Some studies find that market power is associated with credit availability (information hypothesis); others find that less competitive banking markets lead to more credit rationing (market power hypothesis). Empirical research has relied solely on concentration as a measure of market power. The industrial organization literature, however, argues that a structural competition indicator such as the Lerner index is a superior measure. We test the information hypothesis and the market power hypothesis using these two alternative measures of market power and find that they generally give conflicting results. However, we also offer evidence suggesting that both views can be reconciled.

Previous research suggests that loan officers may play a critical role in relationship lending by producing soft information about SMEs. For the first time, we analyze this hypothesis and find empirical evidence that indicates that loan officer activities are associated with bank production of soft information. We also find that loan officers at small banks produce more soft information than at large banks, but large banks appear to have the equivalent potential to underwrite relationship loans. Nevertheless, large banks choose instead to focus their resources on transactions lending.

Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital (VC) firm׳s reputation is affected when it fails to prevent fraud in its portfolio companies. We find that reputation-damaged VCs interact differently in the future with their limited partners, other VCs, and IPO underwriters because they are perceived as ineffective monitors. In addition, VCs that fail to prevent fraud experience greater difficulty in taking future portfolio companies public.

This paper investigates whether the benefits of bank–borrower relationships differ depending on three factors identified in the theoretical literature: verifiability of information, bank size and complexity, and bank competition. We extend the current literature by analyzing how relationship lending affects loan contract terms and credit availability in an empirical model that simultaneously accounts for all three of these factors. Based on Japanese survey data we find evidence that the benefits from stronger bank–borrower relationships in terms of credit availability are limited to smaller banks. However, when the benefits are measured as improved credit terms, we find little additional benefit, and in some cases increased cost, from stronger relationships for opaque borrowers and for borrowers who get funding from small banks. These latter findings suggest the possibility that relationship borrowers may suffer from capture effects.

Market size structure refers to the distribution of shares of different size classes of local market participants, where the sizes are inclusive of assets both within and outside the local market. We apply this new measure of market structure in two empirical analyses of the US banking industry to address concerns regarding the effects of the consolidation in banking. Our quantity analysis of the likelihood that small businesses borrow from large versus small banks and our small business loan price analysis that includes market size structure as well as conventional measures yield very different findings from most of the literature on bank size and small business lending. Our results do not suggest a significant net advantage or disadvantage for large banks in small business lending overall, or in lending to informationally opaque small businesses in particular. We argue that the prior research that excluded market size structure may be misleading and offer some likely explanations of why our results differ.

We document that borrowers of banks that received capital support under TARP/CPP significantly increased their quarterly provision of trade credit (accounts receivable) during the crisis by 5.2%, while borrowers of other banks did not. The effect is strongest in 2008Q4, and larger for pre-crisis riskier, growth-oriented and bank-dependent firms and for firms that borrow from pre-crisis smaller, less profitable and better capitalized CPP banks. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that the effect is caused by CPP and not by heterogeneity between firms, banks and time periods. Our study provides novel evidence that suggests a beneficial multiplier effect of bank bailouts.

We investigate the effects of countercyclical prudential buffers on bank risk-taking. We exploit the introduction of dynamic loan loss provisioning in Spain, mandating that banks use historical average loss rates in their estimation of loan loss provisions. We find that dynamic loan loss provisioning is associated with reductions in timely loan loss provisioning. Banks that previously recognized loan losses in a timely fashion exhibit the greatest reductions in timeliness and consequently extend loans to riskier borrowers with lower accounting quality. Our results have policy implications for the debate on the use of financial reporting requirements in mitigating capital pro-cyclicality.

A popular explanation for the explosive growth in banks' off-balance sheet (OBS) activities is the avoidance of capital adequacy requirements. Several studies have examined this and other motivations behind bank OBS activities with mixed results. We shed further light on the issue of OBS growth by modelling OBS products as financial innovations subject to a logistic diffusion adoption pattern. Our data also allows us to investigate the impact of important changes in capital adequacy regulations on OBS diffusion rates. We find that changes in capital requirements have had no consistent impact on the speed of diffusion across OBS activities.

We examine the effects of bank M&As on small business lending using data on over 6000 recent U.S. bank M&As. We are the first to decompose the impact of M&As into the static effects from simply melding the antecedent institutions and the dynamic effects associated with post-M&A refocusing of the consolidated institution. We are also the first to estimate the dynamic reactions of other local banks. We find that the static effects of consolidation reduce small business lending, but are mostly offset by the reactions of other banks, and in some cases also by refocusing efforts of the consolidating institutions themselves.