We test the hypothesis that investment banking networks affect stock prices and trading behavior. Consistent with the notion that investment banks serve as information hubs for segmented groups of investors, the stock prices of firms that use the same lead underwriter during their equity offerings tend to move together. We also find that when firms switch underwriters between their initial public offering (IPO) and a seasoned equity offering (SEO), they comove less with the stocks associated with the old bank and more with the stocks associated with the new bank. This change in comovement is greater for stocks completing their first SEO and for those experiencing large changes in institutional ownership.

We use a regulatory experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short-selling constraints on a random sample of U.S. stocks to test whether capital market frictions have an effect on stock prices and corporate decisions. We find that an increase in short-selling activity causes prices to fall, and that small firms react to these lower prices by reducing equity issues and investment. These results not only provide evidence that short-selling constraints affect asset prices, but also confirm that short-selling activity has a causal impact on financing and investment decisions.

We provide empirical evidence that a firm's overall visibility with investors, as measured by its product market advertising, has important consequences for the stock market. Specifically we show that firms with greater advertising expenditures, ceteris paribus, have a larger number of both individual and institutional investors, and better liquidity of their common stock. Our findings are robust to a variety of methodological approaches and to various measures of liquidity. These results suggest that the investors' degree of familiarity with a firm may affect its cost of capital and consequently its value.

Investment spending by US public firms is highly concentrated. The 100 largest spenders account for 60% of total capital expenditures and drive most of the variation in aggregate investment. This high concentration creates a disconnect between the average public firm and macroeconomic aggregates. For large firms, cash flow remains the primary driver of investment spending and has not declined in importance as it has for smaller public firms. The cash flowing to big spenders provides a better forecast of future investment opportunities than noisy proxies for Tobin's q even though these firms are not financially constrained. These results suggest that, at least for the largest spenders, it is unlikely that measurement error drives the significance of cash flow. Our results are also inconsistent with recent models that predict higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for small young growth firms and suggest that cash flow is still the most important determinant of macroeconomic fluctuations in investment spending.

Aggregate idiosyncratic volatility spiked nearly fivefold during the Internet boom of the late 1990s, dwarfing in magnitude a moderately increasing trend. While some researchers argue that this rise in idiosyncratic risk was the result of changes in the characteristics of public firms, others argue that it was driven by the changing sentiment of irrational traders. We present evidence that the marketwide decline in maturity of the typical public firm can explain most of the increase in firm-specific risk during the Internet boom. Controlling for firm maturity, we find no evidence that investor sentiment drives idiosyncratic risk throughout the Internet boom.

We show that stock market liquidity is an important determinant of the cost of raising external capital. Using a large sample of seasoned equity offerings, we find that, ceteris paribus, investment banks' fees are significantly lower for firms with more liquid stock. We estimate that the difference in the investment banking fee for firms in the most liquid vs. the least liquid quintile is about 101 basis points or 21% of the average investment banking fee in our sample. Our findings suggest that firms can reduce the cost of raising capital by improving the market liquidity of their stock.

Recent studies document both a significant decline in firms’ propensity to pay dividends and a significant increase in firms’ propensity to repurchase shares and issue equity over the past 30 years. In this paper we test whether firms’ net cash disbursements to equity holders have declined in a pattern similar to firms’ propensity to pay dividends. Contrary to the evidence using dividends, we find no evidence that the conditional propensity to distribute net cash to equity holders has declined over the past 3 decades. Surprisingly, we find that, conditional on firm characteristics, net payout yields have been increasing over time.

We provide evidence that the positive relation between firm‐level stock returns and firm‐level return volatility is due to firms’ real options. Consistent with real option theory, we find that the positive volatility‐return relation is much stronger for firms with more real options and that the sensitivity of firm value to changes in volatility declines significantly after firms exercise their real options. We reconcile the evidence at the aggregate and firm levels by showing that the negative relation at the aggregate level may be due to aggregate market conditions that simultaneously affect both market returns and return volatility.

This paper provides a rational explanation for the apparent ability of managers to successfully time the maturity of their debt issues. We show that a structural break in excess bond returns during the early 1980s generates a spurious correlation between the fraction of long‐term debt in total debt issues and future excess bond returns. Contrary to Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) , we show that the presence of structural breaks can lead to nonsense regressions, whether or not there is any small sample bias. Tests using firm‐level data further confirm that managers are unable to time the debt market successfully.

Previous studies have found that the proportion of equity in total new debt and equity issues is negatively correlated with future equity market returns. Researchers have interpreted this finding as evidence that corporate managers are able to predict the systematic component of their stock returns and to issue equity when the market is overvalued. In this article we show that the predictive power of the share of equity in total new issues stems from pseudo‐market timing and not from any abnormal ability of managers to time the equity markets.