We identify two opposing effects of issuing equity with tag-along rights that secure an equal price in the event of a takeover. First, the anti-self dealing effect commits controlling owners to sell only to new owners that increase shareholder value. Second, the rent transfer effect shifts rents to existing unprotected minority owners. The institutional setting in Brazil's stock market allows us to test this trade-off. We find that announcements of tag-along rights are associated with an average cumulative abnormal return of around 5%, and that the probability of issuing shares with tag-along rights increases with the cost of self-dealing and decreases in the share of existing unprotected minority investors. Overall, our analysis confirms that private contracting can mitigate the economic costs associated with the inadequate legal protection of investors in emerging markets.

Exploiting the unique institutional setting of Hong Kong’s real estate market, we uncover a curious ripple effect of haunted houses on the prices of nearby houses. Prices drop on average 20% for units that become haunted, 10% for units on the same floor, 7% for units in the same block, and 1% for units in the same estate. Our study makes two contributions. First, we provide an estimate of a large negative spillover on prices caused by a quality shock. Second, we find that the demand shock rather than the fire sale supply shock explains most of the spillover.

We study whether personal experiences are so powerful that they make individuals actively shy away from risk. Our research design relies on portfolio decisions relating to inheritances, which alter the active decision from one of choosing to take risk to one of choosing to reduce risk. Experience derives from investments in banks that defaulted following the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We classify experiences into first-hand experiences, resulting from personal losses; second-hand experiences, from losses of family members; and third-hand experiences, from locations where banks defaulted. Our results demonstrate that experiences gained personally, not common shocks, make individuals shy away from risk.

Empirical studies of large publicly traded firms have shown a robust negative relationship between board size and firm performance. The evidence on small and medium-sized firms is less clear; we show that existing work has been incomplete in analyzing the causal relationship due to weak identification strategies. Using a rich data set of almost 7000 closely held corporations we provide a causal analysis of board size effects on firm performance: We use a novel instrument given by the number of children of the chief executive officer (CEO) of the firms. First, we find a strong positive correlation between family size and board size and show this correlation to be driven by firms where the CEO’s relatives serve on the board. Second, we find empirical evidence of a small adverse board size effect driven by the minority of small and medium-sized firms that are characterized by having comparatively large boards of six or more members.

We test whether forecast bias affects household stock trading by combining measures of bias elicited in laboratory experiments with administrative trade-level data. On average, subjects exhibit positive forecast bias (i.e., extrapolators), while a large minority exhibit negative forecast bias (i.e., contrarians). Forecast bias is positively associated with past excess returns of stocks that are purchased: Extrapolators (contrarians) purchase past winners (losers). Forecast bias is negatively associated with the capital gains of stocks that are sold. Furthermore, forecast bias explains investor heterogeneity in the relation between market returns and net flows to stocks. Overall, our study provides evidence of a common mechanism – forecast bias – that links past returns to trading decisions for purchases, sales, and net flows.

We build an empirical model to attribute delays in mortgage refinancing to psychological costs inhibiting refinancing until incentives are sufficiently strong; and behavior, potentially attributable to information-gathering costs, lowering the probability of household refinancing per unit time at any incentive. We estimate the model on administrative panel data from Denmark, where mortgage refinancing without cash-out is unconstrained. Middle-aged and wealthy households act as if they have high psychological refinancing costs; but older, poorer, and less-educated households refinance with lower probability irrespective of incentives, thereby achieving lower savings. We use the model to understand frictions in the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission.