We characterize infrequent durables stock adjustment by consumers who also derive utility from non-durable consumption flows in the presence of idiosyncratic income uncertainty. The data we analyse include subjective future income uncertainty measures, which we use as instruments in the estimation of relevant parameters of heterogeneous consumers' dynamic adjustment problems. The data feature two conceptually distinct sources of variation: cross-sectional heterogeneity of the sampled households' dynamic problems, and history-dependent heterogeneity in their situation during the observation period. We note that the latter should affect the likelihood but not the size of stock adjustment decisions, and find broad support for theoretical predictions in formal selection-controlled regressions based on this insight.

We propose a new approach to identify the strength of the precautionary motive and the extent of self-insurance in response to earnings risk based on Euler equation estimates. To address endogeneity problems, we use Norwegian administrative data and instrument consumption and earnings volatility with the variance of firm-specific shocks. The instrument is valid because firms pass some of their productivity shocks onto wages; moreover, for most workers, firm shocks are hard to avoid. Our estimates suggest a coefficient of relative prudence of 2, in a very plausible range.

The empirical evidence on rational inattention lags the theoretical developments: micro evidence on one of the most immediate consequences of observation costs––the infrequent observation of state variables––is not available in standard datasets. We contribute to filling the gap using new household surveys. To match these data we modify existing models, shifting the focus from nondurable to durable consumption. The model features both observation and transaction costs and implies a mixture of time-dependent and state-dependent rules. Numerical simulations explain the frequencies of trading and observation of the median investor with small observation costs and larger transaction costs.

A theory of the optimal number of banking relationships is developed and tested using matched bank‐firm data. According to the theory, relationship banks may be unable to continue funding profitable projects owing to internal problems and a firm may thus have to refinance from nonrelationship banks. The latter, however, face an adverse selection problem, as they do not know the quality of the project, and may refuse to lend. In these circumstances, multiple banking can reduce the probability of an early liquidation of the project. The empirical evidence supports the predictions of the model.

We evaluate the allocation of risk between firms and their workers using matched employer‐employee panel data. Unlike previous contributions, this paper focuses on idiosyncratic shocks to the firm, which are the correct empirical counterpart of the theoretical notion of diversifiable risk. We allow for both temporary and permanent shocks to output and find that firms absorb temporary fluctuations fully but insure workers against permanent shocks only partially. Risk‐sharing considerations can account for about 15 percent of overall earnings variability, the remainder originating from idiosyncratic shocks to individual workers. Our welfare calculations indicate that firms are an important vehicle of insurance provision.

We provide a systematic analysis of the properties of individual returns to wealth using 12 years of population data from Norway's administrative tax records. We document a number of novel results. First, individuals earn markedly different average returns on their net worth (a standard deviation of 22.1%) and on its components. Second, heterogeneity in returns does not arise merely from differences in the allocation of wealth between safe and risky assets: returns are heterogeneous even within narrow asset classes. Third, returns are positively correlated with wealth: moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the net worth distribution increases the return by 18 percentage points (and 10 percentage points if looking at net‐of‐tax returns). Fourth, individual wealth returns exhibit substantial persistence over time. We argue that while this persistence partly arises from stable differences in risk exposure and assets scale, it also reflects heterogeneity in sophistication and financial information, as well as entrepreneurial talent. Finally, wealth returns are correlated across generations. We discuss the implications of these findings for several strands of the wealth inequality debate.

Lacking a long time series on the assets of the very wealthy, Saez and Zucman (2015) use US tax records to obtain estimates of wealth holdings by capitalizing asset income from tax returns. They document marked upward trends in wealth concentration. We use data on tax returns and actual wealth holdings from tax records for the whole Norwegian population to test the robustness of the methodology. We document that measures of wealth based on the capitalization approach can lead to misleading conclusions about the level and the dynamics of wealth inequality if returns are heterogeneous and even moderately correlated with wealth.

We examine the effects of mandatory board gender quotas on unregulated firms that are connected to regulated ones via interlocking directorates. After the introduction of quotas, connected firms significantly increase their share of female directors relative to similar unconnected firms. The spillover effects are substantial — at least as large as the direct effects on regulated firms, challenging previous claims that quotas have no broader impact on women in business. Our results suggest that quotas indirectly broaden the supply of candidates for connected firms, along dimensions that include, but are not limited to, gender.

Exploiting portfolio data and repeated surveys of an Italian bank's clients, we test whether investors’ risk aversion increases following the 2008 crisis. We find that, after the crisis, both qualitative and quantitative measures of risk aversion increase substantially and that affected individuals divest more stock. We investigate four explanations: changes in wealth, expected income, perceived probabilities, and emotion-based changes of the utility function. Our data are inconsistent with the first two channels, while they suggest that fear is a potential mechanism underlying financial decisions, whether by increasing the curvature of the utility function or the salience of negative outcomes.

We study which dimensions of corporate culture are related to a firm׳s performance and why. We find that proclaimed values appear irrelevant. Yet, when employees perceive top managers as trustworthy and ethical, a firm׳s performance is stronger. We then study how different governance structures impact the ability to sustain integrity as a corporate value. We find that publicly traded firms are less able to sustain it. Traditional measures of corporate governance do not seem to have much of an impact.