We use granular data from an investment firm and a credible identification strategy to estimate the effect of financial advisors' incentives on client investments. Exploiting a natural experiment triggered by the 2018 implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), we find that clients' investments respond strongly to changes in advisor incentives. Advisors react through multiple mechanisms: (i) inducing existing clients to bring in new money, (ii) channeling it to high‐incentive funds, and (iii) attracting more new clients. We also find that the MiFID II reform generated more balanced incentives, which translated into higher portfolio efficiency through lower average fees and stronger portfolio diversification.

UK government bond yields tend to drift upwards before scheduled news such as monetary policy announcements and labour market data releases. This effect is particularly pronounced during periods of UK bond issuance and is linked to higher term premia. Financial intermediary constraints play a role as dealers avoid accumulating inventory in pre-news windows following issuance. The composition of liquidity providers also shifts: hedge funds buy a large share of the bond issuance outside pre-news windows, but more passive investors – such as foreign central banks and pension funds – provide liquidity in pre-news windows. We outline a simple model to rationalize these findings.

We explore a new mechanism by which investors take correlated shortcuts and present evidence that managers—using sales management—take advantage of these shortcuts. Specifically, we exploit a regulatory provision wherein a firm's primary industry is determined by the highest sales segment. Exploiting this regulation, we provide evidence that investors classify operationally nearly identical firms as starkly different depending on their placement around this sales cutoff. Moreover, managers appear to exploit this by manipulating sales to be just over the cutoff in favorable industries. Further evidence suggests that managers engage in activities to realize large, tangible benefits from this opportunistic action.

We show that Treasury security prices in the secondary market decrease significantly in the few days before Treasury auctions and recover shortly thereafter, even though the time and amount of each auction are announced in advance. These results are linked to dealers' limited risk-bearing capacity and end-investors' imperfect capital mobility, highlighting the important role of frictions even in very liquid financial markets. Our results imply a hidden issuance cost to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, estimated to be 9 to 18 bps of the auction size, or over half a billion dollars for the issuance size in 2007.

We study the transmission of financial news and opinions through social interactions among retail investors in the United States. We identify a series of plausibly exogenous shocks, which cause “treated investors” to trade abnormally. We then trace the “contagion” of abnormal trading activity from the treated investors to their neighbors and their neighbors’ neighbors. Coupled with methodology drawn from epidemiology, our setting allows us to estimate the rate of communication and how it varies with the characteristics of the underlying investor population.

Using comprehensive administrative data from the UK, we examine trading by different investor types in government bond markets. Our sample covers virtually all secondary market trading in gilts and contains detailed information on each transaction, including the identities of both counterparties. We find that hedge funds’ daily trading positively forecasts gilt returns in the following one to five days, which is then fully reversed in the following month. A part of this short-term return predictability is due to hedge funds’ ability to predict other investors’ future demand. Mutual fund trading also positively predicts gilt returns, but over a longer horizon of one to two months. This return pattern does not revert in the following year and is partly due to mutual funds’ ability to forecast changes in short-term interest rates.

Using granular data covering both regulated (brokerage‐financed) and unregulated (shadow‐financed) margin accounts in China, we provide novel evidence on retail investors' margin trading behavior and its price implications. We first show that retail investors' decisions to lever up in stock trading despite the hefty borrowing cost is related to their lottery preferences. We then show that margin borrowing affects investors' trading behavior—investors are more likely to liquidate their holdings as they approach margin calls. Finally, we show that margin‐induced trading aggregates to affect asset prices and contributes to shock spillovers across stocks (e.g., from lottery stocks to nonlottery stocks).

Using a novel database that tracks web traffic on the Security Exchange Commission's EDGAR server between 2004 and 2015, we show that institutional investors gather information on a very particular subset of firms and insiders, and their surveillance is very persistent over time. This tracking behavior has powerful implications for their portfolio choice and its information content. An institution that downloaded an insider trading filing by a given firm last quarter increases its likelihood of downloading an insider trading filing on the same firm by more than 41.3 percentage points this quarter. Moreover, the average tracked stock that an institution buys generates annualized alphas of over 12% relative to the purchase of an average non tracked stock. We find that institutional managers tend to track top executives and to share educational and locational commonalities with the specific insiders they choose to follow. Collectively, our results suggest that the information in tracked trades is important for fundamental firm value and is only revealed following the information-rich dual trading by insiders and linked institutions.