IN a recent paper investigating the efficiency of earnings retentions, Baumol, Heim, Malkiel and Quandt (1970) (hereafter BHMQ) estimate the rate of return on earnings retentions, debt and new equity for a large cross section of firms. They find new equity earns considerably higher returns than the ploughback of profit and depreciation, with the returns on new debt falling between. BHMQ do not explain these striking results, beyond suggesting a lack of market discipline on the reinvestment of internal funds. In their concluding remarks, they pose a number of open questions for future research and analysis

T HIS study investigates within a comrnon analytical framework the determinants of firm expenditures o;n capital investment, research and development and dividends. Its two basic objectives relative to past work are: first, to probe more deeply into the forces determining these outlays by taking into account the interdependencies among them,' and second, to provide a framework for evaluating alternative assumptions regarding firm motivation. A firm maximizing stockholder objectives will exhibit different behavior in its expenditure decisions from one pursuing managerial goals. Consequently, two main variants of a model of firm expenditures, based on these rival concepts of motivation, are developed and tested.

This article makes two important contributions to the literature on the incentive effects of insider ownership. First, it presents a clean method for separating the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative entrenchment effect, which can be applied to samples of companies from the US and any other country. Second, it measures the effects of insider ownership using a measure of firm performance, namely a marginal q, which ensures that the causal relationship estimated runs from ownership to performance. The article applies this method to a large sample of publicly listed firms from the Anglo-Saxon and Civil law traditions and confirms that managerial entrenchment has an unambiguous negative effect on firm performance as measured by both Tobin's (average) q and our marginal q, and that the wealth effect of insider ownership is unambiguously positive for both measures. We also test for the effects of ownership concentration for other categories of owners and find that while institutional ownership improves the performance in the USA, financial institutions have a negative impact in other Anglo-Saxon countries and in Europe.

The concept of relative plant productivity and its measurement using census LRD data productivity and changes in ownership of manufacturing plants, Donald Siegel takeovers and corporate overhead, with Donald Siegel leveraged buyouts, with Donald Siegel US and foreign mergers and LBOs, 1988-90 the dismantling of conglomerate firms airline mergers, with Moshe Kim.