Social psychology research suggests that management groups under greater external pressure are more prone to groupthink (i.e., a tendency to reach premature consensus), leading to greater performance volatility. To isolate the group dynamics channel, we focus on the pressure management faces from largely uninformed and dissatisfied non-blockholders. Consistent with the groupthink view, we find that non-blockholder dissatisfaction is positively associated with performance volatility, which is further corroborated by tests addressing omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In addition, the baseline relationship is stronger in firms with greater interaction among directors, more powerful CEOs, and less diverse boards. Our findings suggest that non-blockholder dissatisfaction heightens performance volatility by exacerbating groupthink.

This study examines the impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on audit fees. We first build an analytical audit fee model to analyze the impact on audit fees for the change in both audit complexity and financial reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption. We then test the model's predictions using audit fee data from European Union countries that mandated IFRS adoption in 2005. We find that mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase in audit fees. We also find that the IFRS-related audit fee premium increases with the increase in audit complexity brought about by IFRS adoption, and decreases with the improvement in financial reporting quality arising from IFRS adoption. Finally, we find some evidence that the IFRS-related audit fee premium is lower in countries with stronger legal regimes. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. Data availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996–2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

We investigate whether credit default swap (CDS) trading results in managers learning new information through stock prices that is relevant to their investment and forecasting decisions. We argue that the CDS market structure, the sophistication of CDS market participants, and the cleanness of CDS spreads as a signal of default risk together produce and convey information that is new to managers of firms referenced in CDS contracts. We consider two measures for managerial learning: (1) the sensitivity of managerial investments to share prices and (2) the sensitivity of changes in management forecast accuracy to stock returns. We find that both sensitivity measures increase significantly when firms are referenced in any traded CDS contracts, indicating that CDS trading improves managerial learning. We also find that the improvement in managerial learning is more pronounced for firms that are subject to higher uncertainty in industry‐specific and economy‐wide prospects, consistent with the view that CDS market participants have informational advantages with respect to the industry‐level and macroeconomic environments. We further find that the improvement in managerial learning is more evident for firms with higher credit risk. Our findings provide large‐sample evidence on a positive consequence of CDS trading in the context of managers' ability to learn from outside investors.

Using the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's mandate of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) as a natural experiment, this study investigates whether and how the decreased information‐processing costs brought about by XBRL influence firms’ breadth of share ownership. We find that the XBRL mandate is associated with an increase in the total number of a firm's shareholders. This finding is consistent with the notion that XBRL facilitates a more transparent environment and decreases information‐processing costs, thereby attracting more shareholders in general. More interestingly, we find that while XBRL adoption is associated with an increase in share ownership of individual and non‐U.S. foreign institutional investors, it is associated with a decrease in share ownership of U.S. domestic institutional investors. Further evidence shows that this asymmetric shift in share ownership is more pronounced for more complex firms. Our findings, taken together, suggest that the decreased information‐processing costs brought about by XBRL help firms establish a level playing field by reducing the information disadvantages of individual and foreign institutional investors over domestic institutional investors. Our results are robust to potential endogeneity concerns and alternative research designs.

This study examines the association between chief executive officer ( CEO ) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value ( NPV ) projects as value creating. They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEO s have higher stock price crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEO s. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies.

We examine the relation between short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk. To establish causality, we take advantage of a regulatory change from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Regulation SHO pilot program, which temporarily lifted short-sale constraints for randomly designated stocks. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment setting in which to apply a difference-in-differences research design, we find that the lifting of short-sale constraints leads to a significant decrease in stock price crash risk. We further investigate the possible underlying mechanisms through which short-sale constraints affect stock price crash risk. We provide evidence suggesting that lifting of short-sale constraints reduces crash risk by constraining managerial bad news hoarding and improving corporate investment efficiency. The results of our study shed new light on the cause of stock price crash risk as well as the roles that short sellers play in monitoring managerial disclosure strategies and real investment decisions.

This study examines the effect of downstream firms’ (i.e., customers’) risk factor disclosures contained in annual reports on the investment efficiency of upstream firms (i.e., suppliers). We find that more informative disclosures of customers’ risk factors are associated with less under‐ or overinvestment by suppliers. In addition, this inverse association is stronger when the suppliers are at a bargaining disadvantage, when they operate in the durable goods industries, and when they are more concerned about the volatility of future demand. Overall, our results suggest that risk factor disclosures provided by firms in their annual reports contain useful information that could potentially help their suppliers achieve better investment efficiency. Divulgation d'information sur les facteurs de risque des clients et efficience de l'investissement des fournisseurs