We document that: (1) the incidence of bond trade increases during the days surrounding earnings announcements, (2) there is a bond‐price reaction to the announcement of earnings, and (3) there is a positive association between annual bond returns and both annual changes in earnings and annual analysts' forecast errors. All of these effects are larger when earnings convey bad news or when the underlying bond is more risky. Taken together, our results suggest that the nonlinear payoff structure of bond securities affects the role of accounting earnings in the bond market.

Previous theoretical arguments suggest that industrial diversification provides a co-insurance effect that decreases the firm's default risk. In this paper, we endogenously estimate a firm's segment disclosure quality and investigate whether the quality of segment disclosures significantly affects bond investors' assessment of the co-insurance effect of diversification. We document that bonds issued by industrially diversified firms with high-quality segment disclosures have significantly lower yields than bonds issued by diversified firms with low-quality segment disclosures. We also find that the negative relation between industrial diversification and bond yields becomes stronger when firms improve segment disclosures as a result of FAS 131. Finally, we show that high-quality segment disclosures are associated with lower syndicated loan spreads for a subsample of loans issued by large bank syndicates, which are more likely to rely on publicly reported segment information.

We collect data on ranges of hypothetical asset liquidation values disclosed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court filings. We use this historical information to construct a firm-specific measure, “RecRisk,” which captures asset recovery risk through the uncertainty surrounding asset valuations in liquidation events. We document that higher RecRisk is associated with smaller syndicated loan amounts as a percentage of available collateral, more and tighter performance covenants, and increased loan spreads for borrowers with high credit risk. High RecRisk borrowers also experience lower secondary loan market prices and reduced liquidity for loans with high credit risk. When borrowers become financially distressed, high RecRisk is further associated with declining loan prices and reduced ownership by Collateralized Loan Obligations, the dominant investors in the leveraged loan market. Overall, our results indicate that loan contract terms and prices reflect recovery risk faced by lenders. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. The authors can provide the RecRisk measure at the firm-year level upon request.

We investigate how the tone of sell-side debt analysts' discussions about debt-equity conflict events affects the informativeness of debt analysts' reports in debt markets. Conflict events such as mergers and acquisitions, debt issuance, share repurchases, or dividend payments potentially generate asset substitution or wealth expropriation by equity holders. We document that debt analysts routinely discuss these conflict events in their reports. More importantly, discussions about conflict events that we code as negative are associated with increases in credit spreads and bond trading volume. Consistent with the informational value of debt analysts' discussions in secondary debt markets, we find that negatively coded conflict discussions predict higher bond offering yields in the primary bond market. In additional analyses, we measure the tone of debt analysts' discussions based on their disagreement with the tone of equity analysts' discussions and find that the informativeness of debt analysts' reports is higher when our coding indicates that conflict events are viewed negatively by debt analysts but positively by equity analysts.

We evaluate whether reported accounting numbers are informative about earnings uncertainty and whether earnings uncertainty is priced. We use quantile regressions to forecast the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of future earnings. These three moments are important measures of earnings uncertainty because they reflect the size of the average deviation from expected earnings and the amount of extreme upside potential, extreme downside risk, or both. We develop a novel approach for evaluating the reliability of our forecasts and we show that they are reliable. We also document that: (1) equity prices are increasing (decreasing) in the standard deviation and skewness (kurtosis) of lead return on equity and (2) credit spreads are increasing (decreasing) in the standard deviation and kurtosis (skewness) of lead return on assets. Our results indicate that historical financial statements are informative about earnings uncertainty and that earnings uncertainty is priced. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.