We examine whether directors׳ and officers׳ (D&O) liability insurance affects a firm’s cost of equity. We find a positive association between D&O insurance and the cost of equity. Information quality and risk-taking appear to be two underlying channels through which D&O insurance affects the cost of equity. Further tests suggest that this positive association is not due to optimal risk-taking, as evidenced by a negative market reaction to an increase in D&O insurance coverage, a lack of improvement in firms׳ cash flow and a low valuation associated with high D&O insurance. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the notion that D&O insurance weakens the disciplining effect of shareholder litigation, leading to an increase in the cost of equity.

We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.

Recent studies in the law and finance literature have shown that property rights protection is central to corporate financing and investment decisions and economic growth at large. We extend this literature by examining the effect of property rights security on corporate risk management decisions — an important element of a firm's business strategy. Using a unique dataset covering over 55,000 Chinese firms and employing both institution- and firm-level measures of property rights security, we find that secure property rights lead to higher corporate demand for property insurance, suggesting that property rights security is an important determinant of corporate risk management decisions. The effect of property rights protection on insurance consumption is also validated by a cross-country analysis that uses data from 93 countries over the period 1995–2008. Our study sheds light on the importance of property rights protection to corporate risk management decisions.

Mutual funds have emerged and rapidly developed since 2000 in China. This study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds’ ownership on firm performance in China, using a large sample for the period of 2001–2005. We find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance. The result is robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations. Our finding supports recent regulatory efforts in China to promote mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests that pooling diffuse minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via mutual funds is beneficial.

We show that installing stronger risk management into financial institutions—a proposal widely discussed following the 2008 financial crisis—is insufficient to constrain institutions’ exposure to investment with lurking risk, such as asset-backed securities (ABS). Regulations affect the functioning of risk management: risk management constrains institutions’ exposure to risky ABS when they face mark-to-market reporting combined with capital requirements; however, this role is considerably weaker when capital requirements are combined with historical cost accounting. We find suggestive evidence that financial regulations affect risk management functions through promoting risk managers’ efforts in uncovering ABS risk and curbing executives’ incentives to take excessive risk. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

This paper examines the incentive effects of a mandatory personal deductible in liability insurance contracts for directors and officers (D&Os). Exploiting a novel German law that mandates personal deductibles for executives, we document positive returns for affected firms around the first announcement of the plan to impose a personal deductible. We also find evidence of long-run effects: affected firms decrease risk taking in operational activities and financial reporting, and improve the quality of takeover decisions. Our study shows that the structure of D&O insurance contracts matters because mandating that D&Os have “skin in the game” appears to lead to real effects on firm value.

Despite a longstanding debate over the pros and cons of imposing legal liability on directors and officers (D&Os), there is limited evidence on how D&O liability affects corporate innovation. We study this question by exploiting Nevada's 2001 corporate law change that dramatically lowered D&O legal liability and helped Nevada become the second most popular state for out-of-state incorporations. We find that firms incorporated in Nevada exhibit an increase in innovation outputs relative to matched control firms after the law change, particularly firms facing higher litigation risk or operating in more innovative industries. The results are driven mainly by exchange-listed firms that are subject to better governance than over-the-counter (OTC) listed firms. Lower D&O liability also enables firms to pursue more risky, but potentially more rewarding, explorative innovation. Therefore, although holding D&Os liable may be desirable overall, it also entails a cost by discouraging innovation in some firms. Our study has implications for how the litigation environment may influence sustainable growth via innovation.

We document that firms prefer counties with higher ethnic diversity in locating their interstate investments, especially for those pursuing innovation, seeking to establish service centers, or managing a diverse workforce. We also find some evidence that interstate investment in high ethnic diversity locations results in increased patent applications, sales growth, positive media coverage, and overall operating performance. Taken together, we show that firms prefer to invest in ethnically diverse locations as they recognize the potential benefits of leveraging a diverse labor supply, such as enhancing problem-solving, innovation, and performance. We must recognize that difference is a reason for celebration and growth, rather than a reason for destruction. (Audre Lorde)

We use China as a laboratory to test the effect of government quality on cash holdings. We build on, and extend, the existing literature on government expropriation and its interaction with firm-level agency problems by proposing a financial constraint mitigation argument. We find that firms hold less cash when local government quality is high, which is not consistent with the state expropriation argument, but supports the financial constraint mitigation argument. A good government lowers the investment sensitivity to cash flows and cash sensitivity to cash flows, decreases cash holdings more significantly in private firms, and improves access to bank and trade credit financing. We also test and find support for Stulz's (2005) model on the interaction between government and firm agency problems.

During the 2020–2021 “AAPI Hate,” mutual funds led by female managers perceived as East Asian underperformed relative to other female managers. This effect is stronger in states with higher anti-Asian animus, among more actively managed funds, and when these managers hold sole or senior roles. Factors concurrent with COVID-19, including childcare challenges, concerns for overseas families, marketplace and workplace discrimination, and exposure to the Chinese economy, cannot explain the effect. Underperformance is traceable to poor stock picking due to impairments in generating private information. Racial-ethnic animosity, even outside workplace or marketplace, hinders productivity and decision-making in high-skill professions.