This study seeks to determine whether earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium. We find that investors anticipate some earnings announcements to convey news that increases market return volatility and pay a premium to hedge this non-diversifiable risk. In particular, we find evidence of risk premiums embedded in prices of firms' traded options that are significantly positively associated with the extent to which the firms' earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk. In addition, we find that volatility risk premiums are concentrated among bellwether firms and result in predictable variation in option straddle returns around earnings announcements. Taken together, our findings show that some earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium.

Using a unique data set of firms listed on China’s Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we show that investors’ corporate site visits convey information about future stock returns. Firms with abnormally frequent investor visits predictably outperform firms with abnormally infrequent investor visits by approximately 70-to-100 basis points per month. This return predictability concentrates on neglected firms with low trading volumes and when investors incur higher travel costs. Abnormally frequent investor visits accompany increased holdings among visiting institutions and predict improvements in firms’ fundamental performance, consistent with institutions using visits to gain an information advantage regarding underpriced firms. The significance of conducting site visits and in-depth research by fund companies is to consistently deliver stable and substantial returns to clients through professional expertise. (Lei Jing, CEO of Harvest Fund Management Co., Ltd., China)

Firms with central boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. A long (short) position in the most (least) central firms earns average annual returns of 4.68%. Firms with central boards also experience higher future return-on-assets growth and more positive analyst forecast errors. Return prediction, return-on-assets growth, and analyst errors are concentrated among high growth opportunity firms or firms confronting adverse circumstances, consistent with boardroom connections mattering most for firms standing to benefit most from information and resources exchanged through boardroom networks. Overall, our results suggest that director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices.

We examine how the information produced by analysts when they initiate coverage contributes to the mix of firm-specific, industry-, and market-wide information available about the firm. We hypothesize that the first analyst to initiate coverage provides low-cost market and industry information allowing him/her to follow more stocks, whereas subsequent analysts provide firm-specific information to distinguish themselves from existing analysts. We use stock return synchronicity to measure the mix of information available about a firm, with higher synchronicity indicating more industry and market information. Coverage initiations of firms with no prior analyst coverage increase synchronicity, suggesting that analysts produce industry- and market-wide information. In contrast, analysts initiating coverage on firms with existing coverage appear to focus on producing firm-specific information as these initiations lead to reduced synchronicity. Together, our findings indicate that the type of information that analysts produce at initiation depends on the information provided by other analysts. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

We establish a link between firms managing investors’ performance expectations, earnings announcement premiums, and cyclical patterns (i.e., seasonalities) in returns. Firms that are more likely to manage expectations toward beatable levels predictably earn lower returns before, and higher returns during, their earnings announcements. This pattern repeats across firms’ fiscal quarters, suggesting firms manufacture positive “surprises” by negatively biasing investors’ expectations ahead of announcing earnings. We corroborate these findings using non-price-based outcomes indicative of expectations management. Together, our findings are consistent with the pressure for firms to meet earnings targets shaping the cross-section of firms’ stock returns.

Using a novel dataset, we show that components of firms’ GAAP earnings stemming from ancillary business activities or transitory shocks are significant in frequency and magnitude. These components have grown over time and are dispersed across various sections of the 10-K. Excluding them from GAAP earnings yields a core earnings measure that distinguishes between the recurring and non-recurring components of net income and forecasts future performance. Analysts and market participants are slow to impound these earnings components’ implications, particularly the amounts disclosed in the footnotes. Trading strategies that exploit non-core earnings produce abnormal returns of 8% per year.

We show that financial reporting influences consumer behavior by drawing consumer attention to announcing firms. Analyzing global positioning system (GPS) data, we document upticks in foot traffic to firms’ commercial locations immediately following their earnings announcements. This increase is more pronounced for announcements with substantial media attention, fewer concurrent announcements, heightened internet search volume, and extreme stock price jumps and earnings surprises—indicating that announcement coverage impacts consumer behavior by capturing attention. Furthermore, foot traffic increases with positive earnings for firms offering durable goods, suggesting consumers respond to news about firms’ financial prospects. Consumer attention patterns increase revenues and advertising effectiveness, ultimately suggesting that financial reporting serves a marketing function. Data Availability: All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We provide the first evidence of systematic bias among an emerging type of credit rating agency that relies on subscriptions from institutional clients as its primary source of revenue. Using data from Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR), a representative subscriber-paid rating agency, we show that EJR issues more optimistically biased credit ratings, less timely downgrades, and less accurate ratings for firms held by more EJR clients. Our evidence is consistent with EJR optimistically biasing its ratings to bolster subscriber revenue, which allows institutional clients to invest in riskier bonds with higher expected returns. Taken together, our findings suggest that the emergence of subscriber-paid rating agencies as an alternative to more traditional issuer-paid agencies is unlikely to resolve problems arising from conflicts of interest but rather alter the nature of these conflicts in the ratings process.

We introduce a parsimonious framework for choosing among alternative expected-return proxies (ERPs) when estimating treatment effects. By comparing ERPs’ measurement error variances in the cross-section and in the time series, we provide new evidence on the relative performance of firm-level ERPs nominated by recent studies. Generally, “implied-costs-of-capital” metrics perform best in the time series, whereas “characteristic-based” proxies perform best in the cross-section. Factor-based ERPs, even the latest renditions, perform poorly. We revisit four prior studies that use ex ante ERPs and illustrate how this framework can potentially alter either the sign or the magnitude of prior inferences.