Using administrative data from Scandinavian countries, we provide evidence on international migration responses to wealth taxes and evaluate their aggregate economic implications. We find significant migration responses among the wealthy: A 1 percentage point increase in the top wealth tax rate decreases the stock of wealthy taxpayers by about 2 percent. A large fraction of the wealthy are business owners, and their businesses are negatively affected by owner out-migration. The aggregate effects are nevertheless modest: The migration responses to a 1 percentage point increase in the top wealth tax rate reduce employment by 0.02 percent, investments by 0.07 percent, and value added by 0.10 percent.

We investigate long-run earnings responses to taxes in the presence of dynamic returns to effort. First, we develop a theoretical model of earnings determination with dynamic returns to effort. In this model, earnings responses are delayed and mediated by job switches. Second, using administrative data from Denmark, we verify our model's predictions about earnings and hours-worked patterns over the life cycle. Third, we provide a quasi-experimental analysis of long-run earnings elasticities. Informed by our model, the empirical strategy exploits variation among job switchers. We find that the long-run elasticity is around 0.5, considerably larger than the short-run elasticity of roughly 0.2.

To fight evasion, many developing countries use production-inefficient tax policies. This includes minimum tax schemes whereby firms are taxed on either profits or turnover, depending on which tax liability is larger. Such schemes create nonstandard kink points, which allow for eliciting evasion responses to switches between profit and turnover taxes using a bunching approach. Using administrative data on corporations in Pakistan, we estimate that turnover taxes reduce evasion by up to 60–70 percent of corporate income. Incorporating this in a calibrated optimal tax model, we find that switching from profit to turnover taxation increases revenue by 74 percent without reducing aggregate profits.