We show that the currency risk embedded in the benchmarks of international mutual funds negatively affects fund performance. More specifically, a high benchmark-implied currency risk induces funds to invest in markets with less volatile currencies, leading to a higher degree of currency concentration in portfolio holdings. This currency concentration, however, departs from the optimal equity allocation strategy across countries and reduces fund performance. We document that funds resorting to high currency concentrations underperform funds with low currency concentrations by as much as 1%–2% per year.

We investigate how the state's intervention in the investment decisions of Chinese local SOEs is affected by corporate control distance in the form of pyramidal layers and the geographical distance between the SOEs and their government controllers. Although both the corporate control distance and the geographical distance affect the state's costs of acquiring information about the SOEs, the former is created intentionally by the state to delegate decision rights, and the latter is largely exogenous. We find that local SOEs’ investment efficiency is positively associated with the extensiveness of pyramids but negatively related to the geographical distance. The positive impact of pyramid-building on investment efficiency remains strong even when information costs captured by the geographical distance are low. However, the two distance measures lose their impact on investment efficiency when local governments reclaim control through a vertical interlock of chairman. Our results indicate that the credibility of the government's intention to delegate decision rights is vital to the SOEs’ efficiency when government intervention is the norm in China.

The existing literature treats the short side (i.e., short selling) and the long side of hedge fund trading (i.e., fund holdings) independently. The two sides, however, complement each other: opposite changes in the two are likely to be driven by information, whereas simultaneous increases (decreases) of the two may be motivated by hedging (unwinding) considerations. We use this intuition to identify informed demand and document that it exhibits highly significant predictive power over returns (approximately 10% per year). We also find that informed demand forecasts future firm fundamentals, suggesting that hedge funds play an important role in information discovery.

We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.

This article develops a Kalman filter model to track dynamic mutual fund factor loadings. It then uses the estimates to analyze whether managers with market-timing ability can be identified ex ante. The primary findings are as follows: (i) Ordinary least squares (OLS) timing models produce false positives (nonzero alphas) at too high a rate with either daily or monthly data. In contrast, the Kalman filter model produces them at approximately the correct rate with monthly data; (ii) In monthly data, though the OLS models fail to detect any timing among fund managers, the Kalman filter does; (iii) The alpha and beta forecasts from the Kalman model are more accurate than those from the OLS timing models; (iv) The Kalman filter model tracks most fund alphas and betas better than OLS models that employ macroeconomic variables in addition to fund returns.

We hypothesize that social trust, in mitigating contracting incompleteness, may have an important effect on the activeness and effectiveness of delegated portfolio management. Using a complete sample of worldwide open-end mutual funds, we find that trust is positively associated with the activeness of funds and that trust-related active share delivers superior performance (e.g., approximately 2% per year for cross-border investments). Moreover, “trust in the market” and “trust in managers” play important yet different roles for different types of cross-border delegated portfolio management. Our results suggest that trust acts as a fundamental building block for delegated portfolio management.

Can social norms give rise to distorted information in China? We observe that China’s leading social norm related to alcohol consumption and social drinking enhances earnings management. An analysis of toxic alcohol scandals supports a causal interpretation. Further evidence suggests that the influence of alcohol may come from the negative externality that it creates, which is propagated by corporate leaders and cannot be attenuated by market-oriented institutions. Our results reveal a social norm externality that may have important normative implications.

We study how the presence of short sellers affects the incentives of the insiders to trade on negative information. We show it induces insiders to sell more (shares from their existing stakes) and trade faster to preempt the potential competition from short sellers. An experiment and instrumental variable analysis confirm this causal relationship. The effects are stronger for “opportunistic” (i.e., more informed) insider trades and when short sellers׳ attention is high. Return predictability of insider sales only occurs in stocks with high short-selling potential, suggesting that short sellers indirectly enhance the speed of information dissemination by accelerating trading by insiders.

Inspired by the recent health science findings that air pollution affects mental health and cognition, we examine whether air pollution can intensify the cognitive bias observed in the financial markets. Based on a proprietary data set obtained from a large Chinese mutual fund family consisting of complete trading information for more than 773,198 accounts in 247 cities, we find that air pollution significantly increases investors’ disposition effects. Analysis based on two plausible exogenous variations in air quality (the vast dissipation of air pollution caused by strong winds and the Huai River policy) supports a causal interpretation. Mood regulation provides a potential mechanism.

We investigate the patterns and performance of banks’ investments in fintech ventures in the United States. We document that banks, as compared to independent venture capitalists (IVCs), invest a larger proportion in fintech startups and achieve a higher IPO exit rate. The better exit performance is neither explained by banks’ tendency to invest in later-round or larger deals, nor contributed by banks’ following successful peer IVCs. Banks’ outperformance is mainly concentrated in fin-native fintech startups and those whose business operations overlap with banks’ core business segments, which is consistent with the corporate venture capital (CVC) literature and the conjecture that banks possess unique industry expertise that facilitates their selection of fintech startups. In addition, banks participate more on the boards of fintech startups than of other ventures, implying that the better investment performance is not purely driven by selection.