are accentuated during 1999 and 2000, they persist after the bubble burst and even increase as a percentage of total underpricing. We explore several non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain our findings including price support, laddering, retail sentiment, and information asymmetry. Our results are most consistent with the view that higher secondary market returns accrue to IPOs with more information asymmetries possibly due to price and aggregate demand uncertainty.

Using a sample of state pension funds’ equity holdings, we find evidence of not only local bias, but also bias towards politically-connected stocks. Political bias is detrimental to fund performance. State pension funds have longer holding durations of politically-connected local firms and display disposition behavior in these positions. Political bias is positively related to the percentage of politically-affiliated trustees on the board and Congressional connections. The more politically-affiliated trustees on the board, the more the fund shifts toward risky asset allocations. Overall, our results imply that political bias is likely costly to taxpayers and pension beneficiaries.

We investigate the pricing of 4,989 equity IPOs with offer dates between 1981 and 2000. Approximately three-fourths of these IPOs have integer offer prices. Average initial returns for IPOs with integer offer prices are significantly higher (24.5%) than those priced on the fraction of the dollar (8.1%). This result is robust through time and after conditioning for other effects known to influence initial returns. We hypothesize that integer vs. fractional dollar IPOs are the result of negotiations between the issuing firm and underwriter. Under this negotiation hypothesis, the frequency of integer pricing should be an increasing function of the offer price and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the value of the firm. Empirical evidence, supportive of the negotiation hypothesis, is presented.

We examine whether analysts’ prior industry experience influences their ability to serve as effective external firm monitors. Our analyses of firms’ financial disclosure quality, executive compensation and CEO turnover decisions portray a consistent picture that related pre-analyst industry experience is of critical importance for analysts to play an effective monitoring role. Coverage by analysts with such experience is associated with reduced earnings management, lower probability of committing financial misrepresentation, less CEO excess compensation, and higher performance sensitivity of CEO turnover. We also provide evidence on several plausible mechanisms through which industry expert analysts exert monitoring efforts and limit managerial opportunism.

We examine the value of due diligence recommendations on Reddit’s Wallstreetbets (WSB) platform. Before the Gamestop (GME) short squeeze, recommendations are significant predictors of returns and cash-flow news. This predictability is eliminated post-GME. Post-GME, the fraction of reports emphasizing price-pressure or attention-grabbing stocks dramatically increases, and the decline in informativeness is concentrated in these reports. Similarly, retail trade informativeness is particularly strong following DD reports in the pre-GME period, but not post-GME. Our findings are consistent with the view that the Gamestop event altered the culture of WSB, leading to a deterioration in investment quality that adversely affected smaller investors.

We demonstrate that time stamps reported in I/B/E/S for analysts’ recommendations released during trading hours are systematically delayed. Using newswire‐reported time stamps, we find 30‐minute returns of 1.83% (−2.10%) for upgrades (downgrades), but for this subset of recommendations we find corresponding returns of −0.07% (−0.09%) using I/B/E/S‐reported time stamps. We also examine the information content of recommendations relative to management guidance and earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that analysts’ recommendations are the most important information disclosure channel examined.

We exploit the staggered state-level enactment of the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) to examine the impact of intellectual property (IP) protection on product market dynamics. We find that UTSA-impacted firms shift their IP strategy to rely more on trade secrets and less on patents. Less IP disclosure increases information asymmetry and rival firms must adapt their competitive strategies as espionage and reverse engineering become more costly. Predation risk increases, and rivals engage in more intense price and non-price competition. Additionally, we find the probability of being acquired increases post-UTSA as rivals seek to acquire innovation, resulting in more concentrated product markets. Further, we find that the stock market generally views UTSA favorably.

We examine the expiration of the IPO quiet period, which occurs after the 25th calendar day following the offering. For IPOs during 1996 to 2000, we find that analyst coverage is initiated immediately for 76 percent of these firms, almost always with a favorable rating. Initiated firms experience a five‐day abnormal return of 4.1 percent versus 0.1 percent for firms with no coverage. The abnormal returns are concentrated in the days just before the quiet period expires. Abnormal returns are much larger when coverage is initiated by multiple analysts. It does not matter whether a recommendation comes from the lead underwriter or not.