ABSTRACT Prevailing theories in finance and economics suggest that leases and debt are substitutes; an increase in one should led to a compensating decrease in the other. In particular, there are three views on the magnitude of the substitution coefficient. Standard finance theory treats cash flows from lease obligations as equivalent to debt cash flows, thus describing the tradeoff between debt and leases as one‐to‐one. Others are willing to use a tradeoff of leases for debt which is less than, but close to, one. The rationale for a dollar of leases using less of debt capacity than a dollar of debt obligation is based upon the differences in the terms and nature of lease and debt contracts. Finally, there are some who argue that since leased assets may be firm‐specific, the risk of moral hazard may be great, resulting in a tradeoff of greater than one‐to‐one; that is, a dollar of a lease obligation uses more of debt capacity than a dollar of a debt obligation. A series of empirical tests are performed in this study on samples of approximately 600 firms, covering the years 1976 through 1981, with none of the three views supported by the results. Instead, the results indicate that leases and debt are complements; greater use of debt is associated with a greater use of leasing. This finding reappears consistently for each year, each definition of leverage ratios, and each approach to analysis. This complementary relationship persists even after refinements are made to the estimation technique.

A two-stage stock-financed merger occurs when an acquiring firm first issues shares, and then engages in a cash acquisition shortly afterward. Such deals allow us to test two important hypotheses derived from decoupling: by clienteles via segmentation and by time. The acquirer's value is maximized by selling shares to investors preferring to hold them, and use the raised cash to pay the target shareholders (the decoupling by clienteles hypothesis). Two-stage deals also provide an option to the acquirers by allowing them to decouple their own shares from the correlated target's shares by issuing at an earlier date and wait for good acquisition opportunities (the time decoupling hypothesis). We find empirical evidence in support of both hypotheses.

This paper attempts to shed some light on the role of financial sector policies in generating new knowledge, drawing on the experience of one of the fastest growing and largest developing countries. Using time series data for India over the period 1963–2005, the results indicate that interest rate restraints help generate ideas. Other financial repressionist policies, in the form of high reserve and liquidity requirements, as well as significant directed credit controls, appear to have a dampening effect on ideas production. These results lend some support to the argument that some form of financial sector reforms may help stimulate economic growth via increasing technological innovation.

We demonstrate that existing differences in financial development between countries can be explained by the cumulative variations in their levels of state experience since 1AD. This dimension of early historical development has not been considered so far in studies that analyze the determinants of financial development. The estimation allows for all major theories established in the literature as possible explanations for the disparity of financial development across the globe. Significance of state antiquity is robust to the use of alternative indicators of financial development, the consideration of different lengths and periods of statehood, and controlling for a range of variables or country characteristics. Our results highlight the important role of statehood in propelling financial system development, and thus provide some support to the view that historically determined differences in the early-start developmental advantage provide the basis for explaining the fundamental sources of variations in financial development between countries today.

James S. Ang, Kiritkumar A. Patel, Bond Rating Methods: Comparison and Validation, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 30, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, San Francisco, California, December 28-30, 1974 (May, 1975), pp. 631-640

Managers prefer investors who share similar expectations of their firms' prospects. Instead of taking the distribution of investor types as given, we investigate the question of how the managers may be able to effect a change in the pattern of ownership in a world where outside shareholders hold heterogeneous expectations. Under the requirements that the mechanism is costless to the firm and involves no initial cash transfer among the shareholders, the solution is a menu of securities in the form of sidebets among the shareholders. Ex post, the mechanism allows the high-valuation investors to own a greater proportion of the firm and be rewarded with a greater share of the firm's wealth gains.

We provide empirical evidence on the conjecture that in economic crises, firms could be forced to sell at deep discounts, or fire sale prices. Using the conventional stock price near the announcement date, we find instead distressed firms in crisis periods receive a 30% higher offer premium than distressed firms in normal periods; they also receive a 34% higher premium than non-distressed firms in crisis periods. Acquirers also do not gain, at announcement and over the long-term. Acquirers, however, may perceive they realize fire sale discounts if the reference is the targets’ highest price in the previous 52weeks.

We find, in a sample of 7581 merger offer announcements from 1990 to 2013, shareholders of 1283 (or 17%) target firms responded to the offer with negative market returns. These investors were disappointed at the offer, despite the price premium. To explain their disappointment, one must understand how target shareholders form expectations of premium to be received. We use a novel empirical design to find the relative weights of the rational vs. behavioral factors underlying the process of expectation formation. The estimated expected premiums are shown to have predictive power in the subsamples of both the positive and negative market responses. We also compare how the weights of the expectation factors change under different market conditions: hot vs. cold M&A regimes, bull vs. bear stock market, financial crisis vs. non-crisis periods, and dotcom bubble vs. no bubble.