ABSTRACT This study seeks to determine whether earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium. We find that investors anticipate some earnings announcements to convey news that increases market return volatility and pay a premium to hedge this non-diversifiable risk. In particular, we find evidence of risk premiums embedded in prices of firms' traded options that are significantly positively associated with the extent to which the firms' earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk. In addition, we find that volatility risk premiums are concentrated among bellwether firms and result in predictable variation in option straddle returns around earnings announcements. Taken together, our findings show that some earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium. JEL Classifications: M41; G12; G13; G14

ABSTRACT We examine how the information produced by analysts when they initiate coverage contributes to the mix of firm-specific, industry-, and market-wide information available about the firm. We hypothesize that the first analyst to initiate coverage provides low-cost market and industry information allowing him/her to follow more stocks, whereas subsequent analysts provide firm-specific information to distinguish themselves from existing analysts. We use stock return synchronicity to measure the mix of information available about a firm, with higher synchronicity indicating more industry and market information. Coverage initiations of firms with no prior analyst coverage increase synchronicity, suggesting that analysts produce industry- and market-wide information. In contrast, analysts initiating coverage on firms with existing coverage appear to focus on producing firm-specific information as these initiations lead to reduced synchronicity. Together, our findings indicate that the type of information that analysts produce at initiation depends on the information provided by other analysts. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

Firms with central boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. A long (short) position in the most (least) central firms earns average annual returns of 4.68%. Firms with central boards also experience higher future return-on-assets growth and more positive analyst forecast errors. Return prediction, return-on-assets growth, and analyst errors are concentrated among high growth opportunity firms or firms confronting adverse circumstances, consistent with boardroom connections mattering most for firms standing to benefit most from information and resources exchanged through boardroom networks. Overall, our results suggest that director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices.

We establish a link between firms managing investors’ performance expectations, earnings announcement premiums, and cyclical patterns (i.e., seasonalities) in returns. Firms that are more likely to manage expectations toward beatable levels predictably earn lower returns before, and higher returns during, their earnings announcements. This pattern repeats across firms’ fiscal quarters, suggesting firms manufacture positive “surprises” by negatively biasing investors’ expectations ahead of announcing earnings. We corroborate these findings using non-price-based outcomes indicative of expectations management. Together, our findings are consistent with the pressure for firms to meet earnings targets shaping the cross-section of firms’ stock returns.

Using a novel dataset, we show that components of firms’ GAAP earnings stemming from ancillary business activities or transitory shocks are significant in frequency and magnitude. These components have grown over time and are dispersed across various sections of the 10-K. Excluding them from GAAP earnings yields a core earnings measure that distinguishes between the recurring and non-recurring components of net income and forecasts future performance. Analysts and market participants are slow to impound these earnings components’ implications, particularly the amounts disclosed in the footnotes. Trading strategies that exploit non-core earnings produce abnormal returns of 8% per year.

ABSTRACT We show that financial reporting influences consumer behavior by drawing consumer attention to announcing firms. Analyzing global positioning system (GPS) data, we document upticks in foot traffic to firms’ commercial locations immediately following their earnings announcements. This increase is more pronounced for announcements with substantial media attention, fewer concurrent announcements, heightened internet search volume, and extreme stock price jumps and earnings surprises—indicating that announcement coverage impacts consumer behavior by capturing attention. Furthermore, foot traffic increases with positive earnings for firms offering durable goods, suggesting consumers respond to news about firms’ financial prospects. Consumer attention patterns increase revenues and advertising effectiveness, ultimately suggesting that financial reporting serves a marketing function. Data Availability: All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G12; G14; G40; G41.

We introduce a parsimonious framework for choosing among alternative expected-return proxies (ERPs) when estimating treatment effects. By comparing ERPs’ measurement error variances in the cross-section and in the time series, we provide new evidence on the relative performance of firm-level ERPs nominated by recent studies. Generally, “implied-costs-of-capital” metrics perform best in the time series, whereas “characteristic-based” proxies perform best in the cross-section. Factor-based ERPs, even the latest renditions, perform poorly. We revisit four prior studies that use ex ante ERPs and illustrate how this framework can potentially alter either the sign or the magnitude of prior inferences.